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VI. PRODUCTIONIntroduction:

It is unfair to Goleniewski's tremendous contribution to the Western intelligence services to allow the man's exasperating, paranoid personality to obscure his value. A review must emphasize the almost total recall with which he was endowed and which enabled him to give the names and details of 1,693 intelligence personalities, including officers, co-opted workers and agents, and his initiative in sending successfully to the West 1,000 pages of classified Polish documents which he had photographed and in caching another 750 Minox film frames of classified documents when he defected. The Goleniewski tragedy lies in his unparalleled contribution to Western intelligence and his hopelessly paranoid personality which blocked long-term cooperation with any Western service. On the basis of his exceptional memory, his experience as an operational intelligence officer and his intimate association with UB and KGB officers, he should have been one of the most enduring and valuable defector assets in the West. His mental illness has made that impossible, which is a loss for the Western services and a tragedy for the man himself. It is most important to note, however, that until approximately early 1964, Goleniewski was an accurate and reliable source of intelligence.

A. Counterintelligence Production:

1. Goleniewski's counterintelligence production is the bulk of his information by virtue of his career in the Counterintelligence Department of the Polish Security Service. As stated above, the information he gave us prior to January or February 1964 is as accurate as any counterintelligence received from a



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defector. Because of the amount of information he provided, this review can give numbers and highlights only. Following is a numerical breakdown of intelligence personalities on which he reported:

<u>Type and Service</u>	<u>Number</u>
Polish Security and Military Intelligence Officers	650
Agents and Co-opted Workers for the PIS	903
KGB and GRU Staff Officers	110
Agents	<u>30</u>
Total	1,693

In providing names and considerable information on 650 ranking and middle-level officers of the PIS, Goleniewski identified most of the PIS. He was able to provide CIA with a complete list of agents and co-opted workers in the field of S41 due to the last position he held in the UB as Chief of Section 6 (Scientific and Technical), Department I. His extraordinary memory recalled not only names but specialities, training, personal idiosyncrasies and, in many cases, birth dates of his UB and Z-II colleagues. His status as a KGB liaison officer and a KGB penetration of the Polish services made it possible for him to report on KGB operations and personnel. Traditionally, the Soviets exploit but do not trust the Satellite services, but within the limits of their basic distrust, they probably trust the Poles more than the East Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, etc. Goleniewski was allowed to see more of and learn more of the Soviet advisors with whom he worked than most Satellite intelligence officers. He was a shrewd and capable elicitor of information from his KGB contacts because he knew how to touch the nerve of their inordinate pride in their intelligence accomplishments.

2. The more conspicuous cases based on Goleniewski leads and which have received press coverage are the following (the list is not complete by any means):

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- a. George Blake, KGB penetration of the British Service, MI-6;
- b. Molody, alias Gordon Lonsdale, KGB illegal network head in London;
- c. Morris and Lora Cohen, alias Peter and Joyce Kroger, KGB agents working as support agents for Molody in London and previously part of Rudolf Ivanovich Abel's organization in the United States; also an illegal net;
- d. Harry Houghton, KGB agent in the Royal Navy reporting to Molody;
- e. Ethel Elizabeth Gee, KGB agent, Houghton's girlfriend, providing classified Royal Navy documents for Molody;
- f. Heinz Felfe, West German BND counter-intelligence officer and KGB penetration of the BND;
- g. Hans Clemens, KGB penetration of the BND;
- h. Bulla Case, Ursula and Alois Bulla, KGB penetration of the West German Socialist Party and West German Government.

3. Goleniewski provided the most complete and detailed charts and organizational description of the Polish Security Service and the Polish Military Intelligence Service received on any Communist service. His meticulous attention to detail and his extraordinary memory made it possible to trace all the organizational shifts which occurred in the two services since 1945. The control and/or influence of the Soviets, the relationship to the Communist Party and the purges following the Gomulka take-over were all painstakingly described. His knowledge of the personnel working in the UB was encyclopedic. Having served in two provincial UB posts--Gdansk and Poznan--and in the UB Headquarters in both Departments I and II, he was acquainted with personnel working in both

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internal and external counterintelligence operations. The extent of his knowledge of external counterintelligence operations was described briefly above. A very abbreviated summary of his reporting on UB internal operations follows:

a. During the time spanning his knowledge of internal CI activities, approximately 1954 to 1958, he knew that the UB had succeeded in obtaining the codes and ciphers of embassies and consulates in Poland.

