

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

Os--

All of us in the DDI who have been connected with this problem wholeheartedly endorse the recommendation in the attached. I suggest that you take the bull by the horns and go ahead.


Ed Proctor

27 August 1971
(DATE)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	<i>C/SSE</i>		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks:			
<i>Pls. study & let me have your views.</i>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
<i>Executive Officer</i> <i>[Signature]</i>			30 AUG 1971
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions

(40)

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DDI - 7E44 HQ	27 Aug	
2			
3			
4			

(b)(3)

Remarks:

Attached is a study by Walter Pforzheimer on the Agency's capability to deal retroactively with security leaks. It concludes that we are poorly prepared to undertake a crash study of these leaks against the deadline, and it recommends a centralized Agency leak file, preferably in the Office of Security. I think that the recommendation is a good one if there is reason to believe that we will continue over long periods to have very high level interest and concern with the subject. The procedure would be somewhat costly and demand conscientious compliance by all parts of the Agency.

Ed -
 I think this is a good suggestion.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE
H. C. EISENBEISS, D/CRS 2E60 HQ		27 Aug
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions

GPO : 1968 O - 297-542

(40)

DDI-2038-71

20 August 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director Central Reference Service

SUBJECT : Intelligence Security Leaks

1. During the week of 9 August 1971, CIA was called upon by the White House to make a crash study of intelligence security leaks in the press during the Nixon Administration. The study was to be limited to two newspapers, The New York Times and The Washington Post. The original request required a reading of every page of those two newspapers from 20 January 1969 to date. Subsequently, Mr. Osborn, Director of Security, met with David Young, of the White House staff, who agreed to modify the requirement to allow CIA to use its clipping files rather than to undertake a page by page reading of the newspapers themselves. Further, the Indochina war was excluded, and virtually no attention was focused on leaks involving DDP activities. In essence, the study concerned itself with leaks on the Warsaw Pact nations, China, and the Arab-Israeli confrontation. Mr. Helms forwarded the resultant study to Mr. Ehrlichman at the White House on 16/17 August. Approximately 191 leaks were selected as containing significant disclosures. It is doubtful that any were inadvertent.

2. Most of the major leaks are in the field of Soviet weaponry, overhead reconnaissance and communications intelligence, so responsibility for this study was placed on John Paisley, Acting Chief, Office of Strategic Research. On 11 August, Mr. Young, of Mr. Ehrlichman's staff, sent a list of 19 categories to Mr. Paisley "of the kinds of information we would hope to be able to gather." A copy of this list is attached. The resultant effort leads me to make certain comments and suggestions which you may wish to forward to the DDI for further consideration.

3. The first question one must consider is what is a "leak." Presumably, from our standpoint, a "leak" is any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, or disclosure of intelligence estimates, reports, studies, facts or figures which would tend to reveal either intelligence sources or methods or the extent of our information on a given subject. An added difficulty is determining which are authorized "leaks" as opposed to unauthorized "leaks." Unfortunately, the majority of authorized "leaks" are often as damaging as the unauthorized "leaks," if not more so, because of the access to classified material by those who feel they are authorized to leak.

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

4. There were several Agency elements in a position to contribute to this special White House study.

(a) Office of Strategic Research (OSR). For some time now, OSR has maintained some sort of file on security leaks in their subject area. These have dealt largely with Soviet weaponry and other military strengths, as well as with the SALT talks. Recently, OSR has undertaken the quick scanning of The New York Times and The Washington Post for leaks each morning in order to send the DDI an evaluation, if possible, prior to the DCI's nine o'clock meeting. In forwarding their note to the DDI, OSR usually tears out the article and attaches it to their comment. In many instances, they do not keep a copy of the article in their own files, but merely retain an annotated card listing. Therefore, for the present study they often did not have the original article and had to look at a copy elsewhere. (The CIA Library reproduced 50-60 articles for this purpose). Nor were OSR's own card listings by any means complete, but were supplemented by HIC and Security in connection with this study.

The original classified material which formed the basis of the leak was, or might have been, identified at the time the leak occurred. Thus, it could be pointed out that a specific leak originated from a specific issue of the Current Intelligence Bulletin or a National Intelligence Estimate or a special study. There have been at least two recent incidents where members of the Agency have responded to perfectly legitimate telephone requests for information from officials outside the Agency who were entitled to it; but when supplied to these officials, the information has almost immediately turned up in the press. Nevertheless, OSR has not maintained many notes of the documentary origins for these leaks, particularly those originating from CIA material. To go back and try to reconstruct these origins now would be a major undertaking.

(b) Office of Security (OS). OS maintains some files on leaks. While I have not seen these files, I gather they are by no means complete. I believe that OS' strongest files are those involving CIA personnel who have been blown in the public media. In addition, where there has been a major leak calling for investigation of possible source, OS has often made an analysis of the

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

origins of the leak against a particular document or documents, as well as trying to ascertain the source. I do not believe that OS was a major source of information for the present study, although they made some contribution.

