

HS Project No. 2.290

HISTORY OF THE FI SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE  
GROUP (1959-1965)

Writer:

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The Scientific Intelligence Group  
of  
The Foreign Intelligence Staff  
1959-1965



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## FOREWORD

Up until the late Fifties in the Directorate of Plans the Foreign Intelligence (FI) Staff had been the principal custodian of interest and the mainspring of action in developing clandestine collection efforts against important foreign scientific and technical programs. Under the impact of the Inspector General's report on FI Staff in 1959 and with the installation of the new Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Richard Bissell, on 1 January 1959, much of the responsibility for planning initiatives, research and development, and direct operational action in response to S&T requirements, which had hitherto been lodged in FI Staff by explicit charter or established practice, was for the most part placed back upon area divisions and (for R&D in support of operations) upon Technical Services Division.

During the "Bissell era" (1959-1962) the former Scientific Operations Branch, now renamed the Scientific Intelligence Group of FI Staff, completed its transmutation from a largely action-oriented collection function to an advisory, support and coordinative role. The following account picks up the chronicle of the Scientific Intelligence Group from the onset of that transition and carries it forward into 1966.

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I. The Bissell Era: 1959-1962

A. Impact of the Inspector General's Findings

The year 1959 in the annals of the Clandestine Service (CS) was a year of transition and self-examination, brought on in no small measure by a deepening concern about the impact of Soviet achievements in military and space technology. To be sure, the stirrings of change and the need for better intelligence on the Soviet Union had already been felt at all levels of Agency management even before the electrifying Sputnik successes in 1957. It was in this atmosphere in the summer of 1958 that the Inspector General began a survey of the Foreign Intelligence Staff, 1/ an important share of which was devoted to the Scientific Operations Branch (hereafter referred to as the Branch).\*

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\*Except for the initial use of "Scientific Operations Branch" in the section heading by that title, the Inspector General's Survey of FI Staff uses throughout the abbreviation "SOD" in referring to the Branch. That abbreviation had remained in use from the time Scientific Operations Division, as it was then known, was a part of the Requirements Staff. Early in 1959 it was decided by C/FI to drop the use of "SOD" and to adopt the abbreviation "SOB", in order to reflect clearly the subordination of the scientific staff element to FI Operations Division.

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Submitted in February 1959, this survey was generally critical of the Branch while acknowledging the exemplary performance of its former chief.

Early in December 1958 Thomas Karamessines, Acting Chief of Operations, directed the assignment of [redacted] to the Branch as its new Chief; the appointment was made effective 1 January 1959.

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[redacted] had just returned from a PCS assignment in [redacted] as Deputy Head of a [redacted] processing unit, and as Chief of its CIA element; this unit was responsible for processing the product of a large [redacted] technical collection operation [redacted]

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In that position [redacted] had regular contact with the representative of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) [redacted] and with visitors from headquarters responsible for finished intelligence on foreign scientific developments. In addition, [redacted]

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dealt with [redacted] officers responsible for scientific information requirements and with officials of [redacted]

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[redacted]

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In outlining [redacted] new responsibilities, Karamessines took note of this experience and the good relations [redacted] enjoyed with senior OSI

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officials as a basis in part for his selection as Chief of Scientific Operations Branch. [ ] re- minded Karamessines that he had no professional training or academic background in science and technology. Karamessines assured [ ] that this had been taken into account and that it had not been considered important that the chief of the Branch be a scientist or engineer; on the contrary it was to be preferred that he be operationally oriented, familiar primarily with the mission and needs of the CS, and capable of managing technically trained officers. Citing the IG Survey, Karamessines asked [ ] to give particular attention to reorganizing and remotivating the Branch, improving its relations with OSI\*, strengthening S&T training programs for CS officers, and stimulating more vigorous area division actions to collect required S&T information.

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The early months of 1959 were devoted to reorganization and redirection of the Branch, essentially along the lines recommended by the Inspector General.

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\*The IG had reported that the "relations between SOD and OSI are among the worst in the Agency and must be corrected by drastic action if the Agency is to improve the collection of scientific and technical intelligence information. 2/



The IG Survey of FI Staff had made 23 specific recommendations concerning the Branch, in all but two of which the DDP concurred either outright or with some modification. One of the two recommendations in which the DDP did not concur arose from a simple misunderstanding on the part of the Inspector General which was later resolved to his satisfaction. 3/\* The other bore on the question of rotation of officers between the Branch and OSI. 4/ The IG felt that this would be beneficial to both offices; but neither was happy with the proposal, and in the end the DDP recommended that the DCI disapprove the recommendations. 5\*\*

The twenty-one IG recommendations concerning the Branch in which the DDP concurred tended to cluster around seven objectives:

a. removal of the Branch from active engagement in clandestine operations and overt collection

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\*This concerned the physical division at headquarters of small samples [redacted] for laboratory testing [redacted]

The Inspector General felt that dividing the sample might be detrimental to analytical work on the material. However, it was demonstrated, on evidence from the laboratories themselves, that no such damage would occur. 6/

\*\*This issue will be treated in more detail in Section B of this chapter.

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of scientific information;

b. greater emphasis on staff support and guidance to area divisions in scientific operations;

c. development of comprehensive plans and programs for improving clandestine collection of required scientific information;

d. disposition of the research and development projects managed and controlled by the Branch;

e. wider use of OSI specialists for temporary assignment to the Clandestine Service;

f. removal of the Branch from activities which were properly the responsibility of other components, such as processing of S&T requirements, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] on S&T subjects, and presentation of training courses;

g. revision of the mission, organization, management, and future status of the Branch within FI Staff. 7/

By March of 1959 [redacted] had re-organized the Branch and its authorized T/O of [redacted] professionals and [redacted] clericals; on board at the time were [redacted] professionals. 8/ Four sections were established

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instead of five. The former Admin Support Section was dropped and its clerical staff was distributed among other parts of the Branch. Section heads were named for Sciences Section, Conference and Exchange Section, and the Operations Support Section. The Astrophysics Section which [ ] had established had a T/O of [ ] professionals but no incumbents. She had had great difficulty in finding qualified guided missile and astronautics specialists for this Section, even with the personal support and assistance of the Director of Personnel. 9/ These recruitment difficulties persisted well into 1959 and by mid-summer the concept of an Astrophysics Section was dropped. 10/ Work on collection problems in that field was handled by one or other of the officers in the Sciences Section, as it had been all along. By late 1959 the Branch did succeed in the external recruitment of a young mathematician and physicist with some aeronautics experience; he was assigned to Sciences Section, first to train and later to provide staff guidance on some aspects of the collection of missiles and intelligence.

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The problem of morale in the Branch, to which the IG had alluded in his Survey, 11/ appeared to be

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satisfactorily resolved by the time this first re-organization and allocation of section responsibilities had been accomplished.

Throughout the Spring and Summer of 1959 most of the other actions recommended by the IG were being carried out. Officers in the sections had been strongly admonished to give close attention to their staff support and guidance responsibilities.\* They had begun to divest themselves in an orderly fashion of case officer chores which could more appropriately be handled by area division officers.\*\* By direction of Chief, FI the Branch safehouse was turned over to the Special Operations Group of FI Staff. Responsibility for supervising collection of Soviet material was passed to SR Division.

[redacted] were discontinued;

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\*In one of his most strongly worded criticisms of the Branch the IG observed that "by its own overriding emphasis on operations, SOD has on many occasions destroyed the image of itself as a staff willing to advise and assist the area divisions and instead has created an image of itself as a malevolent staff competitor." 12/

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and the dissemination of FBI reports on scientific matters was turned over to CI Staff. 14/ Procedures were being established for coordinating overseas travel of U.S. scientists with CIA missions, for the review of individual scientific and technical requirements by RQM, and a good start had been made on the development of S&T training methods and courses for CS officers. 15/ A further recommendation of the IG, affecting three R&D projects of the Branch, was about to be implemented. These projects had been administered by the staff since 1953 at an annual cost of around

[redacted] they were designed to develop techniques for collecting [redacted]

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It was the judgment of the IG that they should be transferred to TSS in order to free the Branch to perform other more appropriate operational functions. 16/ By mid-1959 the Branch had begun negotiations with TSS to effect transfer of responsibility for contractual arrangements with [redacted] and for funding the projects. The Branch reserved responsibility for providing operational guidance and evaluating operational applicability of the techniques

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developed. By January 1960 technical and administrative control of the projects had been effectively lodged with TSS. 17/

In short, the Branch was well on its way toward repairing one of the two major faults noted by the IG, failure "to understand its paramount staff function." 18/ The other major fault was described as a lack of comprehensive planning for a CS-wide attack on the S&T intelligence problem.

Instead of jumping from one activity to another, SOD should survey the over-all DD/P scientific and technical intelligence collection effort and should systematically develop and recommend action for the correction of deficiencies. 19/ This subject -- the effort of the Branch to establish a broad CS-wide collection program -- will be treated separately in the next section.

Before we go on to that subject, however, there was one other point raised by the IG which needs discussion. This concerned the status of the Branch, that is, the question of its proper place within the CS organization.


Following his inspection of FI Staff the IG, in February 1959, had suggested that Chief, FI consider

upgrading the Branch to division status, thus putting it on a par with other FI divisions. However, by the time the IG had completed a further inspection within the CS, this time a survey of the immediate DDP area which was submitted in July, 20/ he had a more radical plan to recommend, namely, the merger of the Branch with TSS. By that time, almost a year after he had begun the inspection of FI Staff, the IG was apparently convinced that reliance on existing CS organizational patterns and operational approaches were not enough to give the required impetus to CS efforts to collect scientific and technical intelligence information. The IG concluded that

The DD/P must break the conventional case officer-agent approach to all clandestine operations and must aggressively seek the assistance of science and technology if it is to meet increasing responsibilities in this crucial field...The first step in this direction should be the merger of TSS and SOD. 21/

The IG rationale for this position was twofold: lack of operational insight on the part of the numerous TSS scientists and engineers, and "lack of adequate

numbers of scientifically and technically trained personnel in the Branch." 22/ It was the conviction of the IG that merger of the Branch with TSS would serve to correct these deficiencies. TSS would be brought into closer daily touch with operational realities, and the Branch, in its guidance and technical advisory functions, would be able to fall back on the large number of trained specialists in TSS for scientific and technical assistance. Underlying this rationale was the deeper but vaguer conviction of the IG that somehow the CS would have to gear itself to make better use of the resources of science and technology to improve its operations, especially against the Soviet Union.



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The IG went on to propose that the merged unit should seize the initiative in identifying problem areas in S&T collection and in conceiving solutions, that it



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should make full use of the ideas and facilities of OSI, and that it "must achieve a quantum leap in the application of science and technology to the problems of intelligence." 24/\* The DD/P was enjoined to support all measures to bring home to the entire CS "the importance of science and technology in accomplishing overall missions." 25/

After considerable study and discussion with FI Staff, and between the Staff and the DD/P throughout the summer and early fall of 1959, the Chief, FI in comments to Chief, Operational Services on the IG Survey of the DD/P, recommended against the merger of TSS and the Branch. 26/ He argued that the Branch had already been redirected in its functions and reorganized along the lines recommended earlier in the year by the IG and "that further experience with the present role of FI/SOD should be acquired and assessed before further changes in its status are considered." 27/

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\*This ambitious and visionary goal turned out, in the long run, to be beyond the means of the Clandestine Services. The "quantum leap" envisioned by the IG became the basis for the charter of a new directorate for science and technology in the Agency -- the Deputy Directorate for Research, established in February 1962 and later renamed the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology.

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The FI Staff view prevailed and the merger did not take place.

In January 1960 the Branch began to function as a staff element reporting directly to Chief, FI and was redesignated Scientific Intelligence Group. Its functions were essentially those [ ] had proposed to the DD/P by memorandum in August; 28/ they were approved by the DD/P in September. 29/ They underlined the support and guidance role of the Branch (now to be known as FI/SIG) and its emphasis on establishing objectives and a program for collection of S&T information. The statement of these functions was further refined and eventually incorporated into the official Instruction on FI Staff in March of 1961. The Group, which meanwhile had been reduced in size by direction of the DD/P, 30/ functioned under this charter and concept of its role until mid-1962.

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B. Programming for Scientific Operations

Perhaps the most important work performed by the Branch in the three years from 1959 through 1961 was in program development. For a decade before that the Branch had functioned as a quasi-operations element, while performing a variety of staff support

and guidance tasks. But as the IG had noted, it had "no long-range plan for improving scientific and technical intelligence collection in the Clandestine Services." 31/ He went on to conclude that it should direct its efforts toward "the development of specific goals and implementing plans for DD/P-wide efforts..." 32/

By the summer of 1959 the Branch had mapped out plans for a survey of area division collection activities directed toward procurement of S&T information. Divisions were asked to begin assembling data on their current programs for such collection; the stated objectives branch by branch, the types of requirements guidance in use, operational activities underway or under development, and manpower assigned to S&T activities in the field and at headquarters.\*

Several problems were encountered at the outset of the survey. The annual program guidance from the DDP/Projects and Programs Group referred only to broad types of operational activity, such as positive intelligence operations which were to be covered in

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\*These data requirements were discussed at length with FI representatives from all area divisions in a special meeting convened by C/FI on 24 July 1959.

the program statements. Nowhere in the guidance was separate treatment of scientific and technical information collection required. Divisions were simply not accustomed to programming for S&T collection, as they were for economic and political information. 33/ Early in the survey, also, it became clear that there was disagreement and some confusion over terminology, and over an acceptable means for counting manpower assigned to S&T tasks.

As to terminology, a major stumbling block in the way of coherent communication was the abbreviation "S and T" itself, as applied to operations and to intelligence. A strong and vocal school of thought, particularly in what were then SR and EE Divisions, held the view that there was no such thing as an S&T operation, that "an operation was an operation," whether the collection objective was political, military, economic, or scientific and technical information. SR Division, particularly in its Reports and Requirements Staff, took the position that it had all along been emphasizing operational efforts to acquire high priority, classified information on major Soviet military capabilities and weapons technology. By

implication at least, this meant that a special "drive" or program in the CS to single out scientific and technical information objectives for attention was not necessary. In the SR Division view what was lacking was sufficient emphasis on the Soviet target as a whole and the availability of adequate numbers of Soviet specialists in the CS.\* There was as yet no place in the lexicon of SR, or other divisions for that matter, for "S&T operations" or for "scientific operations" in the sense that that phrase was used in and by the Scientific Operations Branch.

To be sure, the phrase "scientific operations," unless exactly defined, was ambiguous. As used in the Branch it was of course intended to convey the objective of the operation, not its technique, and it is probable that area division officers who dealt often with the Branch were not really confused by the locution. The phrase "S&T operations" was more practically troublesome because the included phrase "technical

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\*The basis for this position had been established by a DD/P memorandum of 2 September 1959 to all Chiefs of Division directing expanded action against the Soviet target and the training of additional CS officers as Soviet specialists by rotation into SR Division. 34/

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operations" already had currency in CS tradecraft

nomenclature (to refer specifically to [redacted])

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[redacted] and technical collection was

already well understood to include SIGINT, photorecon-

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naissance, and other, usually non-agent, collection

methods. It was therefore a legitimate demand of divi-

sion officers that the staff provide clarification of

these terms so that they could properly sort out the

activities they were expected to report on. It was

some time, however, before agreed and standardized

nomenclature became generally accepted in the CS.