b. In March 1961 Goleniewski told his CIA debriefer that every embassy in Warsaw, with the exception of the United States and British embassies, had been "penetrated". He was referring to physical penetration of the diplomatic installations. He added that the UB was constantly reviewing and planning possible penetrations of the United States and British embassies.

c. The UB had a pool of attractive female agents who were used against all Western diplomats. If a Westerner made the acquaintance of a Polish woman outside of the UB pool, an effort would be made to remove the latter from the social scene of the Westerners and substitute one of the female UB co-opted workers or agents. In several cases the association has ended in marriage and, according to Goleniewski, the Polish woman will be forced or urged to remain a reporting UB source. She would also be exploited as an access to her husband. In two cases cited by Goleniewski, the Western diplomat has had a successful career in his country's service and in both cases the KGB has taken the case from the UB. The KGB was developing the operations at the time of Goleniewski's defection. Both diplomats were reported by CIA to the security service of his respective country. CIA also informed the FBI, because in both cases one member of the family, either husband or wife, had occasion to visit the United States. There are many other examples of the female UB agent marrying Westerners or leaving Poland with the assistance of a Western diplomat, too numerous to be listed here.

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d. The Poznan Fair was and still is exploited to the fullest by the UB as: an opportunity to spot potential recruitment targets; a convenient rendezvous for agents working outside of Poland who have logical cover for attending the Fair; and as a source of positive intelligence. In 1960 Goleniewski was in charge of the UB task force responsible for the intelligence exploitation of the foreign visitors to the Poznan Fair. He had used the Fair in previous years for his own operations but in his position as chief of the UB unit he had an opportunity to collect considerable data on UB operations of all departments and on KGB and MFS activities. One example of the type of information he collected and passed to CIA was an indication that a high-level Italian diplomat or trade official with diplomatic rank had been recruited by the UB when the Italian was serving in Warsaw. A UB colleague mentioned the Italian by his UB cryptonym, assuming that Goleniewski knew of the operation, and commented that the Italian was visiting the Fair but the UB were ordered to ignore him because the KGB was assessing the Italian with a view to taking over the agent (unfortunately Goleniewski could not ferret out the true name). In discussing the Poznan Fair, Goleniewski emphasized the control and exploitation all Communist intelligence services made, not only of Poznan but of all trade fairs which take place in satellite countries. He emphasized, in addition, the coordination among the satellites and the ubiquitous KGB presence.

D. Examples of Counterintelligence Production:

1. KGB: Goleniewski gave an extensive amount of information on the KGB. He reported on KGB organization, personnel, and at length on those KGB officers with whom he had been acquainted. As revealed by the operations stemming from his reporting touched on briefly above, he produced extremely valuable leads to KGB operations. His knowledge of KGB manipulation of the Satellite services and coordination between the Satellite services is revealed in all of his counterintelligence reporting. He was extensively debriefed on KGB illegal operations and the KGB Illegal Directorate. The basis for his

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knowledge was a campaign the KGB undertook to force the Poles to establish illegal rezidenturas in North America, where, the KGB stated, the large number of Polish immigrants made it relatively simple to build up illegal networks. Using the KGB insistence on UB activity in the illegal field, Goleniewski learned the following:

a. In August 1956, Sakharovskiy (General Aleksandr Mikhaylovich), then Chief of the KGB First Chief Directorate, summoned a UB and GZI delegation to Moscow for a conference. Goleniewski was a member of the Polish group. The discussions led to criticism of the Polish intelligence services for not exploiting the excellent material available in Poland for illegals. Sakharovskiy urged the Poles to create six to eight illegal rezidenturas in the United States. When the Poles demurred, saying the Soviets probably did not have that many, Sakharovskiy became angry, went to a safe and pulled out a large number of dossiers. Throwing them on the table, he announced that the GRU and KGB had 53 illegal rezidenturas in the United States. This was changed to include Canada and Mexico, but all targeted against the United States.

b. During the same month, August 1956, Goleniewski had an opportunity to bring up the number of KGB illegal rezidenturas with Yevdokimenko, senior KGB advisor in Poland, who was also present during the Moscow conference. The latter said that 57 was a slight exaggeration for the benefit of the Poles and there were 40 active illegal rezidenturas in North America.

c. Still in 1956, Goleniewski, with his usual thoroughness, asked Karandashov, former KGB advisor to the UB who was visiting Warsaw, about the number of illegal rezidenturas in North America. Karandashov confirmed the number of 40 active rezidenturas.

d. Ostryakov, deputy chief of the KGB Third Chief Directorate, visited Warsaw in September 1956 and Goleniewski checked the number of illegal

