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ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX432 MCN = 90024/41843 TOR = 900242357
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS2317 0242356-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS

HEADER

P
242356Z JAN 90
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE

P
242340Z JAN 90
FM CIA

TO RUETIAA/DIRNSA
RUEHC/DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
RUCIAEA/FTD WPAFB OH
BT

CONTROLS

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NOFORN

[Redacted]

WNINTEL

SECTION 1 OF 2
CITE CIA 022948

SERIAL: [Redacted]

(b)(3)

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC); STATE FOR INR.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL--NOFORN-- [redacted] DIST: 24 JANUARY 1990

(b)(1) (b)(3)

COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJ: 1. EVOLUTION OF THE MIKOYAN DESIGN BUREAU SINCE 1970'S 2. INTRODUCTION OF MIG-25

DOI: [redacted]

(b)(1) (b)(3)

SOURCE: [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING THE DEFECTION OF LT. VIKTOR BELENKO WITH HIS MIG-25 BASIC INTERCEPTOR, THE MIKOYAN DESIGN BUREAU DEBATED THE FEASIBILITY OF CANCELLING PRODUCTION ON THIS VERSATILE AIRCRAFT. THE

PRIMARY REASONS FOR KEEPING THIS TWO TRACK PRODUCTION EFFORT-- DEVELOPMENT OF A HIGH PERFORMANCE HIGH-MACH INTERCEPTOR, AND DEVELOPMENT OF A TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT--OPERATING INCLUDED

PERCEIVED THREATS ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE U.S. B-70 BOMBER, SR-71 HIGH ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, AND BECAUSE OF THE MIG-25'S PROVEN EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST ADVANCED STRATEGIC AIR LAUNCH MISSILES. MIG-25 PRODUCTION LINES WERE ALSO KEPT OPERATING TO ACQUIRE WELDING AND STEEL FABRICATION TECHNOLOGIES DERIVED FROM THIS BASIC RESEARCH EFFORT.

[redacted] U.S. INTENTIONS TO DEVELOP MACH FOUR AND ABOVE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WILL BE COUNTERED BY THE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT OF FOLLOW-ON AIRCRAFT TO THE MIG-31 OR SOME OTHER TYPE OF ADVANCED AIRCRAFT WITH MORE SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT.

(b)(1) (b)(3)

TEXT: 1. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1) (b)(3)

THE MIG-25 WAS DEVELOPED PRIMARILY TO COUNTER THE PERCEIVED THREAT

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FROM THE UNITED STATES' B-70 BOMBER. [REDACTED] WHEN (b)(1)
 THE B-70 PROGRAM WAS CANCELLED, THE MIG-25 PROGRAM WAS RETAINED (b)(3)
 BECAUSE OF ITS DEMONSTRATED EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST THE U.S. HIGH
 ALTITUDE SR-71 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. [REDACTED] SR-71 (b)(1)
 INCURSIONS INTO RESTRICTED AIRSPACE OVER THE SOVIET UNION WERE OFTEN (b)(3)
 REBUFFED BY THE LAUNCH OF MIG-25'S WHICH FORCED SR-71'S TO RETREAT
 FROM THEIR SURVEILLANCE PATTERNS OVER SOVIET TERRITORY. [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] MIG-25'S WERE DESIGNED TO SHOOT DOWN HOUND-DOG (b)(1)
 MISSILES THAT WERE BEING CARRIED BY B-52 LONG RANGE BOMBERS. (b)(3)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)
 COMMENT: [REDACTED] THE MIG-25 PROGRAM WAS RETAINED (b)(3)
 BECAUSE IT PROVIDED EXCELLENT DEFENSE AGAINST ADVANCED STRATEGIC AIR (b)(3)
 LAUNCH MISSILES (ASALM), BUT THIS REFERENCE APPEARS TO BE SOMEWHAT (b)(3)
 IN

ERROR SINCE THE TIME FRAME FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ASALM PROGRAM
 DOES NOT APPEAR TO COINCIDE WITH THE EVOLUTION OF THE MIG-25.)

[REDACTED] THE MIG-25 PROGRAM WAS ALSO KEPT GOING FOR (b)(1)
 TECHNOLOGY DERIVED FROM IT. PERFECTED WELDING TECHNIQUES AND STEEL (b)(3)
 FABRICATION PROCESSES UNDER THE PROGRAM ARE STILL BEING UTILIZED
 THROUGHOUT HEAVY INDUSTRY IN THE USSR.