Meanwhile, during the annual program exercises in early

1960 and 1961, operations to collect scientific and

technical intelligence were variously referred to as

"scientific intelligence collection," "scientific opera-

tions," or "S&T operations."

Finally, in March 1961, the terminology issue

came to a head on the occasion of a long memorandum

to Bissell from [redacted] then Chief of SR Division. 35/

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[redacted] memorandum was essentially a review of SR Divi-

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sion operational philosophy as applied to clandestine

collection of scientific and technical intelligence.

In it [redacted] began by offering his definitions of

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scientific and technical intelligence and scientific and technical operations. In his view, "S&T operations" should mean collection of scientific and technical intelligence, and "technical collection operations" should be used for collection employing special techniques or methods (e.g. ELINT techniques). FI Staff proposed improvements on these definitions in April. 36/ They were further refined in several meetings with representatives of area divisions and later, in June, were promulgated in a guidance paper prepared by FI/SIG over Bissell's signature. 37/ The term "scientific operations" was henceforth to be used for collection activities "designed to satisfy requirements for scientific and technical intelligence," and each of these two types of intelligence was separately defined. 38/ In spite of the discussion and effort which went into these definitions, they did not in practice become standard, except in communications from the staff and the office of the DD/P. Frequently divisions lapsed back into the use of "S&T operations," but in general it was understood and accepted henceforth that this term did not cover technical collection activities.

The dispute over terms was not frivolous. A lasting benefit from the tedious preoccupation with definitions probably was to be found in the gradually increasing awareness of case officers and division management of this genre of operations and their place in the CS mission. Also the dispute was symptomatic of real and deeper concerns among CS operators; it formed, as it were, an obligato over the more fundamental themes of operational philosophy, the best ways to use CS resources to answer increasingly urgent requirements for scientific and technical information from denied areas.

From the first day of the Bissell regime it was clear that manpower requirements would be a crucial issue in any plans of the DD/P to intensify the CS attack on S&T information targets. Within the CS there was a dearth of operations officers with up-to-date scientific training and intimate acquaintance with S&T information requirements. Within TSS there were many scientists and engineers, but these were not operations officers. Outside the CS the largest pool of scientific and technical talent was in OSI. Early in 1959 attention was given to OSI as a possible source of



manpower assistance in operations, rather than to TSS, because of OSI's responsibilities for S&T intelligence production and initiation of requirements.

But as we have seen, in the previous section, the IG later in the year envisaged TSS as the in-house supplier of the required S&T talent, this time arguing that the full arsenal of science and engineering would be needed to equip the CS for its new collection responsibilities.

Because of his close personal acquaintance with Herbert Scoville and understanding of Scoville's responsibilities as AD/SI, it was natural that Bissell should seek ways to make use of OSI specialists in the CS. This became a recurrent subject for discussion within the CS and between the CS and OSI for many months.

Bissell expressed himself as favoring some rotation of officers between OSI and the CS, and of using the inducement of higher rates of pay, if necessary to attract scientific specialists into the CS. He was not in favor of a separate career service in the CS for such specialists. 39/

The Bissell policy on manpower resources included two related theses: one, that the CS should

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increase its effective case officer strength for use in operations by intensive training, specialization, and improved professionalism (this was what he so aptly dubbed "capital formation"); the other, was the conviction that the CS was "fat at home, lean abroad," and that more of its trained and ready officers should be moved out of Washington to the operational theatres. As this policy affected the Branch's staffing it meant, first, that only the most able and scientifically trained specialists should be sought to fill existing vacancies, and second, that non-scientific positions should, so far as possible, be eliminated. 40/ In terms of numbers, this meant that the original Branch complement of [ ] professionals was to be reduced to [ ] Authorized strength remained at that lower level throughout Bissell's tenure; but by the end of 1961, as a result of recruitment difficulties and transfers out of the Branch, only [ ] professionals were actually on board.

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Bissell was early persuaded that the CS and OSI might somehow agree on a rotational scheme beneficial to both

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parties.\* There was much discussion, dispute within the CS, and correspondence on this topic well into 1960. The Branch had given its views on the subject to Bissell early in 1959, and its comments on the first IG survey. 41/ The Branch argued that the temporary assignment of OSI specialists to the CS would tend to delay the formation of a strong permanent cadre of operations officers with S&T experience and specialization, but was not averse to transfer of operationally promising OSI officers to the CS on a more permanent basis. Bissell demurred:

I certainly agree that excessive reliance at this stage on a rotation scheme would delay the development of an adequate group of scientifically competent personnel in the Clandestine Service and that the development of such a group must be pursued with vigor. If, however, we firmly resolve to accomplish this purpose by recruitment and training it would seem to me that rotation between its members and OSI

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\*Probably resulting from his association with Scoville as well as from the findings of the IG.

would be feasible and mutually beneficial. 42/  
In actual practice the Branch found that a case by case consideration of its officers led quickly to the conclusion that none could be spared for rotation into OSI; there were already several unfilled positions in the Branch. Conversely, OSI had little enthusiasm for releasing numbers of its specialists, even for limited duty tours in the CS, without qualified replacements. [redacted] speaking for SR Division but reflecting a wide-spread attitude of senior officers, questioned the qualifications of DDI specialists to function effectively in operations; in the event a scientific specialist was needed in the field, on a particular case, it was [redacted] view that the required expert should be dispatched TDY to the station. 43/

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Bissell again dissented, stressing once more his conviction that specialist personnel, and more particularly scientists, "might well add to our operational capability" and he found it "hard to believe that, with today's emphasis on scientific intelligence, there is no help to be obtained from scientists in the task of clandestine collection." 44/

He continued to feel that such specialists could, so to speak, be naturalized within the CS. Nevertheless, the [ ] point of view was the one adopted in practice. By the end of 1960 FI Staff had succeeded in having one OSI officer\* transferred to the Branch with CS career status; FE Division had accepted another senior OSI officer as a scientific counselor in [ ] [ ] and SR Division had assigned one of its officers to rotation duty in OSI. But the idea of a general planned rotation system had slowly been fading and by the end of 1961 was dropped as unworkable.

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By the end of 1959 the influence of the Branch on CS planning and programming had been exerted in several related ways. First, through the survey, the deficiencies in manpower and operations for use against foreign S&T intelligence targets were highlighted for CS management. Second, the Branch projected itself energetically into S&T training for headquarters case officers and returnees from the field; Branch officers, from the Chief down,

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worked closely with OTR on improvement of the S&T Operations Course and played an active role in lectures, case presentation and analysis, and individual briefings and indoctrination on S&T operational matters. Third, attention of the divisions was focussed on the need for the placement of more trained case officers, with S&T specialization in the field and in key support positions at headquarters. It was a year of educative work and accommodation to the theses and intentions of the new DD/P as they affected S&T matters.

Early in 1960 the Branch began to lay plans for a more formal entry into the annual programming process. In January it drew up, for John Bross, the DDP's Senior Planning Officer, a detailed list of S&T collection objectives which reflected overall intelligence community requirements appropriate for CS action. 45/ These covered such major topics as Soviet guided missiles and nuclear weapons developments, and BW and CW programs in the USSR, along with a few other objectives of lesser interest.

Through the winter, the Branch (now named FI/SIG) prepared detailed comments and recommendations on each area division draft operational program. Most

attention was given to the SR, FE, and EE draft programs; in all three cases FI/SIG, commenting to FI/Plans Group, noted that evidence was lacking of specific plans for developing operations against high priority S&T information objectives in the Soviet Union and China. 46/ In a later memorandum to Chief, FI/Plans, C/FI/SIG observed:

As you know, we have drawn up a set of intelligence collection problems related to priority scientific targets. As I have mentioned repeatedly before, I do not find in the 1961 SR program any plan of the division to address itself to these problems by designing specific projects or operations to solve them or to attack a target of agreed high priority by any continuing substantial operational effort. 47/

There were three information targets of high priority which OSI identified during the first half of 1960: research and development [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] In consultation with FI/SIG, OSI prepared a detailed Collection Aid for the CS on [redacted] but was

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reluctant to invest its time in further collection guidance unless the CS was prepared, for its part, to plan and implement long-range clandestine collection programs. Scoville wrote to Bissell in June of 1960 that he saw no clandestine collection effort underway to match the extensive research and guidance efforts of OSI which were undertaken on behalf of the CS. 48/ Meanwhile, Helms was writing to Chief, SR Division enjoining the latter to step up the development of agent operations and to make full use of the resources of OSI to provide background data [redacted]

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Early in October Scoville sent to Bissell a second Collection Aid on the [redacted] [redacted] designed for use by CS case officers, but was constrained again to give notice that OSI's future production of such aids would depend on the ability of the CS to put them to effective use in collection. 50/

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\*The Collection Aids prepared by OSI on priority S&T collection objectives were primarily designed to trace the

[redacted] Operational plans and actions based on the use of these OSI Aids were known, in the CS, collectively as the [redacted]

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Underneath the bland phraseology of Scoville's transmittal letter was a concern -- indeed, a skepticism -- about the scope and depth of CS energies dedicated to S&T intelligence objectives. In truth, although WE and EE Divisions, at least, had made some operational use of the data in the [redacted] Collection Aid, there were no immediate dividends in terms of positive intelligence information.

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The [redacted] even with the persistent prodding and stimulus of FI/SIG on the CS side and of

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[redacted] in OSI, at best evoked only a limited operational response in the CS. The area divisions looked on the [redacted] concept -- that is, the concept of developing [redacted]

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[redacted]

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one among several available operational methods, but a method not likely to bear early fruit. FI/SIG, in an interim assessment of the method, addressed to Bissell, agreed that quick results were unlikely but that the scheme was operationally promising and should be sustained. 51/ The program continued well into 1961. In the summer of that year OSI sent to

the CS another Collection Aid, this one on [redacted]

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[redacted] \* But by that time OSI had long since become persuaded that its campaign to generate a more vigorous collection response in the CS would have to be conducted on a broader base and at higher levels.

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A flurry of developments in the late summer and fall of 1960 brought to a head a major issue between the DD/I and the DD/P on the subject of scientific and technical intelligence.

In a strongly worded, lengthy memorandum for the DCI\*\*written in August, Scoville concluded that "the future for the collection of S&T intelligence by clandestine means...was very dim" unless "serious new approaches" were tried. 52/ His simmering impatience with what he considered to be the slow pace of CS actions to address this problem are everywhere

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\*This is based on the recollection of the writer and on internal evidence in documents available to him. There is no remaining record in FI Staff of this Aid or of the dates of its preparation and submission to the CS.

\*\*Scoville sent his memorandum through the DD/P who in turn forwarded it to the DCI, but not until 17 October. 53/

evident in this paper. As he saw them, CS operational responses to the intelligence challenges he had so often presented were tardy, bureaucratic, based on "business as usual" procedures, piecemeal, and disappointing. FI/SIG obtained a copy of the Scoville Memorandum and went to work at once to prepare comments on it for Bissell, based on the Group's own findings in its survey of CS S&T operations. Meanwhile the DD/I had also expressed concern over the lack of cooperation of SR Division with the DD/I Guided Missiles Task Force, and [ ] went on record, in a report to Bissell, on his division's efforts to up-grade the knowledgeability of SR officers in this field, to cooperate with the DD/I on targetting problems, and to increase working-level contacts. 54/ At the close of his report, [ ] acknowledged the "suspicions" and "complaints" of the DD/I concerning the SR position on S&T [ ]

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In late September John Bross took account of the ground swell of OSI and DD/I criticism. In a note to Bissell he suggested that Bissell call a council of the principally affected CS officers to

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consider the issue. 55/ The next day [ ] sub-  
mitted to Bissell an account of FI/SIG findings  
concerning the state of S&T collection in the CS. 56/  
In it the Group presented factual confirmation of some  
of the more generalized charges of OSI: lack of pro-  
gramming for S&T collection, insufficient speciali-  
zation in that field among CS case officers, too great  
a dependence on field initiative, inadequacies in  
the Related Mission Directives, persisting lack of  
attention at CS management levels to the need for  
special and concerted efforts in the divisions.

On 17 October Bissell convened the meeting suggested  
by Bross and on 18 October directed [ ] to draft  
the CS comment on Scoville's August memorandum. 57/

[ ] draft, submitted a week later, 58/ briefly  
reviewed CS actions to centralize staff support and  
planning for scientific collection programs and, as  
requested by Bissell, dealt with the specific prob-  
lems which had created some friction and misunder-  
standing between the CS and OSI. As directed by  
Bissell, no basic organizational changes or alterna-  
tives in CS operational methods and philosophy were  
promised or proposed.

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In December Bissell met with Scoville and [redacted] of OSI to discuss Scoville's August memorandum and the CS comments on it. 59/\* Bissell recorded his own impression of that meeting and its results in a six-page memorandum for Chief, FI. 60/ In it he made reference to the fact that he had chosen not to pass on to the DCI the Scoville Memorandum but, with the knowledge of Amory and Scoville, had attempted to work out the difficulties in conference. The length and detail of Bissell's paper are evidence not only of the seriousness with which he took Scoville's complaints, but also of his personal intent to provide leadership and policy guidance within the CS on the many vexatious issues surrounding the S&T collection problem. It is apparent from this paper, and others written by him which preceded and followed it, that Bissell leaned toward the position of Scoville, of the IG, and of FI Staff on the central issue: the extent of the CS effort against S&T targets. He expressed

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\*There is nothing in records available to the writer to indicate whether [redacted] draft comments were actually shown to Scoville at this meeting, or at any other time. It seems probable that Bissell used the draft comments only as a basis for his own oral remarks.

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himself clearly on this point:

...the most serious charge which OSI makes against us is that we have not given sufficient recognition to the admittedly high priority attached to requirements for S&T intelligence, more specifically; that we have not devoted enough case officer time, enough ingenuity in the development of operational techniques and approaches, enough of our managerial drive and energy to the fulfillment of this set of requirements as against all the other requirements levied upon us...

I am afraid it is probably true that, if we could measure in terms of man-hours the way in which we have allocated resources to various FI tasks, the record would show that we are still devoting a smaller proportion of our resources to the task of S&T collection than that task deserves in the light of the very high priority assigned to it...

...The main conclusion that seems to me inescapable, whatever the justice or injustice of my suspicion, is that operations officers must henceforth be left in no doubt whatever

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about the priorities. We simply cannot afford to allow opportunities for the collection of such information to go unexploited (or under-exploited) while we are turning out a pretty large volume of political intelligence which can only be described as low grade ore...61/

On the various secondary questions affecting CS relations with OSI, Bissell declared his own impatience with what he called "unnecessary brokerage" between analysts and collectors. FI/SIG he saw as cast essentially in a trouble-shooting role, not as a screen between case officers and OSI analysts. He felt that the CS rule against discussion of sources outside the CS should not be too rigidly applied, especially in non-sensitive cases where OSI assistance could be improved by a little extra candor on the part of the case officer. On requirements, he wanted no change in the existing system of having these served on CS through the IPC system, but thought that OSI advice on the relative priority of requirements submitted by other customers could at times be valuable. On the much-argued question as to whether the CS could afford to develop case officers with

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S&T specialization, Bissell declared:

...I am aware of and I subscribe to the view that for the task of collecting S&T intelligence, an officer must be first a good operator and only second a scientist or technician in his own right. Nevertheless, I would argue strongly that some scientific background not only enhances the ability of the operations officer but is apt to give him a strong personal interest in the subject matter on which he is asked to undertake collection. I believe, therefore, we must continue to try to expand the cadre of CS officers possessing this capability...62/

Finally, he urged C/FI to consider "new procedural devices to bring home at least to certain selected branches in headquarters and stations overseas how seriously we take the priority on S&T operations." 63/ He asked that his paper and  report to him of 1 October be distributed to divisions and staffs for comment.