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rezidenturas with him. Ostryakov confirmed the number of 40 in North America.

e. In August 1957 Goleniewski, during a trip to Vienna, asked the KGB rezident in that city, Legeyev, a personal friend of the recently arrested Abel, about the Soviet illegal rezidenturas in North America. Legeyev stated that the figure was between 40 and 50.

f. Back in Warsaw Goleniewski again raised the question of Soviet illegal rezidenturas with Vladykin, deputy to the senior KGB advisor in Poland, Yevdokimenko. Vladykin stated that Sakharovskiy's figure of 53 was accurate and added, "The Czechs work well, the Romanians do not know how, the East Germans are just trying to mount operations now, and the Poles are not doing anything."

The above is cited as an example of Goleniewski's careful research when he wished to confirm a report. He was very positive about the extensive KGB illegal operations on the North American continent. The number of rezidenturas would include "MOB" (described below) and active illegal rezidenturas.

2. "MOB" Networks: "MOB" comes from the word "mobilization" and is the name given sleeper networks which would become active in case of war. Their missions are primarily sabotage and diversion. They maintain communications periodically but do not engage in clandestine activity. According to Goleniewski, the Russian term for the "MOB" nets is "in storage" and the agents should be exempt from the draft and in good standing with the local police. An example of a large "MOB" net was given by General Korczynski, head of Z-II, from his last visit to China (report is dated 1960). Korczynski said the Chinese had told him that they had 2,500 "MOB" agents in Japan, now inactive, who would remain inactive unless war were declared. Goleniewski stated there was an "MOB" net in Scandinavia and in Canada. The Canadian net was created in the early 1930's with the assistance of the Canadian Communist Party.

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The information, admittedly vague, was given the RCMP.

3. "Aktion": One of the first reports Goleniewski sent through his letters of 1958 concerned a proposed KGB propaganda offensive against the Western Powers in the German Federal Republic labeled by him "Aktion". The program originated with the KGB Second Chief Directorate and that Directorate's Chief, Gribanov, and was to be implemented by the Satellite services. The objective of the propaganda assault was to support and strengthen the Soviet contention that West Berlin was an outpost of the Western intelligence services and the West German service, the BND, was a tool of the Western Powers. After the KGB explained its plan, it became obvious that the Satellites would be sacrificing their agents in West Berlin and the Federal Republic to achieve the KGB goal. The proposal did not meet with enthusiasm and the plan, as originally presented, was dropped but the BND agents who had been identified in West and East Berlin and in the GDR were exposed. The planning for "Aktion" occurred during the months of April, May, June and July 1959 and was in preparation for the Geneva Conference which the Soviets would attend. According to Goleniewski, the failure of the plan was blamed on the KGB advisors to the pertinent Satellite services and there were Khrushchevian fireworks aimed at the KGB in general.
4. "Hacke": This was Goleniewski's label for a long-term KGB operation, the purpose of which was to control a neo-Nazi organization. Some history is necessary to understand the source of his information. As has been alleged and reported from other sources since the end of World War II, Heinrich Mueller, Chief of Amt IV of the SD, known as "Gestapo Mueller", was recruited by the Soviets before the end of World War II. Through him the MGB obtained information on a proposed post-World War II Nazi secret conspiracy which Bormann was organizing. The head of the MGB from 1946 to 1951 was Abakumov, who came into power through his emphasis on external operations, primarily against the United States. Abakumov recognized the potential offered the MGB by a neo-Nazi group in contact with the agent networks

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which the Germans had in North and South America. He knew that the Nazis were still very hostile toward the United States and would probably continue to plan underground operations inimical to the United States. He ordered, for this reason, an interrogation of all Nazi leaders who would be in a position to know the members of the neo-Nazi conspiracy in order to identify the members of the group. Goleniewski was called in to pick up the interrogation of the former Gauleiter of Danzig, Foerster, who had been under interrogation by another UB officer without results. The Soviet General, Gezborodov, who was visiting Danzig in early 1951, told Goleniewski that the first UB interrogator had failed to get Foerster's cooperation in spite of very hostile interrogation. Bezborodov ordered Goleniewski to report only to the Soviet advisor, Sklyar, on the results of Foerster's interrogation. The interrogation or, as Goleniewski described it, the talks to restore Foerster's "psychic balance" after the brutal treatment by the previous interrogator lasted until June 1952, when Foerster gave the first indication of knowledge of Nazi plans following a defeat. As soon as Goleniewski reported the results to Sklyar, Foerster was taken from the Danzig prison and flown to Moscow. Abakumov's plan was to have the MGB control only the two or three men who were heading the Nazi group and operate under the "false flag", i.e., the remaining Nazis and German intelligence assets would be unwitting of Soviet control, believing themselves in the employment still of the Germans. The "Hacke" information was passed to the BND.