2. THE MIG-25 PROGRAM, [REDACTED] WAS A (b)(1)
 TWO-TRACK (b)(3)
 PRODUCTION EFFORT DESIGNED TO DEVELOP A HIGH PERFORMANCE HIGH-MACH
 INTERCEPTOR, AND A TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
 THE SEPTEMBER 1976 DEFECTION OF LIEUTENANT VIKTOR ((BELENKO)) IN A (b)(3)
 MIG-25 BASIC INTERCEPTOR, [REDACTED] AFTER THE AIRCRAFT (b)(1)
 WAS TAKEN APART AND REASSEMBLED IN JAPAN BY THE U.S., IT WAS SHIPPED (b)(3)
 BACK TO THE SOVIET UNION WHERE THE MIKOYAN DESIGN BUREAU PROMPTLY
 DISASSEMBLED IT TO DETERMINE THE TYPE OF INFORMATION THAT THE U.S.
 COULD HAVE OBTAINED FROM ITS INVESTIGATION. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)

3. [REDACTED] THE CAPABILITY OF THE (b)(1)
 MIG-31, WHICH [REDACTED] WAS BUILT ON THE BASIS OF TECHNOLOGY (b)(1)
 INHERENT IN THE MIG-25. [REDACTED] THE MIG-31 WOULD (b)(1)
 PROBABLY BE FORMIDABLE AGAINST MOST SYSTEMS, ALTHOUGH UNMANNED (b)(3)
 SYSTEMS COULD POSE PROBLEMS FOR THE INTERCEPTOR. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] WHETHER OR NOT MIG-31'S OR FOLLOW-ONS WOULD BE (b)(3)
 NECESSARY IN THE FUTURE GIVEN THE RETIREMENT OF THE U.S. SR-71
 PROGRAM, [REDACTED] U.S. DEVELOPMENT OF (b)(1)
 MACH FOUR AND MACH FIVE MANNED AIRCRAFT FOR USE AS RECONNAISSANCE (b)(3)
 AIRCRAFT [REDACTED] THAT TYPE OF PERCEIVED THREAT FROM THE (b)(1)
 U.S WOULD HAVE TO BE COUNTERED. [REDACTED] SOVIET (b)(1)
 [REDACTED] (b)(3)

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RESPONSE TO THIS NEW THREAT TO BE IN THE FORM OF FOLLOW-ON TO THE MIG-31 OR SOMETHING SIMILAR UTILIZING MORE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.

[redacted] MACH FOUR OR MACH FIVE IS ABOUT AS HIGH AS MAN CAN GO (b)(1)
USING CARBON BASED FUELS SUCH AS NATURAL GAS, AND TO GO UP FASTER (b)(3)
THAN MACH FIVE, ONE WOULD HAVE TO USE DIFFERENT FUELS SUCH AS
HYDROGEN.

4. [redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] STATUS OF THE MODIFIED TUPOLEV AIRCRAFT BEING EQUIPPED TO
USE HYDROGEN FUEL. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] THIS PROJECT IS STRICTLY A (b)(3)
TUPOLEV DESIGN BUREAU UNDERTAKING AND [redacted] TSAGI HAS NOTHING (b)(1)

TO DO WITH IT. [redacted] THE (b)(1)
FIRST PROTOTYPE VERSION OF THIS AIRCRAFT WAS SCHEDULED TO BE TEST (b)(3)
FLOWN SOMETIME IN LATE 1989. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(3)
[redacted] IT IS (b)(3)
HISTORICALLY CUSTOMARY FOR TSAGI TO BE INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN THIS
TYPE OF WORK.)

5. [redacted] TSAGI IS THE LARGEST INSTITUTE OF (b)(1)
ITS KIND IN THE SOVIET UNION--PRESUMABLY THE LARGEST RESEARCH (b)(3)
INSTITUTE. ON THE ISSUE OF TSAGI CONVERTING SOME OF ITS CAPABILITIES
AND FACILITIES TO CIVILIAN ENDEAVORS, [redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] HAD CONVERTED TO CIVILIAN PROGRAMS IN A LIMITED FASHION. (b)(3)
[redacted] COMMENT: PRESUMABLY, TSAGI, SINCE IT IS A BASIC RESEARCH (b)(1)
INSTITUTE, HAS LESS TO DO WITH CONVERSION SINCE ITS TECHNOLOGY WOULD (b)(3)
BE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO ALL AREAS. THERE MAY STILL BE PARTIAL
CONVERSION, PERHAPS AWAY FROM MILITARY SYSTEMS OR HIGH GRAVITATIONAL
SYSTEMS, TO CONSUMER OR CIVILIAN PRODUCTION.)

ADMIN

[redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] (b)(3)

WARNING: REPORT CLASS S E C R E T --WARNING NOTICE-
INTELLIGENCE

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SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED--

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND
CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENTS. END OF MESSAGE SECRET.

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