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This was a landmark document. It represented the first occasion, of which the writer is aware,



on which a head of the Clandestine Services addressed himself so personally and comprehensively to the S&T problem." In many ways it set the stage for a train of events which was to culminate, twenty months later, in a radical departure from the Bissell conception of the FI/SIG role in the CS. It will be noted that the real stimulus for the Bissell pronouncements in his 6 January message to Lloyd George came not from within the CS but from outside, from OSI. Similarly, early in the regime of Richard Helms as DD/P, during 1962, the final impetus to attempt a long delayed major transformation of the S&T effort in the CS came once more from without, this time from the White House and the USIB.

The events that led to that important change in the destiny of FI/SIG can be rather briefly recounted. But first the state of affairs in the Group up to this point should be set down.

The assignment of [ ] to FI Staff as Deputy Chief on 2 October 1960 must be specially noted as an event which was to influence the future status and functions of FI/SIG. [ ] had returned to headquarters [ ] where he had been

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Chief [ ] He had heard of the efforts at headquarters to expand the S&T collection effort and had taken a close personal interest, while [ ] in the development of better materials and instruction on S&T matters for use [ ]

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[ ] He had met frequently with OSI officers lecturing [ ] had listened to OSI complaints about the backwardness of the CS in S&T matters, and was himself early persuaded that CS responses to the challenge were tardy and deficient. Some time before [ ]

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[ ] reassignment [ ] solicited [ ]

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[ ] advice on a proposal [ ] had made to serve as a senior liaison officer between OSI and the CS. [ ]

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strongly advised against this, reminding [ ] that Scoville and Bissell were both opposed to "brokers" between the two offices,

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that institutionalized "liaison" would almost inevitably exacerbate the problem, and that a man with [ ] interest and stature might better be employed directly on CS scientific collection efforts. 63a/

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Immediately after his appointment as DC/FI, [ ] began to take a direct interest in the affairs of FI/SIG; these became his dominant preoccupation in the Staff thereafter as we shall see.

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Another appointment of significance at about this time was that of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, who was made the DD/P's Special Assistant for Scientific Affairs. He served in that position from 1960 until Bissell's resignation. He devoted much of his attention to the problem of improving and extending the applications of scientific research and technology to clandestine operations, and to tapping influential U.S. scientists and engineers for [redacted] on behalf of the CS.

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At the end of the year 1960 the Group had an authorized strength of [redacted] including [redacted] clericals, and all positions had been encumbered. In addition, [redacted] officers were assigned to duty in the Group out of the FI Staff Development Complement. Early in the year the Group was further reorganized. The deputy position was dropped and its incumbent, [redacted] was made head of a new Program Section. Support and guidance to area divisions on S&T operations was provided by the Operations Section, which replaced the former Sciences Branch.

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With the resignation in the summer of 1960 of [redacted] a microbiologist recruited by

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[redacted] the Operations Section was put in charge of [redacted] a chemist with experience in science writing who was also hired by [redacted]. Others in the Section were [redacted] a career OTR officer who had helped to develop and manage the S&T Operations Course; [redacted] a former OSI analyst; [redacted] a physician with operational experience transferred from the Medical Staff; [redacted] an externally recruited mathematician [redacted] an OO officer who had experience in its Science Branch; and [redacted] another physician with the Medical Staff who had been on operational assignment [redacted] thereafter was brought into FI/SIG on the Development Complement.

The work of the Operations Section was essentially to provide staff support to the area divisions on collection activities based on scientific intelligence requirements in the fields of [redacted]

[redacted]

The Section also handled several covert scientific contacts

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[redacted] most of whom had been recruited during [redacted] regime. Central management of these assets was allowed by the DDP on the grounds that they had usefulness in various geographic areas and could not properly be made the responsibility of any one division. The Operations Section also prepared target analyses and preliminary operational plans on behalf of divisions without experienced S&T officers; and it assisted Program Section in gathering data for semi-annual surveys of CS scientific operations.

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The Program Section had [redacted] professionals, including [redacted] secretary. The others assigned to this Section were [redacted] who had specialized in international scientific conferences;

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[redacted] who had handled staff coordination of Soviet materiel procurement and who assisted [redacted]

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on conference operations; [redacted] a CE specialist on S&T cases, and [redacted] transferred from the International Communism Branch of CI Staff to the FI Staff Development Complement. [redacted]

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[redacted] had served for several years with [redacted] As its name implied, Program Section was made responsible for conducting the surveys of

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area division operations and resources to collect scientific and technical intelligence, and to draft programs for such collection. Experience with the operational programming in 1959 and 1960 had fully convinced the Group that its piecemeal comments on individual area division programs and RMD's had little apparent effect on the amount of effort or attention given to S&T collection in the divisions. The Group soon became convinced that commonly agreed collection objectives, a statement of desired manpower allocations to the effort, and carefully selected collection tasks for each area were essential ingredients in any acceptable program.

Finally, on 13 January 1961, after months of intensive work with all area divisions and with the other staffs, FI/SIG presented for DD/P approval a comprehensive Scientific Operations Program for FY 1962. 64/

The Program was intended by the Staff to be used by divisions as a basis for planning that portion of their respective FY 1962 operational programs allocated to clandestine collection of foreign scientific information. In three detailed annexes it prescribed objectives, recommended allocations of full time S&T case

officers at headquarters and at field stations, and outlined a revised training plan. Except for a few minor reservations on the case officer deployment scheme, Bissell approved the Program on 8 February 1961, urging that FI/SIG "actively pursue this matter with the Divisions" and that the "Divisions should be advised that I hope there will be a re-direction of our personnel resources in order that the proportion devoted to the task of collecting scientific intelligence will be more nearly commensurate with the high priority assigned to the task." 65/

The impact of this ambitious programmatic undertaking by the Staff was, at best, unimpressive. From the day the Program was distributed, and in spite of Bissell's imprimatur, it encountered difficulties, if not obstruction, in the divisions. Its mere existence tended to kindle a suspicion that the Staff was about to tread on authorities sacrosanct to the divisions: the authority over personnel assignments and over operational planning. The divisions were not really persuaded that any such thing as a scientific operations program was necessary or possible in the CS. Each division was used to, and resolved to protect,

its own operational game plan and its own managerial style. Consequently division responses to the Program tended to reflect bookkeeping and not operational adjustments of any real scope.

This reaction is rather subtly illustrated by [ ] comments to Bissell on the latter's 6 January memorandum; 66/ while not directly addressed to the Scientific Operations Program as such, [ ] remarks apply a fortiori to the conceptions underlying that document. He casts doubt on what he calls the OSI position\* that more S&T case officers and more S&T operations were needed. "It is difficult to see," he goes on, "how specialized 'S&T case officers' can be efficiently used on a full time basis in the average operational situation." 67/ His view was that there should be an increase in Soviet operations of all types, that SR had long since been on the alert for S&T potential in any of its operations, and that development of S&T competence in all SR operational personnel was generally a better solution than the

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\*It was, in fact, emphatically the FI Staff position as well, as Bissell later reminded him.



full-time specialization of some. 68/ Though Bissell disagreed with [ ] point about the requirement for full-time specialists on S&T matters in the divisions, he agreed with the rest of [ ] comments and suggested that they be circulated as guidance for the CS. 69/

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Later, in a memorandum to C/FI, FI/SIG observed that it found no provision anywhere in the SR Program for full-time concentration of any of its officers on S&T collection problems, to meet quotas proposed by the Staff. 70/ While supporting [ ] appeal for a greater CS effort against the Soviet target as a whole, FI Staff stressed its view that more full-time S&T case officers should be committed to that objective. In May it was finally agreed between the Staff and SR Division that SR would attempt to work out with area divisions the assignment of an additional [ ] officers to Soviet operations and that [ ] of these would be sought as S&T specialists. 71/

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The Chief, WE Division objected sharply to FI/SIG's analysis of its efforts, arguing that the Division had more "scientific case officers" in the field than the Staff had reported, but ignoring the Staff's

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point that only full-time specialists were being counted. 72/ Nevertheless the mood of the Division was cooperative and disagreements between it and the staff on manpower allocations were later ironed out. In general, WE was prepared to go farther and faster in its S&T collection efforts than it did, especially through the more active engagement of its many liaison assets; but it was restrained by the influential dicta of SR Division which generally advocated concentration on [ ] recruitments of Soviet sources and de-emphasis on the role of liaison in that effort. EE Division's initial reaction to the Program recommendations was non-argumentative, more neutral than compliant, reporting its S&T operational resources while avoiding commitments to shift or increase them in line with FI/SIG suggestions. FE was responsive, and indeed sought FI/SIG assistance later in the year in establishing an S&T section in the China Operations Division. NE Division, in its program, abstained from entering man-year estimates of time devoted to S&T collection, although it was known in the Staff that at least [ ] NE officers in [ ] were engaged almost full-time on S&T collection

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requirements. Later in the year, James Critchfield, Chief of NE Division, sharply questioned whether one of these officers was being appropriately tasked by headquarters and whether his S&T efforts might not be reduced. 73/ The question here was whether headquarters requirements, issuing from SR, but prompted in part by FI/SIG on the basis of OSI urgings, were suitable for clandestine collection. [redacted] had complained that it saw very little intelligence profit to be had from the [redacted] scientists traveling to the USSR equipped with elicitation requirements which could more appropriately be satisfied by the Office of Operations or other overt collectors.

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This particular issue illustrates what was to be a continuing conflict over operational philosophy and method between FI/SIG and other parts of the Staff on the one hand, and SR Division, namely, the relative emphasis in operations to be placed upon current information objectives, using whatever sources and methods which happened to be available, and concentration on recruitment of human sources. The two views were of course neither logically nor practically incompatible; it was not impossible that different officers, or

different stations, or different functional parts of the CS could concentrate on one or the other, so that both aims could be pursued simultaneously. Yet it became a settled conviction in SR that concentration on the one precluded effective effort on the other, that scientific information obtained by elicitation or as a by-product of recruitment-oriented operations was usually valueless, and that the main resources of the CS should be marshalled to acquire controlled Soviet sources with access to classified information only. The impressive resources of SR Division were early marshalled to disseminate and, so far as possible, to enforce this as the governing doctrine in all operations directed at Soviet targets. It was carried by dispatch and by word-of-mouth by SR travelers into all operational areas, beginning in 1961 at the latest. Some area division chiefs and several senior officers with experience in Soviet operations  and elsewhere in the European area during the late fifties and early sixties shared this outlook and assisted in its propagation. Its effect, whatever the

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authority behind the FI Staff's proposed Scientific Operations Program, was to thwart, if not nullify, the intentions of that Program.\*

It must be remembered that that Program had two main elements: a statement of collection objectives, area by area, specifying scientific intelligence gaps requiring special operational attention, and a deployment schedule for full-time scientific operations specialists. Foremost in Bissell's mind was this second element of the Program, which was by far the more controversial of the two. SR and other divisions did not ignore the call for greater effort against S&T information objectives, as outlined by the Staff. What they did resist was the Staff's ideas as to how that effort should be programmed. It was the steadfast conviction of the Staff that the proper organizational response of the CS to the magnitude of the intelligence challenge had to be an identifiable centrally managed program, staffed by specialists in

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\*In this connection, the author recalls a meeting late in 1961 with David Murphy, then Acting Chief, EE Division who expressed the view that regardless of what existed on paper, there was and could be no such program in the CS.

scientific operations in a strong organizational entity with operational planning and directive authority.\* The first "Program" launched by the Staff, seen in those terms, was defective and ambiguous. Area division command prerogatives were left effectively untouched. The Program had only advisory force, and since its main thrust was in the direction of Soviet targets, it instantly encountered the programming authority of SR Division, which was and remained controlling throughout the troubled history of FI/SIG.

Perhaps the most profound influence militating against the FI/SIG position and appearing to support the SR operational outlook, was the extraordinary intelligence windfall resulting from the Penkovskiy operation. For a time, while the operation lasted (well into 1962), CS management could show impressive evidence of its capacity to seize and exploit a major operational opportunity. The operation was not


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\*It will be recalled that at the point in 1959 when FI/SIG first broached this idea, in a memorandum to COPS/DDP 74/, the policy of Bissell was to reduce staff complements and to keep FI/SIG, in particular, in an advisory, trouble-shooting role. Within the Group it was felt that this weakened Group leadership and authority at a time when strong central direction of the CS S&T effort was most needed.

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the result of deliberate planning; it bore no evident relation to a programmed effort of the kind FI/SIG was sponsoring; and it tended to confirm the SR view that the best use of CS resources -- in relation to Soviet intelligence targets -- was general readiness, ability to capitalize on the unexpected, and concentration on expansion of expertise in Soviet operations rather than in a particular category of intelligence interest such as S&T information.

Scientific information, in the SR view, was but one of several necessary concerns which also included political, economic, and military affairs. The division did not separately program for "economic intelligence" or "military intelligence" in its positive intelligence operations, and argued that special programming for "scientific intelligence" would not affect or improve what it was already doing through all the various operational avenues open to it:



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Thus the Staff initiative to establish an over-all program, as a means of orienting area division plans and organizing case officer resources, foundered in its first year. Until mid-1962, FI/SIG continued to acquire data on division scientific operations for the semi-annual surveys. But further attempts to formulate CS-wide scientific operations programs were dropped.

Long before that happened, however, [ ] and [ ] were convinced that some more fundamental and incisive action would be needed within the CS to meet the rising pressures from OSI and other outside parties.

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In July of 1961 Mr. Lawrence Hyland, a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, met with Gottlieb [ ] at Scoville's suggestion. Hyland had been looking into various aspects of the Agency's scientific and technical activities. In the course of his sessions with OSI he had asked about the offices OSI dealt with and had been led on to a discussion of the collection problem, as Scoville, General [ ] and others in OSI saw it. It was clear to Gottlieb [ ] in this meeting with Hyland, that in his questions about OSI-CS relations, and about the apparent scarcity of officers with scientific

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education in SR Division, that he had assimilated much of Scoville's concern on these and related subjects. 75/

On 30 October 1961 General Cabell, Acting Director, received from Mr. McGeorge Bundy at the White House, a brief memorandum stating the recommendation of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that the USIB "make an early assessment of the problem with a view to improving the collection, coordination, and analysis of intelligence concerning the scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet Bloc." 76/ General Cabell directed that the DCI's Assistant for Coordination, General Desmond Balmer, undertake the assessment and report to the USIB by 15 December 1961. 77/

On 9 November members of General Balmer's staff met with Lloyd George,  to discuss agent collection of scientific and technical information in the CS. The Balmer group asked for data on the DDP's scientific collection program and for figures showing what proportion of the total FI collection effort was devoted to scientific information collection. George later reported to Bissell his concern that the way the Balmer group was going about its enquiry, that

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is, by focussing on agent collection only rather than the total clandestine effort (including technical collection of SIGINT and ELINT, and overhead reconnaissance) might distort the total picture of the CS scientific collection activities. 78/ In reviewing for Bissell the state of agent collection activities,  noted that divisions had reported a sizeable increase in part-time case officer efforts, but a decline in full-time assignments to scientific collection both at headquarters and in the field. 79/ Overall, he found the effort was "still substantially below the level which we estimate as enough to do the job required of us, as based on the community's agreed requirements and urgent collection problems in this field." 80/

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At the close of 1961, Scoville addressed to General Balmer a memorandum on clandestine collection of S&T intelligence. 81/ Scoville sent a copy to Bissell with a note explaining that the memorandum had been prepared at General Balmer's request. In it Scoville reiterated and reemphasized most of the points he had made in a similar letter to the Director about eighteen months before. 82/ His letter closed with a ringing call:

...essential to the development of a capability for effective collecting of S&T information vital to our needs is (1) a policy determination to develop a program with which to task individual Clandestine Services components in an orchestrated worldwide collection effort, (2) a concomitant specific dedication of Clandestine Services manpower resources to the performance of assigned tasks, and (3) such changes within the DD/P command structure and the acquisition of such technically qualified personnel as may be necessary to the effective performance of those S&T tasks. 83/

In commenting to Lloyd George on Scoville's memorandum, Bissell acknowledged that the CS might not yet be pursuing the S&T collection task with the required energy and resources, basing this impression on data recently provided by FI/SIG; and he asked George to keep him informed on "the limiting factors on the scale of our effort and of the specific steps we might be able to take to widen our effort or remove these limitations." 84/

During the year 1961 Bissell had been critically occupied with the Bay of Pigs affairs and its aftermath.