E. Positive Intelligence:

1. A general count of pages of the documents received from Goleniewski is: 1,000 pages while still in-place in Warsaw; 750 pages on film retrieved from the cache in Warsaw after his defection. These documents included significant positive intelligence, provided numerous clues to penetrations of Western governments, armed forces, NATO, etc., and contained invaluable counterintelligence information.

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2. The representatives from the Army interviewed Goleniewski alone without a CIA representative present. Goleniewski was extremely antagonistic toward one of the Army debriefers and, if his comments to his CIA debriefer are indicative of his attitude, he was not very cooperative. Listed in broad categories, the Army disseminations based on information obtained from him are:
 - a. Soviet SAM sites and security measures around the sites; Soviet discussions with Poles regarding IRBM bases in Poland;
 - b. Polish Order of Battle; Polish mobilization plans; arms and equipment of Polish Army; Polish Office of the Quartermaster General; purge of Jewish officers from the Polish Army; Soviet-Polish border transshipment points; arrangements for Soviet transport through Poland; organization and personnel of Polish Ministry of National Defense; Warsaw Military District;
 - c. Soviet aircraft: MIG-23Bis, MIG-24; A-powered aircraft; Soviet interest in the B-58;
 - d. Nuclear weapons: Soviet units of tactical destruction and assault; Soviet nuclear submarines and Soviet deception methods to conceal true submarine strength; bunker for atomic ammunition; Soviet ray guns; Soviet technical collection systems and Soviet deception to avoid technical collection;
 - e. Warsaw Pact and Polish MOB plans; armament strength of Warsaw Pact nations;
 - f. Nine reports on military operational leads.
3. The State Department did not assign a debriefer as the Army had done but specific topics were covered at the request of State, which were:
 - a. Soviet-Satellite relations in connection with the Sino-Soviet dispute;

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- b. Sino-Soviet differences;
 - c. Outline of developments in Poland in 1956 which brought Gomulka back to power;
 - d. KGB technical surveillance capabilities.
4. In the field of communications, he gave information on communications security, UB knowledge of Western ciphers (mentioned above in CI Production) and the Martin-Mitchell case (NSA defectors).
5. Other disseminations based on his information were:
- a. The Katyn massacres;
 - b. Scientific and technical intelligence exchange among Communist countries;
 - c. Soviet scientific and technical intelligence;
 - d. Comments on the Iraqi revolution;
 - e. The U-2 case;
 - f. S/W screed in Polish service passports;
 - g. A Soviet-manufactured digital computer, Ural-2.
6. The voluminous dissemination on the KGB, the KGB advisors, and the KGB/UB relationship should be counted among his positive intelligence production. It is a study of a hostile intelligence service, but it is also a historical record of Soviet measures to bring an East European nation's security/intelligence services under complete Soviet domination and the maneuvering of the East European nation used to gain a small degree of independence and national identity.

F. Comment on Production:

- 1. Goleniewski "went on strike" against CIA before it was possible to complete debriefings on topics which

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he had previously agreed to cover and, in some cases, he had suggested should be covered in detail. Following are four of the larger categories which were not covered as thoroughly as planned:

a. His biography was never completed (as mentioned above in the Biographical Section);

b. "Pax": Goleniewski was, when rational, insistent that the "Pax" organization should be very carefully examined because the organization was a KGB-developed and controlled operation designed to counter the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland and parts of the Ukraine. He asserted that the UB resented the KGB control of "Pax" and the hidden struggle between the KGB and the UB was well worth the attention of Western services. The "Pax" debriefing was never accomplished;

c. The series of Z-II or O-II bulletins which he photographed and sent West merited a CI analysis, according to Goleniewski. He suggested that the bulletins be carefully analyzed in an effort to identify the Polish Military Intelligence sources. Because of his low opinion of the US Army debriefer, he refused to bring up the topic with him and insisted, when still talking to CIA, that one of his CIA debriefers should work with him on the Z-II bulletins. Time was inadequate for the examination of the bulletins before he stopped cooperating with CIA;

d. WIN: When he arrived from Germany, he warned CIA that the UB study of the WIN case included in the cache documents was a UB training study and misrepresented the UB role. He suggested that a comparative study be made, using the UB paper and CIA's own background on the WIN operation, to detect the UB mistakes. This was never done.