(c) Office of the Assistant to the DCI. Mr. Goodwin's office has the Agency responsibility for the reading of a considerable number of newspapers (plus the press clippings on CIA which they receive from a press clipping service). They also cover a few major periodicals and receive pertinent extracts of radio and TV interviews from an outside service. In addition, HIC and the CIA Library cover a few foreign newspapers and periodicals, as well as additional domestic periodicals, for information for HIC's files as well as for Mr. Goodwin's files and dissemination. Unfortunately, Mr. Goodwin's files, by and large, are not useful for a crash study on security leaks. Except for articles on CIA personnel which are filed in folders under the name of the person mentioned, it is usually necessary to have a specific date in order to retrieve a given article from the Goodwin files. While there is a certain amount of area or subject (Green Berets, National Student Association, Pentagon Papers) breakdown, everything is filed chronologically and in such bulk as to make a search of these files time consuming in the absence of a given date. Basically they do not have any files dealing with leaks as such, and they were able to contribute hardly anything to the present study.

(d) Historical Intelligence Collection (HIC). HIC maintains extensive clipping files of an historical nature, both on CIA and intelligence. (HIC has virtually the only Agency clippings for the period 1942-50). It places considerable emphasis on the reporting of major espionage cases. HIC receives the daily package of xeroxed clippings from Mr. Goodwin's office, incorporating pertinent ones into its files. It also covers certain British language newspapers and some American and foreign periodicals for material of interest to HIC. Some of these clippings which would appear to have a wider interest are given to Mr. Goodwin for his daily dissemination. HIC files its clippings generally on a broad subject base, i. e., Overhead Reconnaissance; Comint; Great Britain: Official Secrets Act; and within these specialized categories they are filed by date.

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

- 4 -

HIC also keeps generalized clippings under an area breakdown such as USSR, China and Cuba. These clippings are on various aspects of intelligence in those areas and not on pure substantive information. HIC also maintains a broad selection of clippings in the "General" category dealing with references in the public media to CIA and intelligence that are more generalized than those in specific category files. However, it should be noted that HIC does not file clippings under a "leak" category but simply has them in the files appropriate to the given subject, such as Overhead Reconnaissance. Because of the superior accessibility, content, and breakdown of the HIC clipping files, the two analysts [redacted] who wrote the study reviewed appropriate categories of HIC's clippings. Mr. Paisley advised the DDI that "In particular, the files maintained in the Historical Intelligence Collection were heavily used." One of the analysts told me they had found "about 75" useful articles here with which they were not familiar; perhaps this figure is too high, but they did find several dozen which contributed to the study.

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

5. The reason that I have detailed this background is to illustrate my view that we are all fairly poorly prepared to undertake a crash study of intelligence leaks against a tight deadline. The main reason is the absence of a good, centralized data base. (I had previously found this true in 1964, when three members of the DDP and I were locked in a room for two days to source Wise and Ross' Invisible Government; and, in 1966, when I edited, and contributed, to the DDI damage assessment comments on The New York Times series on CIA, for 21 hours straight). The present study for the White House was comparatively easy because it entailed a review of only two newspapers - The Times and The Post - and a comparatively short time-frame - 20 January 1969 to the present. It also required no input on the Vietnam war or Indochina. If the study, even within the short time-frame, had had to cover all of the published leaks of which we were aware, it would have taken much more research time to cover the other newspaper and magazine articles which are included in the files; at least one other clipping repository, NPIC, would have had to be consulted.


6. One of the categories (#7) which was requested by the White House was a comparison of the frequency and gravity of leaks in this

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

- 5 -

Administration compared to previous Administrations. Because of the shortness of time, we did not answer that question in the Agency's initial reply to the White House. Here again we lack a centralized data base; it would take a stunning number of manhours to try to work it out, given the passage of time since the earlier leaks occurred. HIC's files would carry a major part of that burden, I believe.

7. It would seem to me to be essential that a centralized Agency "leak" file be created. Whenever an intelligence leak appears in the public media, it should be reported to such central repository with a copy of the article, together with a statement as to the nature of the leak, any information as to the documentation from which it came, and any information as to possible source of the leak. It is probably best that such a file be maintained in the Office of Security, and that all elements of the Agency, including the DDP, should contribute to it on an all source basis. (It might be possible to maintain such a file in Mr. Goodwin's office, but they are not really set up for it.) HIC is an alternative, but it is highly doubtful that DDP would report sensitive leak situations here, and at present we are not set up for handling material higher than COMINT. If such a permanent file is desired, it will have to have the full backing of the Deputies and the DCI so that every Office would be responsible for producing an annotated description and damage assessment of leaks in the field of their particular expertise. There is hardly anyone in the Agency capable of assessing all the leaks without expert assistance. In this way, the Agency could keep on top of the leak situation and evaluate it from time to time.


Walter Pforzheimer
Curator
Historical Intelligence Collection

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

Attachment

White House Memo
dated 11 August 1971
re Leak Data Assessment

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~