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Allen Dulles had retired and Bissell at this time was perhaps already preoccupied, to a degree, with his own plans. He had heard many times the arguments of OSI, yet balancing to some extent the criticisms of Scoville was the manifest intelligence harvest being reaped from the Penkovskiy operation. The blandness of his reaction to Scoville's memorandum probably reflects the combined influence of these circumstances.

His last communication on the subject was on 9 February 1962, just before his resignation and the appointment of Helms as DD/P. Commenting on General Balmer's draft report for the Chairman, USIB, Bissell objected, among other things, to the implication in the report that the CS had no long-range program for S&T collection\* and that its activities in that dimension should remain under continuing scrutiny. 85/ He asserted that there was such a program, having in mind the exertions of FI Staff the year before. Yet in terms of OSI expectations there was of course no

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\*A conclusion clearly carried over into the Balmer report from the results of Scoville's analysis of the situation. It should be noted that a former officer in OSI's Collection Staff, [redacted] was appointed to Balmer's staff and took an active part in the enquiry.

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such program. The area divisions were in all major respects going their various ways, under very little effective control by the FI Staff over programming, doctrine, and use of resources.

At the end of the Bissell era the CS thus found itself beleaguered from the outside on the S&T problem, and with weakened and distracted leadership on the inside. The principal complainant outside the CS was Scoville, who had the ear of the DCI, of Dr. Killian, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and of many other highly placed officials in Defense, State, the Atomic Energy Commission, and elsewhere. In this author's judgment there can be little doubt that the stimulus for the USIB enquiry ordered by the White House was traceable to the persistence and zeal of Scoville. Internally, the evidences of the DD/P's earlier resolve to establish a strong and organized S&T collection program were becoming less and less distinct. At the time of Bissell's resignation only [ ] of the authorized [ ] FI/SIG professional positions were encumbered. While the Group and its support were called on from time

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to time by area divisions and by the DDP, and while it has some accomplishments to look back on,\* its position had become increasingly obscure and ambiguous within the CS. Yet it kept its determination to find a viable means of expanding the operational base for S&T collection within the practical constraints of the CS command structure. Moreover, with the announced appointment of Helms as DD/P, there was a stirring of expectation in the Group that new initiatives on the S&T front might be given serious consideration.

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\*Apart from its demanding chores on the operations surveys and the drafting of the scientific operations program, the Group managed [redacted] (b)(1)  
 [redacted] from outside (b)(3)  
 the CS for placement in scientific operations, developed and handled three common-concern projects (one of these acquired from CI Staff included [redacted] (b)(1)  
 [redacted] prepared lead and targetting studies (b)(3)  
 for field stations under the CS-OSI [redacted] program, (b)(1)  
 coordinated a considerable number of OSI and other DDI (b)(3)  
 scientific travel cases involving intelligence missions abroad, created the first central roster in the CS of (b)(1)  
 scientific consultants and contacts for operational use, (b)(3)  
 participated actively in OTR training courses (including provision of case material), administered the on-the-job S&T operational training of several Junior Officer Trainees and two transfers into the FI Development Complement, and standardized definitions and nomenclature applicable to scientific operations.

II. The Helms Era: 1962-1965

A. Proposal for a Centralized S&T Operational Effort.

The Balmer report was not submitted to USIB until 21 May 1962. Meanwhile, it was clear that Helms was prepared to listen carefully to a reasoned staff analysis of the situation and any staff proposals which gave promise of effectively upgrading the CS S&T operational effort.

In January, in a paper drafted by [ ] George sent to Bissell his comments on "the limiting factors" Bissell had referred to in the latter's 19 December memorandum to George. 86/ There is no record of Bissell's reaction to this C/FI paper which for the first time proposed a centralized attack on the S&T target directed by a headquarters unit specially constituted for that purpose. The paper found its way to Bross who returned it to Helms on 19 February 1962 with the remark: "...for your further consideration whenever you get a chance to think about it." 87/ Helms returned it to George the following day with a request for further clarification concerning "the problem in re [ ] existing staff and its placement".88/

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From that point, [ ] taking heed not only of Scoville's long-standing complaints and the implications of the Balmer enquiry but also of their own conviction as to the obligations of the CS, began to shape their conceptions of a new and bolder approach to the S&T issue within the CS.

The idea of a central scientific operations component with action authority began to take concrete form early in 1962. In late April, George sent back to Helms, via Karamessines, under a covering memorandum, 89/ the 8 January 1962 memorandum he had prepared in answer to Bissell's earlier request, but this time adding a draft statement of functions and a T/O for a completely reconstituted and strengthened Scientific Intelligence Group. 90/ The Chief of the new FI/SIG would be responsible for directing all operations of the CS with capability of producing S&T information. Prominent outside scientists would be called upon as advisors in this program. A permanent cadre of scientific operations officers would be collected, managed, and assigned by the new unit. [ ] headquarters and [ ] field positions under the control of FI/SIG were requested with 1 July 1964 set as the target date for

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the full staffing of the headquarters organization and the overseas deployment of the field case officers. Karamessines found this plan overbold and too ambitious.

After discussion with [ ] who, [ ] had composed the plan, he returned the papers in June with the request to [ ] that the plan be drafted along less radical lines before submission to Helms. 91/

While this re-drafting was underway [ ] had occasion to discuss with an officer of EE Division, [ ] [ ] with the knowledge and approval of David Murphy, Chief, EE, a possible assignment for [ ] in FI/SIG.

[ ] then Deputy Chief of the [ ] had served with OSI and also had considerable operational experience on S&T cases during a duty tour [ ] [ ] outlined to [ ] the FI Staff plans for an expanded, staff-directed, S&T operational program. When [ ] reported his discussion with [ ] to Murphy, 92/

the latter immediately sent a memorandum to George expressing not only his reluctance to release [ ] for duty in FI Staff but also seriously questioning "the feasibility and the wisdom of attempting to establish a new operational unit of this sort in the DDP." 93/ Murphy sent a copy of his demurrer to C/SR. [ ]

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thereafter talked with both Murphy and [redacted] (b)(3)  
 C/SR, pointing out that nothing had yet been settled  
 with Karamessines and that [redacted] had given an exag- (b)(3)  
 gerated impression of the size of the projected organi-  
 zation and of its possible impact on division authority.  
 But the word was out of new schemes afoot in FI Staff,  
 with opposition developing in the divisions even before  
 a plan acceptable to the DDP had been drafted.

In late July General Balmer held an interagency  
 meeting to discuss and resolve some of the main points  
 of contention in the draft report of his staff which  
 had been circulated for comment prior to submission to  
 USIB. Reporting on this meeting to Helms and Karamessines, 94/

[redacted] noted two issues of special interest to the CS (b)(3)  
 which were discussed at Balmer's meeting: one, the  
 subject of [redacted] (b)(1)  
 [redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] Contacts Division in the  
 Office of Operations; the other, establishment of a long-  
 range CS program to collect S&T information. On the  
 latter point [redacted] reminded his addressees: (b)(3)

...that the implication that we have such a  
 program is based on the assumption that certain  
 recommendations the FI Staff has been discussing

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with ADD/P will be implemented at a level sufficient to make them effective. Unless this is done, I do not believe it is defensible to say that we have a long-range program under way. 95/  
General Balmer's draft report had included the recommendation that

CIA should develop and carry out a long-range program for the clandestine collection of scientific and technical information from the Soviet Bloc. 96/

This wording clearly implied that the CS had no such program and Helms, as in the case of Bissell before him, could not accept this implication. The view of top CS management and of SR Division was that strong efforts were being made to improve agent collection against the difficult Soviet targets, that the scope and shape of this effort might not be visible in the form envisaged or desired by OSI, but it had been going on, had been producing, and was to continue. The DDP insisted that the wording of the Balmer recommendation be changed to read "CIA should continue and emphasize a long range program.....etc." This was done and in his comments\* to the Director on the Balmer Report Helms stated

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\*Drafted by

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This recommendation is of particular interest to me. I am in full accord with its argument. 97/ Yet internally the FI Staff was convinced that the diffused activities of the divisions, which were essentially unfocussed and without central direction, did not constitute a program and did not measure up to the dimensions of the problem.

Pursuing this conviction, [ ] prepared another paper, 98/ addressing the reservations which Karamessines had expressed to him earlier about the engagement of staffs in operations and possible conflicts with area division authorities if the initial plan [ ] had presented were to be carried out. [ ] assured Karamessines in this paper that the intention of the Staff was to cooperate with the divisions, not to dominate or interfere with them in the development of scientific operations. The work of FI/SIG would complement, not displace, the related collection activities of the divisions, would be confined initially at least, and for the most part, to developing access to foreign scientific target personalities [ ] and would not attempt to duplicate the work of SR Division in handling and directing recruited agent assets. The

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new mission of FI/SIG would be to enlarge the S&T operational effort by adding its own case officer efforts to those of area divisions, and to focus and coordinate the overall operational program. Karamessines returned [ ] paper on 6 September indicating his agreement with it and requesting "active follow up."

In September [ ] developed at length his views on the content of a staff study which [ ] had promised to the DD/P. This study was completed and submitted by [ ] to the DD/P on 20 September. Helms approved it the same day, authorizing an increase in FI/SIG from [ ] during FY 1963, and a further increase to [ ] for FY 1964. 99/ On 21 September Helms sent a brief memorandum to Scoville, now Deputy Director (Research),\* reiterating his concurrence in the Balmer recommendation concerning a clandestine collection program and stating that

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\*Scoville was appointed to this new post in February 1962. A DCI Action Memorandum, No. A-48 of 18 Sep 1962, signed by Kirkpatrick as Executive Director, designated the DD/R as action officer to coordinate replies to a request of Gen. Balmer on 27 Aug 1962 that each agency provide estimates of manpower and funds required to implement actions recommended in the Balmer report. 100/

Clandestine Services have formulated plans for reinforcing and reorienting the program of clandestine S&T collection. Every effort will be made to implement this plan within the resources presently available. 101/

Helms sent a copy of this note to the D/DCI on 1 October and in a covering memorandum gave details of the plan for upgrading the CS effort and enlarging the mission of FI/SIG. 102/ [ ] drafted this memorandum, including in it figures on total CS manpower devoted to the S&T collection effort, full time and part time, and the planned manpower and operational budget estimates for FI/SIG. Helms memo stated that these details were not provided to the DD/R since "I do not consider it desirable to have the resources of the Clandestine Services discussed or debated in the USIB." 103/

(b)(3)

In the staff study he prepared for Helms, [ ] had emphasized the weakness of an area-oriented approach to the S&T collection problem, the need for a strong cadre of case officers with scientific and technical backgrounds and interests, the importance of sustained developmental work by trained specialists to assess and approach scientific agent candidates, and the

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necessity for central management and coordination of all CS S&T collection efforts.  paper concluded that

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...simple addition of manpower to present efforts of area divisions and pursuit of the area-oriented approach to scientific operations will not bring about the required improvement and reinforcement of these efforts. We conclude that improvement can be made by development of a centralized capability for effective operational guidance in a unit equipped both to provide badly needed fundamental analysis and planning and to perform operational tasks as required. 104/

The new program to be administered by FI/SIG included responsibility for mastery of pertinent S&T requirements, collection and analysis of target data, selection of target personalities for cultivation as support agents or as reporting sources, operational planning, conduct of operations, preparation of S&T reports, guidance and support of division S&T operations, and development of operational assets within the scientific community. It was an ambitious program, requiring new construction almost from the ground up.

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B. Establishment of a Strengthened Scientific Intelligence Group in FI Staff.

At a meeting with Helms attended by George, (b)(3)  
 on the day he approved the new charter for FI/SIG, it was agreed that the Group should begin at once to assemble and train the additional personnel required, and to reorganize according to the plan outlined in the staff study. It was further agreed that until the Group had established itself and had acquired additional officers trained and ready to function, it would be prudent not to assert too early the new authorities granted to the Group or to accept responsibility for operations which it was not yet equipped to handle effectively. Also, it was decided that issuance of a Clandestine Services Instruction for the Group could be deferred until it had gained some experience with its new mission.

The plan of organization, with the  positions authorized during FY 1963, called for creation of an Operations Section to contain  officers, (b)(3)  
an Intelligence Assistant, and a secretary. The (b)(3)  
Office of the Chief had  positions: Chief, Deputy, (b)(3)  
Secretary, and  Clerk-typists. The latter were to (b)(3)  
be available, on a pool basis, for clerical assistance

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to the Operations Section. That Section contained four sub-sections: Physical Sciences, Life Sciences, Earth Sciences, and Space Sciences. [ ] positions were allocated to Physical Sciences, [ ] to Space Sciences, and [ ] each to the other sub-sections. On board to occupy these positions in September 1962 were only [ ] officers, a secretary, and a clerk-typist (see Figure 1). Two of the officers, [ ] [ ] a nuclear physicist, and [ ] a medical doctor, were qualified to head up the Physical Sciences and Life Sciences sub-sections respectively. They were immediately appointed to those positions.

[ ] an officer with academic training in chemical engineering and with operation experience in [ ] had joined the Group in February 1961, transferring from FE Division. He was assigned to [ ] sub-section.

During the last three months of 1962 the numerous practical details of reorganization and reconstruction of the Group, to equip it for its greatly expanded responsibilities, occupied most of the time of [ ] as Chief, [ ] as Deputy Chief, and [ ] as prospective Chief of Operations.

Figure 1

FI/SIG Personnel, September 1962



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Job descriptions had to be written for all positions. Requisitions specifying desired qualifications of candidates sought for the various grade levels had to be prepared and discussed with Agency recruiters. Plans for providing training and cover for new recruits had to be drawn up. New space had to be acquired at a time when there were other high priority claims on available office accommodations by other Agency elements.\*

[redacted] with previous management experience in the National Security Agency and in FI/D and [redacted] with extensive field experience in the conduct of S&T operations, brought a unique combination of talents to bear on these diverse planning and organizational tasks. Along with [redacted] both officers had urged for years the establishment of a strong central authority within the CS for developing and coordinating S&T operations. Both approached the challenges of the new FI/SIG mission with verve and total dedication, as did the other

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\*Notably the new Special Operations Division and Domestic Operations Division in the DD/P, and the DD/R (re-named DD/S&T in August 1963) which had begun to expand during this period. Enlarged quarters for the Group were obtained on the ground floor of the Headquarters Building in the northwest area. This space was refitted in the early weeks of 1963 and finally occupied by the Group in April where it remained until August 1966.

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[redacted] officers in the Group.

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[redacted] carried most of the day-to-day work load of current staff support activities and also assisted in the formation of plans for the new organization. [redacted] was new to the

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Group, having recently returned to Headquarters after several years on assignment in Europe as [redacted]

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A specially tailored [redacted] arrangement was worked out for him, [redacted]

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From the beginning of 1963 a determined effort was made to locate qualified officers for assignment to the Group. First attention was given to CS officers known to have some scientific or engineering background and some experience with S&T cases. The first and predictable problem to be faced by the Group was the fact that any of these officers, with a good operational pedigree, were already well-situated in an area division or on assignment overseas and not likely to be dislodged. Yet the news that a new operational campaign in the S&T field was about to get underway did reach the ears of some officers who had a natural interest in that field or who, one way or another, had acquired an interest in S&T operations from previous case experience.

It was early apparent, however, that the numbers from which to choose within the CS would, for a variety of practical reasons, be small indeed. The DDP directed the Chief of Operational Services to negotiate with area divisions for the release of certain designated officers for assignment to FI/SIG. The Group intended to use this authority sparingly, preferring to locate and then induce a desired officer to accept assignment to the Staff with the agreement of his parent office.

As it happened, however, Chief, Operational Services approached SR Division before the Group could pave the way for effecting voluntary changes of assignment. The result was an immediate broadside by [redacted] then Chief, SR, against the whole idea of having FI/SIG authorized to increase its staff and to function as an operational unit. 105/ [redacted] argued that FI/SIG was not and could not be in a position to implement an S&T collection program, that it lacked both S&T and operational expertise, that SR and other operating divisions were the only locations in which new recruits in the S&T effort could function effectively, and that FI/SIG should remain in a staff support role. "This," [redacted] concluded, "is the job which it was designed to do and can do. To bring it, instead, into direct competition with, or as a replacement for, one important aspect of the fundamental task with which the Clandestine Services is charged would not produce the results anticipated but would bring additional confusion and a most undesirable dispersion of productive operating capacity." 106/ [redacted] memorandum went to Karamessines who called at once for a meeting with [redacted] noting on the routing sheet that "I'm sure we can reconcile these views with our needs." 107/

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There is no evidence available to the author that Helms ever saw [ ] memorandum though it is most unlikely that Karamessines would not have briefed him on its contents and on the outcome of the meeting with [ ] There is no record of that meeting; however, later in January [ ] [ ] met with [ ] to assure him that FI/SIG had no intention of displacing SR Division's S&T efforts, and obviously could not do so; the main objective of FI/SIG, they explained, was to supplement the CS operational capacity against S&T targets in any way it could and, hopefully, in close collaboration with SR and other divisions. Some accord was reached on the respective missions of the two elements and a little later [ ] visited [ ] with a proposal to detail one of his officers to FI/SIG for a trial period and, if mutually agreed at the end of that period, to extend the assignment to a full two-year tour in the Staff. The designated officer, [ ] did in fact serve in the Group for about six months and then was returned to SR Division. Another former SR Division officer, [ ] [ ] was later assigned to the Group following

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his return in December 1963 from a field assignment

[REDACTED]

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The accord between FI/SIG and SR Division was, at best, uneasy. The attitude toward the Group, the conception of its place and role as expressed in

[REDACTED]

letter, persisted in the Division\* but did not flare again into an open challenge to the Group's mission and authority until early 1965.

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#### C. Staffing Problems

During 1963, with considerable assistance from FI/Support Group and Office of Personnel, FI/SIG began an intensive search for officer candidates outside the Agency. Blind advertising was placed in newspapers and professional magazines in several major cities. There were numerous responses to these ads over a period of about eighteen months. The Group received and reviewed about six hundred applicant files including those referred to the Group by OSI, which was engaged simultaneously in a similar talent hunt. Applicants who

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\*Notably in the Reports and Requirements Staff. As we shall see later, good relations developed between FI/SIG and the S&T Branch of SR Division's Collection Group, which David Murphy established soon after he became Chief. SR in the autumn of 1963. This harmony lasted through [REDACTED] term as Chief of the SR/CG/S&T Branch.

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appeared most likely to be qualified and suitable were first contacted by Agency recruiters who prepared interview reports for review by FI/SIG. A small proportion of these pre-screened applicants were found to be apparently qualified and were then interviewed by the Group, with the objective either of direct hire into the Staff or of operational use on the outside as scientific support assets. The numbers so chosen for internal staff assignment were extremely small; only [ ] officers were thus obtained: one during 1963 and the others during 1964-65. (b)(3)

At the end of calendar year 1963 [ ] officers [ ] intelligence assistants had been added to the Staff. One of the officers was an outside recruit fresh from college with an engineering physics degree; the other [ ] were CS officers recently returned from the field and only one of these, [ ] was experienced on S&T cases. The total FI/SIG complement at year's end was [ ] professionals and [ ] clericals. (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3)

Thus, fifteen months from the time the new FI/SIG mission was approved, the Group was far short even of its reduced authorized strength of [ ] In consequence its professional competence, operationally and in S&T (b)(3) (b)(3)

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expertise, was still far from adequate. Only [ ]  
of the [ ] professionals had any experience  
immediately applicable to S&T cases and much of  
their time was necessarily devoted to training and  
supervising the other [ ] In addition, the re-  
quired and lengthy OTR training for the new and in-  
experienced officers subtracted further from the  
effective strength of the Group. It was clear that  
the identification, selection, and clandestine  
training of scientists or engineers with no previous  
intelligence experience would be a painfully slow,  
expensive, and laborious process.\* The Career  
Trainee (former Junior Officer Trainee) Program was  
specifically designed to do this to meet the Agency's  
long term needs for professionally qualified officers,  
including scientists and engineers. At year's end,  
1963, the Group had increasingly turned its attention  
to that Program as a source of acceptable if inexperienced,

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\*In August 1963 Helms requested the DDCI to approve [ ]  
Scientific Pay Schedule positions for the CS. 108/ This  
was to allow advanced salary rates for specially qualified  
scientific personnel recruited outside the Agency. FI/SIG  
was allowed one of these positions but it was never used.

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recruits.\* Yet the very fact that this was a long-term solution to the personnel recruitment problem meant only enforced delays and deferment of actions by the Group which a more fully experienced operations staff would have been prepared to carry out.

As 1964 began, the approved table of organization of the Group (see Figure 2) included [ ] headquarters positions [ ] field position; the latter accommodated a staff agent project administered and funded by the Group. This total of [ ] positions, rather than the originally authorized strength of [ ] came about as the result of mandatory Agency-wide ceiling reductions during 1963. It was understood, however, that the secretarial positions were flexible, that is, they would be allowed to accommodate additional secretaries as the Group approached its maximum professional strength.

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[ ] young trainees were temporarily detailed to the Group during the late fall of 1963 for a few weeks, prior to scheduled operations training. This brief duty afforded the trainees a glimpse of the S&T efforts of the Group and of the CS as a whole and was intended to motivate them toward selection of an S&T specialization in operations. It was not expected that they would be able to provide more than routine assistance in the short time they were available.

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Figure 2

Table of Organization, February 1964



(b)(1)  
(b)(3)



search was going on for a more senior officer to serve as permanent chief. [redacted] Chief of Life Sciences Section, who had been with FI/SIG since May 1960, requested transfer to the DD/S&T in June 1962 to accept a position of more responsibility than the Group was prepared to offer. His departure, and that of [redacted] in May 1964, his assistant, left the Life Sciences Section entirely vacant for more than a year. One of the most promising of the JOTs, who had served with the Group for several months after completion of the Operations Course and was finally entered on the rolls in August, decided to resume his academic studies in Earth Science and resigned in September. The death in May of [redacted] an experienced CS intelligence assistant who was to direct the Research and Reports Unit, and the resignations of [redacted] other young intelligence assistants, disrupted the work of that unit and diminished the support it could provide to the operations officers for several months.

At the close of FY 1964 (30 June 1964), the point at which the Group was to have reached its maximum authorized strength of [redacted] its actual effective strength was [redacted] officers, [redacted] intelligence assistants,

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[ ] secretary, and [ ] clerk-typist (see Figure 3).  
[ ] positions were occupied in Physical Sciences  
Section and [ ] in Space Sciences. The other sciences  
sections were empty. [ ] positions were occupied in  
the Research and Reports Unit. All [ ] officer posi-  
tions were occupied in the Office of the Chief.

By the end of calendar 1964, the situation was  
somewhat improved. Research and Reports Unit had been  
reorganized and renamed Operations Support Unit. All  
[ ] of the positions allotted to it were encumbered.  
It was headed by [ ] a CS professional with exten-  
sive experience in WH Division. The Life Sciences and  
Earth Sciences Sections at this point were vacant.  
Physical Sciences Section was down to [ ] officers (not  
including [ ] positions vacant;  
Space Sciences, headed by its new Chief, [ ]  
(previously with SR Division), had all of its [ ] posi-  
tions occupied. The complete staffing of this section  
and its development into an effective team under [ ]  
leadership represented a qualitative improvement in the  
Group's ability to function operationally during 1964  
and early 1965 (see Figure 4).

Counting the occupied positions in the Office of  
the Chief, there were at year's end [ ] assigned

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Figure 3  
FI/SIG Personnel, July 1964



(b)(1)  
(b)(3)



Figure 4

FI/SIG Personnel, January 1965



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(b)(3)

professionals in the Group though only [ ] of these (b)(3)  
had any significant experience with S&T operations, as  
compared with [ ] with such experience at the start (b)(3)  
of the year. Also, the [ ] JOTs on detail but not (b)(3)  
assigned to the Group had to be supervised and kept use-  
fully employed. This added to the strains on the more  
senior officers who were attempting to develop operations  
while coping with the management of a suddenly enlarged  
group of willing, eager, but almost wholly inexperienced  
assistants. The disproportionately large flux of per-  
sonnel gains and losses during the year -- a total of  
[ ] changes in a T/O of only [ ] -- (b)(3)  
had a necessarily interruptive and sometimes disquieting  
effect on managers and managed alike; this was perhaps (b)(3)  
the most important single factor impairing operational  
efficiency and progress in the Group at the time. Never-  
theless, the increased numbers of occupants in the Group --  
young, busy, and hopeful -- served to elevate the morale  
of the office and to create an esprit which was to con-  
tinue for a short time into 1965, and then quickly fade.  
The reasons for this unfortunate turn of events will be  
discussed later.

In February, [ ] a dynamic and productive (b)(3)  
officer with abundant S&T experience in the Western

Europe area, joined the Group and remained with it until December 1968, first as head of the Earth Sciences Section and later, after [redacted] transfer to FE Division (at his own request), as head of the combined Earth and Space Sciences Section. Later in the year [redacted] who had resigned from the Agency (out of OSI Life Sciences Division) to join the National Science Foundation several years before, was rehired in October for placement in FI/SIG as Chief, Life Sciences Section.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

A relatively strong staffing situation persisted from February into the early summer. But by that time the Group was facing serious obstacles to the development and pursuit of its program. Morale had begun to decline in the spring, in face of persistent challenges by area divisions to the authority of FI/SIG, to the validity of its charter, and to the value and propriety of its operational efforts. In April a new DD/P -- Desmond Fitzgerald -- was appointed, replacing Helms. Within the Group and FI Staff as a whole speculation was rife as to Fitzgerald's conception -- and intended use -- of his Staffs. As resistance to the SIG program began to loom larger on several fronts, the spirit of

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the Group sagged and a number of its most able officers began to look and move elsewhere. From July on a parade of transfers and resignations took place. Twelve persons left the Group beginning in March 1965 and only four were replaced from then until the end of the year. By the end of December 1965 [ ] officers remained in FI/SIG, [ ] intelligence assistant, and [ ] secretaries (see Figure 5).

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Early in 1966 [ ] after years of resolute effort to help establish a viable, centrally-managed S&T program in the CS, regrettably resigned from the Agency to become [ ] He must be counted among the few officers in the CS with that unique combination of rare talents: operational flair and mastery of an important field of scientific enquiry. Late in 1966 a promising young oceanographer, hired in 1965, transferred to FE Division preparatory to field assignment. Also during 1966, three secretaries moved on and one was hired. Only one officer was added to the staff in that year, [ ] a young physicist hired directly from a university. But by this time the charter of FI/SIG had changed, at Fitzgerald's direction. The reasons for this change and the events leading up to it are discussed in the succeeding pages.

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Figure 5  
FI/SIG Personnel, January 1966



(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

D. The Operational Role of FI/SIG.

During 1963 and most of 1964 about a third of the Group's time (not counting that spent on personnel matters and training new arrivals) was used on required staff work for the DDP and other management levels. The rest was used for operational research, operational planning, and project development.

[redacted] as Deputy Chief in the Group, was given specific responsibility for handling the various staff support matters that the Group became responsible for. These included: coordination of the travel of OSI and other DD/S&T representatives who were planning to brief CS field stations on recent intelligence developments and producer needs; [redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] arrangement for travel [redacted] officials to U.S. research and development installations; periodic surveys of area division S&T operations and S&T officer assignments; preparation of data and the FI/SIG responses to annual program calls. In addition [redacted] served as FI/SIG security officer and, with the assistance of a young analyst borrowed from Records Integration Division, set up a new records system for the Group

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(b)(3)

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during the early months of 1963. He handled, besides, a variety of ad hoc staff matters which from time to time were referred by the DD/P or C/FI to the Group for action.

This pattern of staff support activity persisted through 1963 and 1964. The Group became much more actively involved in guidance and coordination of area division S&T activities than it had hitherto. The writer, as Chief of the Group, had frequent direct access to Helms and Karamessines; and for a time, particularly in the early months of this period, all FI/SIG officers felt a sense of engagement in, and responsibility for, important affairs of the CS.

On the operational side it was agreed with  that the Group should first attempt to build up its research and planning capabilities, and establish required files and records on scientists according to their qualifications for operational tasks. A Research and Reports Unit was immediately established to assist the officers in this basic work. It was further understood that, as time allowed, the operations officers would proceed to expand their contacts in the U.S. scientific and engineering communities, in order to

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build up gradually a network of scientific assets for operational assistance on clandestine collection tasks.

FI/SIG was at pains to confine itself to these pursuits during the early months of its new mission. The watchwords were professionalism and careful planning, especially while the Group was so heavily occupied with acquiring and training new staff. At the same time the Group was resolved to establish the closest possible working relations with area divisions at both management and case officer levels, to provide them with timely support when requested, and to gain their confidence and active cooperation.

Good rapport and understanding were soon worked out with WE Division. Under [redacted] direction, (b)(3) and from September 1965 under Rolfe Kingsley, the Division was generally responsive to FI/SIG proposals and frequently called on FI/SIG for guidance and support\* [redacted] (b)(3) [redacted] were on friendly, cooperative terms from (b)(3) the outset. Early in July 1963 [redacted] as Chief (b)(3)

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\*A large percentage, perhaps two thirds, of the operational work of FI/SIG from 1963 on was conducted with or on behalf of WE Division.



of Operations in FI/SIG, met with [redacted] Chief,  
WE/FI to outline and discuss FI/SIG plans. [redacted]  
found [redacted] receptive, in principle, to the idea of  
having FI/SIG develop a few carefully selected scien-  
tific agents to be placed in the WE area and controlled  
from Headquarters rather than by stations. 109/

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The Group already had a candidate for one of these  
position, a young physicist who had been recruited by

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[redacted] in mid-1962. He was offered to  
FI/SIG by [redacted] in December 1962,  
for use as a scientist staff agent after completion of  
his operations training [redacted] in January 1963.

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The candidate, [redacted] had an excellent academic  
background in chemistry, mathematics and physics, had  
earned an M.S. degree and accumulated several course  
credits toward Ph.D. requirements, and had five years  
experience with General Electric Corporation. His moti-  
vation toward intelligence was influenced in part at least  
by his father, who had served with OSS. 110/

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The case is interesting historically because it  
illustrates the type of long-term S&T collection capabili-  
ties which the Group hoped to develop and concentrate  
on. In 1962 there were few [redacted]

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[redacted] -- perhaps [redacted] at the most -- who could

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be said to be focussed essentially on collection of S&T information. None of these had a scientific pedigree

remotely comparable to [redacted] Furthermore, and unique

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to this case in the Clandestine Service, he was handled and his work was planned and directed at headquarters

by an officer, [redacted] who himself was a

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professional nuclear physicist and an operations officer

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with several years experience in the late 50's as a scientist staff agent [redacted]

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[redacted] He took over the preparation and management

of [redacted] which was to fund the costs of

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[redacted] activities and, hopefully, of others like him

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who could be acquired as time went on.

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In September 1963 [redacted] was dispatched to [redacted]

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with his family, [redacted]

[redacted] The plan was to have him earn his doctorate in theoretical physics within

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the [redacted] university system, master the language, and

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naturalize himself in the [redacted] environment. During

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\*Established as an FI Staff project and approved by Karamessines in June 1963.

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this period he was to acquaint himself with other foreign students [redacted] where he was enrolled, and to report his observations from time to time. [redacted] [redacted] obtained his doctorate in March 1966, meanwhile having received a temporary appointment in 1965 with a large [redacted] industrial concern holding government contracts on classified research and development. A specialist in laser research and applications, on which he wrote his thesis (in [redacted] during his industrial employment obtained access to, and reported on, technical progress in [redacted] laser development up to the time of his return to the U.S. for home leave and reassignment in April 1966.

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He was unable to return to the industrial firm in [redacted] where he had worked while completing his thesis; the firm was unable to make an acceptable offer for permanent employment. After [redacted] leave and a period of re-training during the summer, FI/SIG and [redacted] continued the intensive efforts which had begun early in the year to find a permanent assignment for him in [redacted] for

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which his scientific background would appear suitable. It was unfortunate that no European assignment had been worked out by the time [redacted] academic stint [redacted] was finished. As the summer wore on, he and his wife became seriously concerned about the schooling of their children. The plan they most favored was to remain in the United States throughout the academic year so that the children could enroll in the fall and remain for the entire academic year without further disrupting their education.

Despite the best efforts of the Group [redacted] [redacted] and of [redacted] no suitable position could be worked out, for overseas employment, which he found acceptable. In his own searches he had, during the latter half of 1966 and early 1967, received one or two offers at salaries substantially beyond the grade level (GS-11) he had reached in the Clandestine Service. One of these offers proved too attractive to spurn and he resigned from the Agency in June 1967.

[redacted] five year career as a scientist-staff agent illustrates a dilemma which had plagued the CS for years: how to retain persons with high scientific qualifications in clandestine operational work. In

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retrospect it could be argued that the CS had arranged to over-qualify him in science before he had time to earn his operational spurs. [redacted] during the planning for [redacted] reassignment, predicted at one point that he would succumb to the temptations of better pay and better personal status in industry as a scientist and would leave the Agency. In the view of [redacted] it would have been better to have used him on contract after he had found a position to his taste on the outside. lll/ A year later both judgments proved to be correct.

Soon after [redacted] arrived in the Group a long time career agent, [redacted] was turned over to FI/SIG by WE Division for operational direction and targetting. [redacted] a mechanical engineer over a period of years had acquired a wide range of foreign contacts in scientific fields. Because of the variety of nationalities and target areas to which he had developed access, the Division felt it appropriate to have FI/SIG assume operational responsibility.\*\*

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\*Hired in 1948.

\*\*The Division retained control of the position and handled all salary and administrative matters.

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Also, [redacted] had handled him in Europe and was intimately familiar with the case. [redacted]

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status and action were excellent; he was assistant to

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[redacted]

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[redacted] 112/ FI/SIG had been developing

high level, cooperative contacts within that society for several years. As an outgrowth of this long-term staff developmental work with officials of the society,

the Group was able to have [redacted] established as

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head of its European office thus serving the purposes of the society, and at the same time extending [redacted]

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[redacted]

His opera-

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tional activities were mainly confined to spotting, assessing and cultivating these personalities, based on guidance and feed-back from headquarters. But along with this work he also handled an important [redacted] agent

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[redacted]

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Except for this agent-handling responsibility, his other activities had come under increasing scrutiny by WE Division. [redacted] as Deputy Chief for WE, asked FI/SIG to give particular attention to the

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intelligence resulting from the numerous contacts which [ ] had been cultivating. 113/ There was growing doubt in the Division as to the value of the product in relation to project costs, along with concern for the integrity of [ ] so many years in agent status.

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This case differed from that of [ ] in several respects. The theater of operations for [ ] was already well established. He was thoroughly seasoned as an operative and was functioning smoothly within [ ] with no reassignment imminent at the point when the Group took him over. But the Division was losing confidence, not so much in the purpose of his intelligence efforts as in their results. His contacts and targets were scattered and diffuse. His reporting was voluminous but often unfocussed. There were few important scientific recruitments traceable to his efforts, if that importance were to be measured in terms of positive intelligence product. To be sure, there were no [ ] work, but he had produced well-evaluated positive scientific information in the short time he was active. Also, [ ] kept him on a tight rein and provided

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guidance based on a scientist's critical appraisal of the relevant requirements. [redacted] on the other hand had managed over time to function much more independently; he became an "old hand" at the operational game and in the later years of his twenty-year career as an agent no doubt strongly influenced and tended to lead his own operation. As [redacted] was foremost a scientist, and [redacted] both scientist and practiced case officer, [redacted] as were those who handled him. By the time he was placed under SIG auspices it was too late to retrieve the operation on the terms set by WE. The Group was already beset with other problems, and the major problem of redirecting and rehabilitating the once promising [redacted] operation demanded more resources and attention than the Group could provide at the time. The demands on [redacted] mentor, were already far beyond reasonable limits, since he was drawn into field handling of another WE agent operation of great importance right at the time when he was most needed to reorient and rejustify [redacted] work. Although [redacted] knew the operation best, it was decided late in 1966 to have [redacted] take a more active hand

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in its management, especially during [ ] frequent and extended temporary duties abroad.

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The hopes of the Group that the operation might be rescued and made productive never were fulfilled. After the merger of EE and WE in the spring of 1966 and the accession of [ ] as Deputy Chief, Europe Division, the operation came more and more under fire from the Division. Finally, in July 1967 after several conversations between [ ] on the subject, [ ] announced Europe Division's decision to recall [ ] and reassign him in the U.S. under [ ] administration. 114/

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One other officer, [ ] who had served the CS on contract from 1951 and then as staff agent from 1955, was referred to FI/SIG by Lloyd George for possible use in S&T collection.

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[ ] was employed first in air operations in the Far East, where George came to know him, but later engaged in mapping and geodetic assignments under WH Division auspices. It was this latter activity which had suggested to George that [ ] might better be managed centrally and focussed on S&T objectives. The case was assigned to [ ] was converted


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to career agent status under indefinite contract,  
and a project [ ] was drafted and approved in  
August 1961 to cover the employment and funding of

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to financial troubles, somewhat evasive, disorganized,  
and chronically unable to inspire confidence in his  
customers. The case made considerable inroads on

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[ ] time and attention. The various contracts  
[ ] was able to arrange and make good on did produce  
information useful to the [ ] as sole  
customer. Yet as [ ] noted in June 1965 at the  
time of project termination,

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Although the project succeeded in procuring  
a modest amount of ground control information  
in North Africa [ ]

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[ ] and in Central America, it did not  
succeed in making real progress toward collecting

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this sort of information from areas close to the Chinese or Russian frontiers...The potential of the project for supplying information of intelligence value was never fully exploited.114a/

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[redacted] had proposed to DO Division several times that

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[redacted] might better be administered by DO's [redacted]

[redacted] But on review of all factors DO de-

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clined and, on project termination, [redacted] was turned over to Special Operations Division, Air Branch, for subsequent handling as a career agent.\*

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An officer recruited by FI/SIG in 1959 was later converted to staff agent status after transfer to FE Division: [redacted] a nuclear physicist. He

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was expected to devote his main efforts to Communist Chinese S&T targets. He served first [redacted] and later

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[redacted] but did not come under direct FI/SIG influence or direction during his staff agent duty.\*\*

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[redacted] as we have noted earlier, served as a staff agent before taking up headquarters duties in

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\*Retired on 30 April 1968.

\*\*Retired on 31 March 1970.

FI/SIG. Both he and [redacted] had worked in the Nuclear Energy Division of OSI before joining the CS. Thus, in contrast with [redacted] their

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[redacted]

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These cases are recited to illustrate what was to have been a principal occupation of the Group, under the [redacted] concept:

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...the recruitment, training, and placement abroad of operations officers [redacted]

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[redacted]...it was the idea that a few [redacted]

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scientific assets would be handled initially from Headquarters, would not have contact with the Station, and would be supported long enough to naturalize themselves in the foreign scientific environment. FI/SIG was to be the central Headquarters element responsible for at least initial operational management of these scientific assets, working closely with and, in effect, as the agent of [redacted].. 1157

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There was nothing startlingly new in this concept in the tradecraft sense except the special qualifications demanded of the actor: authentic scientific credentials and commitment to a long-term clandestine intelligence

mission. Karamessines confirmed his belief in the validity of the concept in a meeting with [redacted] a few months before [redacted] resignation. [redacted] record of the conversation concludes:

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He /Karamessines/ stressed the importance he attaches to the long range value of a staff agent with such solid scientific background under secure long term [redacted] acting as an intelligence collector himself on important targets in a difficult operational environment. He wishes to insure that this long range potential will not be dissipated by agent handling functions of short range value. He stressed that the Agency has many case officers who can handle agents, but few viable [redacted] assets of this type. 116/

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The Staff retained its belief in the soundness of the [redacted] concept, 117/ but by 1965 the dwindling resources of the Group were not sufficient to carry the idea beyond a single trial.\*

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The other operational tasks of the Group, up to about November of 1964, were numerous and varied in

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\*Its future, if it has one, appears unpromising unless worked out somehow, within the larger context of [redacted] problems as a whole.

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relation to the fluctuating and rarely adequate officer (b)(1)  
resources at hand. The Physical Sciences Branch, in (b)(3)  
addition to handling [redacted] provided the bulk of (b)(1)  
technical support and operational guidance [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] on targets in [redacted] (b)(1)  
Operations conducted by [redacted] a gifted and ex- (b)(3)  
perienced S&T case officer [redacted] resulted in the (b)(3)  
collection of physical samples near a [redacted] gaseous (b)(1)  
diffusion plant, in direct response to a headquarters (b)(3)  
requirement. [redacted] was busy directing several (b)(1)  
[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] in coordination (b)(3)  
with SR and EE Divisions. In addition, [redacted] was (b)(1)  
investigating, for possible operational targeting, a (b)(3)  
sizeable number of Soviet researchers in their laser (b)(3)  
R&D programs and attempting to identify Western laser (b)(3)  
specialists with access to or in communication with (b)(3)  
some of those targets. In January of 1964 [redacted] (b)(1)  
joined with two specialists from the [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] on a delicate mission to inspect (b)(1)  
the [redacted] nuclear reactor and other atomic (b)(3)  
energy installations [redacted] He prepared the (b)(1)  
secret report on this mission [redacted] and other (b)(3)  
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selected recipients in the USIB community. He took in a second inspection of [redacted] about a year later.

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[redacted] was engaged in handling two long-time [redacted] who were in constant touch with Soviet neurologists and other medical researchers.

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[redacted]

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continued this for several months.

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The Space Sciences Branch, after a late start, began to build up systematically a network of [redacted] operational assets in the aerospace sciences. [redacted]

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[redacted] travelled frequently on this quest, pursuing leads to industrial as well as academic sources in touch with foreign aerospace developments. Among the assets this Section developed and handled were an ethnic [redacted] aerodynamicist with access to [redacted] missile developments and to Soviet Bloc scientists; [redacted] widely acquainted, through former professional associations [redacted] with [redacted] scientists; and a former [redacted] missile technologist who was returning to [redacted] (1964)

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after a period of work with NASA. All three of these [redacted] contacts were targetted from time to time against designated foreign scientists, usually on the occasion of their attendance at international scientific conferences (e.g. meetings of the International Astronautical Federation which provided abundant opportunities for spotting, assessing and cultivating foreign scientific personages of intelligence interest).

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In addition the Section expended considerable effort over a period of many months developing [redacted] space scientist [redacted] who was doing post-doctoral research in California. With the help of [redacted]

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[redacted] and through close collaboration with DO and NE Divisions, he was brought to the point of signing a secrecy agreement, accepting secure communications arrangements, and agreeing to cooperate with U.S. intelligence. His motives for

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cooperating were rooted in anti-Communist, [redacted] sentiments and not so much in a willingness to perform clandestine collection tasks against [redacted] military research and development programs. His main drive

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was to undermine [redacted] politically -- [redacted] [redacted] and the risks he was willing to take were

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related to that objective, as it turned out, and not so much to S&T information collection.

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[redacted] were operationally active on this case which originated with [redacted] and, after his resignation, was carried on under [redacted] direction.

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[redacted] stayed with the Group only a little more than a year. He was strongly interested in a field assign-

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ment. In the fall of 1964 he was engaged by EE and NE divisions on an operational assignment [redacted]

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targetted against a [redacted] engineer; he was released to FE Division in mid-1965 for posting [redacted]

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[redacted] to work against [redacted] Communist S&T targets.

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[redacted] was active operationally in this period, having picked up on contract a former asset, a zoologist, whom he had handled [redacted] and who had returned to

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the U.S. This experienced asset in turn succeeded over a period of two or three years in spotting, developing

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and recruiting [redacted] scientists in the fields of biology and ecology. [redacted] also handled a former

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asset of CI Staff, a physicist in [redacted] in close association with a resident Soviet researcher in his

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department; [redacted] representative of a [redacted] aviation firm holding [redacted] military contracts; and two

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assets in an American professional scientific association.

Besides handling [redacted] operational (b)(3)

support work included development of operations (independent of [redacted] for acquisition of geodetic information [redacted] (b)(1)

formation [redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] guidance and assistance to divisions (b)(1)

(mainly FE and WE) on plans for clandestine collection [redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] and ad hoc operational assistance to WE Division on [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(3)

With the help of its varying supply of Junior Officer trainees the Group had established contact with about [redacted] scientists and engineers by the autumn of 1964. Contacts with these assets were normally made [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] Meetings and communications were secure. The initial aim of this work was to establish a wide range of assets, familiar with the Group's intelligence objectives, in technical fields such as acoustics, astrophysics, computer technology, electronics, geodetics, medical research (b)(3)

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and nuclear engineering. Special emphasis was placed on the search for those in direct touch with Soviet Bloc scientists either by correspondence, by attendance at international scientific meetings, or by association with resident Soviet researchers at U.S. laboratories or at foreign scientific institutes

[REDACTED]

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The Group's work in cultivating and recruiting [REDACTED] scientists for operational use required frequent coordination and consultation with DO Division. The latter raised no serious objections to that work, insisting only that DO be kept informed and that wherever and whenever possible its case officers be used to handle FI/SIG assets. DO wished to establish the principle that its field component, [REDACTED] should take the operational action on all cases [REDACTED] analogous to the responsibility placed on any field station. On the other hand, DO expected that FI/SIG would provide Headquarters direction and technical guidance to DO case officers on cases involving foreign targets in scientific fields.118/

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This arrangement worked fairly smoothly through mid-1964. Thereafter the problems FI/SIG encountered

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with area divisions as it began to use its scientific assets more actively against foreign targets deserve separate treatment. They will be discussed in the following section.

E. Initiatives and Conflicts.

Whatever was accomplished by the Group of significance or value, in the period treated in this history,\* was done for the most part in connection with non-Soviet personalities and information targets. Yet it must be remembered that the main thrust of the FI/SIG program, as conceived and set forth in the staff study approved by Helms, was toward the Soviet target. The study cited "the acquisition of information on Communist Bloc progress in the adaptation of basic scientific research to the design and development of advanced weapons" as "one of the highest priorities in the intelligence community" and went on to stress the need for radically improved agent operations aimed at the recruitment of Bloc sources of scientific information. 119/

The study concluded that the basis for that improvement lay in the "development of a centralized capability for effective operational guidance in a unit equipped

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\*1959 through 1965

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both to provide badly needed fundamental analysis and planning and to perform operational tasks as required." 120/

The explicit language of the study carefully limited the staff to guidance, analysis, planning, and performance of required operational tasks\* in coordination with area divisions. But the weaknesses recited in the study of the traditional area division approaches to the S&T collection problem and the recommended operational program for FI/SIG clearly implied fundamental changes in the relations between FI/SIG and area divisions. More to the point, it implied a dual authority in operations and, as the main information objective was the Soviet Union, it implied a challenge to the hitherto exclusive authority of SB Division over operations directed against the Soviet target. However adroit the phrasing of  paper, it could not skirt or conceal his principal contention: a central group -- in this case, FI Staff -- could and

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\*This was left intentionally ambiguous, to include operational tasks the staff was asked or directed to perform, as well as those it judged itself required to perform by charter.

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should do what SB could not do, that is, guide, plan and coordinate clandestine agent S&T operations world-wide. The clear logic of this contention spelled collision with SB. If a central unit were to coordinate, let alone guide and support, "all CS agent operations directed against S&T targets or employing scientist personnel" 121/ then conflict with SB at almost any turn was inevitable. The most important S&T targets were Soviet; SB had authority over Soviet targets. How was the authority over those targets to be reconciled with that over S&T targets? One might have thought that this was the first issue to be met and resolved by FI Staff planners.

It was not, and deliberately so. The attempt to find a formal solution to this implicit conflict was, in effect, shelved or, more precisely stated, explained away. In his comment to Karamessines on the forthcoming staff study, about which Karamessines had reservations,  wrote

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You have expressed concern about operations on the part of the staffs, and possible conflict with or duplication of the activities of the area divisions in the implementation of these

proposals. In fact they are designed to complement the work of the area divisions in S&T operations. In their execution there will be frequent contact by FI/SIG with the various divisions, but they should be contacts of cooperating elements...not contacts of contention over rights and prerogatives. 122/

In short the informal solution of any latent conflict between the divisions and FI/SIG was to be found in good will and the mutual respect of parties aware of their overlapping authorities but intent on collaborating in work toward identical goals. The spirit of the cause, not the letter of charters, was to prevail.

Early in 1964 this spirit found expression in a short internal notice circulated within SR Division and signed by David E. Murphy. 123/ When Murphy became Chief of the Division in September 1963 on [redacted] (b)(3) reassignment as Deputy Director of Security, he set out almost immediately to establish an S&T operations element in the Collection Group of the Division. It was designated SR/CG/S&T and [redacted] (b)(3) became its Chief. He and officers of FI/SIG took counsel at once

to work out the terms of a modus vivendi which would in effect divide the labor and thus head off possible causes of friction.

The information objective of the SR program, as explained in the notice, was data on Soviet weapons systems in the planning and development phases. The operational objective was recruitment of Soviet sources with direct access to that information, or failing that, to sources with indirect access. The CI objective was to counter the Soviet S&T espionage effort against Western military research and development. KGB and GRU S&T officers were singled out as "prime targets" for recruitment. The method of the SR program required concentration on Soviet scientists and technicians living abroad for an extended period or travelling frequently outside the Soviet Union. 124/ FI/SIG had no quarrel with this program, with one exception: the Group believed that while RIS officers engaged in S&T collection were certainly valid recruitment targets, the program should not ignore the operational canvassing of any accessible Bloc scientists having some acquaintance with Soviet scientific programs. Furthermore,  demurred somewhat at the emphasis -- in

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his view, over-emphasis -- in the SR Notice on counter-intelligence concerns, fearing that these could dampen attempts "to exploit positive intelligence opportunities." 125/

The means of implementing the SR program were set forth in a passage of the Notice dealing explicitly with functions of FI/SIG, as SR Division understood them. The functions of the SR S&T section will in many respects parallel and complement those of FI/SIG. Unlike FI/SIG, whose mission covers wider responsibilities and whose targets are not limited to the Soviet Union, SR Division's S&T unit will concentrate solely on the USSR. It will be interested in operations designed to recruit Soviet scientists as clandestine sources. Since this objective is also included in FI/SIG's mission, the two units will coordinate closely on all matters relating to contact with or information on Soviet scientists. Both units will attempt to develop contact operations with Soviet S&T personnel [redacted] [redacted] abroad, and each will coordinate such operations with the appropriate CS divisions and staffs as well as with each other. In very general terms it is expected that FI/SIG will approach the

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problem primarily through its study of free-world scientific institutions and individuals who have access to Bloc targets. Conversely, SR will devote its initial and primary attention to the study of Soviet target individuals, to the Soviet scientific community as such, and to the CI aspects of the Soviet program. In operations involving an attempt to recruit a Soviet individual, SR Division will, in accordance with [redacted] assume headquarters action responsibility. 126/ The Notice went on to state that SR/CG/S&T operations against "Soviets in scientific and technical fields on TDY status abroad, [redacted] would be coordinated with FI/SIG. 127/

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From the FI Staff point of view this was a landmark document. It acknowledged FI/SIG's charter in the Soviet field and appeared to recognize the principle of dual authority in most matters affecting S&T collection except actual recruitment attempts involving Soviet citizens; in those cases SR Division was to have undivided control and responsibility. FI/SIG was not concerned about jurisdiction over those cases, which were not expected to be numerous in any event. Much more important, the way appeared open for combined action to broaden

the scope of Soviet S&T operations. In forwarding copies of the SR Notice to FI/SIG [ ] wrote in his transmittal letter that

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Our officers have all been advised about your account of your organization and plans and your offer of help and assistance and we all look forward to mutually beneficial cooperation. 128/

At the time the SR Notice was in preparation FI/SIG was considering the issuance of a similar CSN on SIG responsibilities. More than a year had passed since Helms had authorized the expansion and redirection of SIG and the papers showing that authorization had never been distributed to area divisions. By late 1963, of course, all divisions were aware of the reorganization and relocation of SIG, but no formal notice had been disseminated in writing specifying the range and limits of SIG's mission. The Group was still in a formative stage, training its staff, getting its bearings, laying its foundations. Within the Staff it was thought that a formal declaration of intentions and statement of responsibilities might be premature, but the formation of SR/CG/S&T inclined the Staff to come forward with an announcement of its own. It

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was decided to float a draft CSN on FI/SIG first within the elements of FI Staff, for critical review, and then to one division, WE, to test its reactions.\*

There were no problems with the draft as it moved through FI Staff, except for one or two caveats within FI/RQM concerning references to the handling of requirements. But WE Division, after review of the draft, demurred; its officers worried about the seeming impingement on area division responsibilities of statements referring to SIG operating functions. There was no objection to having SIG operate in the [redacted]

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[redacted] (which was not under WE jurisdiction in any case); the concern was with what might happen overseas. 129/ Oddly, WE Division had raised no objections to SIG's operation of the [redacted] project and in general, as we have noted earlier, cooperated freely on other operations proposed by SIG affecting WE territory (the [redacted] case is a later example). In FI/SIG the WE reaction was thought to be symptomatic of the likely attitude of other divisions. So long as the Group's

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\*Unfortunately no copies of this draft could be found among FI/SIG records or elsewhere in FI Staff.

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few operational initiatives could be worked out on a case by case basis with each division there was no real problem. Apprehensions arose only when SIG moved to document de jure the basis for its de facto operational functions. The Group therefore decided to drop the idea of publishing its charter, for the time being. The SR notice indirectly was serving the same purpose and in the division of major concern to the FI/SIG program.

In trying to exercise its coordination responsibility the Group needed to be kept well informed of area division S&T collection activities. In the first eighteen months of its new program, SIG attempted to do this through its various contacts in the divisions rather than through written instructions. But as time went on it was clear that some more formal procedures would be necessary to help insure that relevant cable and dispatch material on S&T operations were brought to SIG's attention or coordinated with the Group before release, when important actions were being planned. The need for information and action indicators, to be assigned to SIG for use on communications involving scientific matters, became apparent. These were

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assigned by RID, at FI/SIG's request in June  
1964. 130/ 131/

The Group began at once to use both indicators  
 and in  
November 1964 drafted a CS Notice explaining the purpose  
and intended use of these indicators (see attachment C).  
After a long delay the draft was finally circulated  
by DDP/Publications in March 1965. FE and SR Divi-  
sions concurred in the use of the action indicator but  
objected to the assignment of an information indicator,  
FE on the grounds that it was not needed "to insure  
proper flow" of S&T correspondence to FI/SIG, 132/, SR  
because it did not accept the Group's definition of  
scientific operations and did not agree with "the con-  
cept of a staff element receiving duplicate copies of  
all cable and dispatch traffic of operations for which  
divisions have action responsibility..." 133/ EE ob-  
jected that the draft was "too vague" and that a staff  
should coordinate but not try to take action respon-  
sibility for operations. 134/\*

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\*As we shall see presently, EE reversed itself seven  
months later, concurring both in the right of SIG  
to operate and to take action responsibility for S&T  
cases.

In the face of these objections on what was a derivative issue, SIG dropped the attempt to publish a separate CSN on indicators. Meanwhile much more serious troubles had been brewing and the test on assignment of indicators was merely symptomatic of these.

We have run a little ahead of our narrative and now need to look back a bit to trace the causes of the problems. Within FI Staff it was recognized both by Lloyd George and [ ] that early evidence of operational achievement by the Group, of a kind that would be impressive to the DD/P, was unlikely. The FI/SIG plan, to succeed, required a commitment by management to see it through and so far as possible to regulate organizational and functional changes in the CS that might thwart or undermine this plan. Under the best of circumstances, with full and willing cooperation of all divisions, including contributions of a few of their most experienced officers, at least two years, more realistically three, would have been required to assemble enough competent staff and develop the kind of central collection and operational support capability envisaged in the [ ] staff study of 1962.

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The deficiencies described to the DD/P in [redacted] paper, and the thrust of the Balmer enquiry, called for fundamental, not cosmetic, changes in the CS approaches to its S&T collection responsibilities. The wording of the 1962 program for SIG, approved by Helms, proposed fundamental changes and SIG, interpreting it so, set out for the long haul to implement those changes. The question in the Group was whether management minds and commitments would change before the program had a chance for a fair trial.

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As we shall see later, minds did change through a combination of causes and a series of events occurring during 1964 and 1965. First was the influence of David Murphy and his Division's approach to S&T collection problems. Second was [redacted] impatience to see FI/SIG become effectively operational. Third was Karamessines' misgivings about relations of FI/SIG with divisions, especially with SR and [redacted]. Finally, there was Desmond Fitzgerald's new look at the role of FI/SIG. These were the main influences bearing on the destiny of the Group and during 1965 they were all interacting.

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To the extent possible we shall try to deal with them seriatim.\*

The accord with SR/CG/S&T, as seen from the FI/SIG standpoint, worked well during  tenure. By nature bland, quiet, not fractious or easily ruffled, and sincerely interested in smooth relations with the Group, he made it possible, on his side, for officers of his unit to cooperate with SIG. But there were no illusions in SIG that his rather relaxed attitude toward SIG's operational initiatives was widely shared in SR. Among SIG officers it was felt at the time that the Notice on SR's S&T program was not likely to alter the attitude of the Requirements and Reports staff in SR (SR/RR) toward

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\*We stress these as the main influences. There were of course others which will be mentioned in the succeeding narrative: The attitude toward SIG of FE Division, the rapidly growing capabilities of the DDS&T in this period, and the relations of area divisions with that Directorate and especially with OSI. Up to 1965 FE took a rather complacent view of SIG's activities since the number of cases involving Communist Chinese personalities were extremely few compared with Soviet cases. The history of CS relations with OSI and the DDS&T perhaps deserves to be written but lies outside the scope of this paper

SIG operational efforts in the Soviet field. That staff had always had a strong, if not decisive voice, in SR operations and were in a position to exercise considerable control over the selection of Soviet targets and over actions directed against them, whether by SR case officers or by those in other operating elements. Also SIG officers were convinced that it was Murphy's intention to keep firm control over SR's S&T efforts and operational domain, and that the SR/CG/H/S&T unit, created in part as a reaction and counter-weight to FI/SIG, by its existence and stated program was meant to test the validity and practicability of a central S&T authority. Nevertheless, SIG's management of its [redacted] on cases in which Soviet scientific personalities figure proceeded without serious friction until late November 1964. At that time a curious incident occurred which set off a chain of events leading quickly to direct and open confrontation with SR. Division.

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[redacted] as a strong sponsor within the FI Staff of the SIG program and in a sense its underwriter, was impatient with its slow development. He was acutely aware of the threatened erosion of SIG's claim

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to a central position within the CS on S&T matters in the face of SR's aggressive and wide-ranging actions, [redacted] overseas. He had chafed at the many delays and obstacles which for two years had stood in the way of planned staffing. Now, late in 1964, the Group was approaching at least numerical, if not effective operational, strength. Early in November he had occasion to talk with a rather senior secretary who had been assigned to SIG in July but who, for reasons of ill-health, had decided to resign. She had only a few weeks of acquaintance with the Group and during that time had been asked to devote most of her attention to rearrangement and purging of files. In her exit interview with [redacted] he asked her, among other things, about her observations of SIG and its work. In recounting these she left with [redacted] the impression that the Group was plodding and inactive, that it needed "firing up." In discussing her remarks later with [redacted] acknowledged that she was in no position, during her brief stay, to know in any detail the outside operational activities of SIG or to give a balanced appraisal of the Group's pursuits. Nonetheless he felt, he said, that the build-up and

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preparatory work of the Group was now ready to be put to more direct operational use, especially against Soviet target personalities [redacted] He felt there were enough of these to go around, that concerted SIG assessment efforts directed against one or two of them would begin to establish an operational place for SIG in that field before it was wholly preempted by SR and DO Divisions. [redacted] directed that the Group proceed at once to identify suitable targets and draw up operational plans for his review. 135/

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[redacted] called a meeting of SIG officers to convey [redacted] directive. The officers set about to select targets and compose plans. The targets chosen were three post-doctoral Soviet scientists in residence at

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[redacted] concurred in the plan and the operation, which was initially targeted against one of its Soviets only, began in early December. The immediate impact of this effort is described in a memorandum from [redacted] written two months later.

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In late November 1964, FI/SIG requested CI/Liaison by memorandum with copies to SR and DO Divisions to inform the FBI of SIG's intention to operate

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against a Soviet post-doctoral student at the

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[redacted] using as a starting

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point [redacted] a young professor at [redacted]

in the same field as the Soviet. Both Area Divisions reacted immediately. They complained because FI/SIG had not routed the memorandum through them and they alleged that an Agency-Bureau agreement prohibited the CS from conducting FI operations against Soviet students

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[redacted] The Bureau, however,

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posed no objections to the operation and asked simply to be kept informed. Since then, FI/SIG has encountered continual harassment...over questions of jurisdiction and coordination. These recent events suggest that fundamental policies about scientific operations are in dispute. At issue are the role of specialists in scientific operations and how the Clandestine Services should organize and manage resources to meet their responsibilities in S&T intelligence. With FI/SIG now at a point where it must either get on with its work or deteriorate, the present situation of uncertainty and conflict

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is critical. Any meaningful resolution of this situation will inevitably affect the future development of scientific operations and policies within the CS. Such a major decision is needed. 136/

The case [ ] cites began to bring into the open, first with DO Division and later with SR, the conflicts implicit in a dual operational authority. The Soviet scientists SIG had targeted were chosen because they happened to be within range of a SIG asset at the same university and were naturally accessible to him. The asset, untrained in assessments, could begin to acquire experience in this aspect of operational support. But almost as soon as the case got underway DO began to raise questions about SIG's procedures, who should be in overall charge of directing assets, and whether the activity should be undertaken at all.

Karamessines had gotten wind of these difficulties. In January he asked [ ] to see him to discuss the progress of FI/SIG and its relations with area divisions. In the course of the meeting he explained that officers of DO Division had recently mentioned to him some areas of disagreement with

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FI/SIG, which he thought were relatively minor; yet he felt there was room for clarification of respective fields of responsibility between FI/SIG and DO, indeed between FI/SIG and area divisions in general. He felt that these disagreements over jurisdiction and functions should be worked out soon before they widened and a good way to get at them was to issue as soon as possible a fairly detailed instruction setting forth the respective responsibilities of FI/SIG and the divisions for collection of S&T intelligence. 137/ [ ] completed a first draft of a CSI on Scientific Operations in March. It was then extensively revised after much discussion within FI Staff and [ ] submitted it to A/DDP for review in early June. Karamessines asked that it be further revised; this was done but not until November was it finally sent to divisions and other staffs for coordination.

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Meanwhile the CS was under new direction: Helms had become Deputy Director for Central Intelligence and on the day he was sworn in, 28 April 1965, Desmond Fitzgerald moved into the chair as DD/P. Among the various internal problems to which he gave immediate attention, the relations of SIG and of FI Staff as a

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whole with area divisions must, if judged by the volume of paper and discussion expended on it, have been rather high on the list. The course of FI/SIG's evolution through the first year of his regime is reviewed in the next and final chapter of this history.



III. The Fitzgerald Era, 1965-1966

In the first twelve months of Desmond Fitzgerald's incumbency as DD/P the Group began to feel the full weight of area division resistance and active opposition to its operational role. Just before Fitzgerald took office SIG was at the high point in its staffing. It had developed a wide variety of [redacted] assets for operational use. It was successfully handling [redacted] [redacted] scientific staff agent [redacted] and attempting to resolve problems bequeathed to it by other operating elements in the handling, and termination of two other controversial staff agents. It was doing productive work against important nuclear energy targets [redacted]

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[redacted]

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was collecting valuable geodetic data [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] And, by direction, it was beginning to move operationally against Soviet targets through concerted use of its scientific assets. But at the moment that work got seriously underway --

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work designed to complement and reinforce the SR/CG/S&T effort -- the ground began to shift perceptibly under SIG's position.

Among divisions SR, and David Murphy personally as its chief, took the lead in bringing the issue to a head. The issue, as he was later to describe it, was quite simply who should exercise responsibility "for the selection and pursuit of the Soviet target." 138/ SIG claimed authority by its charter to guide and coordinate "all CS agent operations directed against S&T targets" as well as to plan and execute operations of its own supplemental to those conducted by area divisions. 139/

From the first there was never any doubt in SIG that SR/RR would not tolerate SIG guidance of SR operations. Support to their operations was another matter; so long as SIG assets were used as SR wished and against targets selected and approved by SR, there were no conflicts. It was SIG's "selection and pursuit" of Soviet scientific personalities who, in SIG's judgment, deserved operational attention that caused the rub. SIG was exercising a judgment based on its estimate of the S&T intelligence potential of the target; its

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officers were S&T, not Soviet, specialists. But SR did not recognize any S&T authority within the CS with power to guide or influence SR operations except that embodied in its own SR/RR and SR/CG/S&T components. In SR terms its internal Notice of early 1964 spelled only acceptance of support, not guidance or prior coordination of its operations, from SIG. In February 1965 Murphy moved on three fronts simultaneously to preserve, undivided, the authority of SR Division over operations against Soviet S&T targets: in the DD/S&T, in DO Division, and in the office of the DDP. He had already established a formal basis for the strong stand he was to take on the issue of FI/SIG's involvement in those operations. Early in 1964 he had issued with DDP approval a new CSI on Soviet Operations (50-21), 140/ and another on Organization and Functions of SR Division (1-11). 141/ Both documents make clear the responsibility of SR Division for clandestine activities against Soviet targets.  in particular states that SR will "assume headquarters responsibility for directing all operations aimed at the recruitment or defection of any Soviet individuals, whether in the USSR or elsewhere..." 142/ Nowhere in either document

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is a special staff role in operations recognized or mentioned except for certain [redacted]

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[redacted] "or through other non-SR instrumentalities." 143/ Nowhere in either document is scientific and technical intelligence identified or mentioned as a category of special importance, or as the object of a special or distinctive operational effort. But when these two instructions appeared an S&T collection unit had already been established by SR Division. This was to give visible evidence of SR's intention to experiment, for a while at least, with a program concentrating on scientific targets. Thus by the time SIG, at [redacted] urging, had moved more openly into operational use of its assets on Soviet targets, Murphy was well-prepared for the challenge.

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On the same day in February 1965 Murphy sent out two important memoranda, one to the DD/S&T and the other to Karamessines as ADDP. Both concerned S&T collection activities.

The memorandum for the DD/S&T, sent via the DDP, reviewed in considerable detail SR's experience over the years with various sources of information on

Soviet military research and development. It concluded that

...the best focus of our effort seems to be the Soviet scientists or technicians who are

[redacted]

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order to further these efforts we would appreciate receiving from your office, as soon as possible, and on a continuing basis,

[redacted]

[redacted]

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The memorandum went on to ask also for any evidence that might show whether Soviet scientists who are allowed

[redacted]

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[redacted] Murphy finally suggested cooperation between SR and DD/S&T offices on development of information

[redacted]

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[redacted] the Soviet Union. 145/

FI/SIG received a copy of Murphy's memorandum, but was not consulted during or on its preparation. In April Murphy met with the DD/S&T and AD/SI to discuss the memorandum and OSI's reaction to it. Reporting

the session to Karamessines, Murphy noted OSI's willingness to provide the support requested and said he was gratified "to find no basic disagreement with SR's concept of a Soviet military research and development program [redacted]

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
[redacted] 146/ Again in June he reported progress to the ADDP, this time reviewing the first of a series of meetings he had planned with OSI divisions. 147/ SR kept FI/SIG informed of these conferences with DD/S&T but did not ask SIG to take part in or comment on them. The responses of the DD/S&T divisions to SR were treated as privileged information and the Group never had access to them.

The second memorandum Murphy wrote in February 1965, concerning S&T issues, was addressed to ADDP with a copy for C/FI; it reported discussions on the planned collaboration of SR and DO Divisions "in the Soviet S&T field." 148/ Chief, FI received a copy of the memorandum and referred it to FI/SIG. The agenda for the meeting had previously been sent to ADDP for information but not to FI Staff. SR did not consult FI/SIG before these meetings and did not invite the Group to attend, thus underscoring the point that in the SR view the Staff


had no place in those discussions, in spite of the fact that major plans and important policies and procedures affecting FI collection were involved, as they had been in the discussions on DDS&T support.

In reviewing his discussions with [redacted] and [redacted] with the recent Soviet-oriented activities of FI/SIG no doubt very much on his mind, Murphy applauded the cooperativeness of [redacted] and his own intention to see to it that "participation /of SR officers/ in Soviet S&T operational activities [redacted] must necessarily be consonant with the full responsibility [redacted] has for operations [redacted]" 149/ He pledged to keep [redacted] informed of [redacted] operational activity of SR's S&T officers and to coordinate all communications on SR S&T activity [redacted] with DO Division. There were other words in his memorandum which caught the particular attention of FI/SIG officers:


[redacted]




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
SIG officers did not miss the implications of references  
to 

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But much more significant was the stated intention to  
 with SR S&T officers.

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The prospects for pursuing and keeping viable a  
SIG operational program under those conditions appeared  
slender indeed. The SIG program had depended in large  
part on freedom to acquire and develop 



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of the SR-DO agreement seemed clearly designed to thwart  
that effort, if not to put it out of business. The

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\*Author's italics.



dilemma of SIG, and its boundary relations with area divisions, were sharply pointed up by [ ] in a February memorandum setting forth his views on the crucial situation faced by the Group:

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One should scarcely be surprised that jurisdictional problems are latent in the clear and accepted (by the DDP) overlapping between SIG and area divisions. The judgment as to whether an operation warrants central rather than area division direction has, in practice, been left to SIG which has focussed its attention initially upon [ ] certain scientific organizations. Since in all cases the ultimate purpose of SIG's activities has been the acquisition of foreign intelligence...concerning the foreign state's capabilities or intentions, it was always evident that the moment a SIG [ ]

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[ ]

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would be concerned. But with the creation of [ ] all areas were -- so to speak -- occupied.

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Thus, no person in the world remained unclaimed potential for some area division. 151/

As we have seen from his memoranda, Murphy was making his case for central management and coordination

of Soviet S&T operations (a phrase he finally came to use in his own correspondence) directly to Karamessines and, when he took office as DDP, to Fitzgerald. Since the Soviet S&T operations were at the time the most important, the case for a limited central management or direction of other operations, targeted elsewhere, could safely be left to other strong divisions (such as FE) to resolve. What had to be settled was the SIG claim to be a central S&T authority in the CS; on Murphy's terms it could not be and on every issue drawn to test that claim, from early 1965 on, he prevailed.

The impact of Fitzgerald's views on the place and mission of SIG were not felt until the early summer of 1965. In the course of briefings which Lloyd George and [ ] had given him on FI Staff he began to raise questions about the operational role of SIG, its accomplishments, and its relations with divisions. In passing on Fitzgerald's questions and comments to [ ] [ ] said he had the clear impression that Fitzgerald was likely to take quite a different view of SIG's operational role than Helms had taken. 152/

[ ] suggested that [ ] prepare a detailed briefing paper on SIG for Fitzgerald's information.

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The paper was completed on 29 July and sent to Fitzgerald on 17 August. 153/ In it [ ] reviewed the course of SIG development under the Helms charter, summarized staff support and operational activities over a period of nearly three years, and commented on the scientific and operational qualifications of SIG officers.

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Fitzgerald was particularly interested in this latter point; in later discussions with George, [ ] and

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[ ] he often expressed himself on the need for more officers in the CS with some first hand knowledge of the state of current [ ] research and technology. In concluding his review [ ] observed hopefully

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Although about half of our present complement is operationally inexperienced, and although much of the energy of the Group has been applied to the search for, selection, and training of promising scientific operations officers, I think we have a good foundation for a permanent cadre. For the first time in 15 years I think we have the makings here of a Group with solid technical depth and the necessary operational know-how to team up effectively with the area divisions in

scientific collection activities and to conduct other operations competently which can best be carried out by the central unit. I hope that the new Clandestine Services Instruction on Scientific Operations, which we have drafted with much care and thought, will be recognized by the area divisions as a genuine constructive effort to chart the way toward effective working relations and a sensible division of labor between the operating elements and our Group. I would hope also that this Instruction, which we have discussed at length with Mr. Karamessines, can be expeditiously coordinated and published. 154/

Fitzgerald made no written comment on the paper, returning it to [ ] with the remark that he wished to consider the whole problem further and discuss it with some division chiefs.

The work of the Group went on in this uneasy atmosphere through the remainder of the summer. The leadership in the SR S&T unit had meanwhile changed (in April); [ ] replaced [ ] and the unit was redesignated SR/CG/S. Relations of SIG with the SR unit, under [ ] were at best formal and

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businesslike; much of the contact was through memoranda, rather than personal, and consisted mostly of information to SR/CG/S of FI/SIG activities affecting Soviet Bloc targets; after the spring of 1965 rarely were SR S&T operational matters coordinated with SIG.

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Disagreements between SR and SIG over operational jurisdictions and procedures sharpened during the summer. One example was the question of responsibility

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for operational management of CS

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[redacted] had written to [redacted]

[redacted] complaining that one of SIG's officers, [redacted]

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[redacted] had been carrying on activities which were directed

toward Soviet targets [redacted] and were not

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coordinated with SR Division. 155/ [redacted] had not been

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aware that [redacted] TDY during August had been taken at

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the request of [redacted] and had been funded by

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that division; also, [redacted] plans for contacting an

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asset in whom SR had an interest had in fact been

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coordinated with SR. [redacted] reviewed the facts of the

case in a memorandum for Murphy, expressed SIG's willing-

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ness to cooperate with SR in collecting S&T information

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and noted that

...a good basis for such cooperation was worked out some time ago in a number of discussions

between SIG and officers of your Division. The terms of agreement...reached at that time are very well set forth in the SR Division notice No. 64-4 which you issued on 7 February 1964.

I suggest we give the formula so thoughtfully prepared..., a fair chance to work and succeed. 156/

Early in May [redacted] had drafted a proposed CSI on

[redacted] the purpose of which was to estab-

lish "policies and responsibilities for the Clandestine

Services in [redacted] operations." (See

Attachment E) The draft reserved to the divisions full

responsibility for conducting [redacted] operations and

providing requisite support. The staff (FI/SIG) was to

be responsible for representing CS interests in dealing

with other CIA elements [redacted]

[redacted] matters; it was also to provide

Staff guidance, and to coordinate on correspondence

relating to [redacted] operations. Among staffs and divi-

sions only SR objected to the proposed CSI and refused

to concur on grounds that "it appears to allocate to

a staff element functions which are normally the respon-

sibility of area divisions." 157/ [redacted] appealed the

issue to Karamessines, 158/ emphasizing that the intent of

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the instruction was "to enhance not to weaken the effectiveness of Division efforts; to retain control over clandestine techniques within the Clandestine Services..." 159/ [ ] noted that "the fears expressed by SR are without foundation" and concluded that "Such small alarms should not be allowed to deter management from repairing a demonstrated weakness in the control of the affairs of the Clandestine Services." 160/ Yet the appeal failed and the CSI was never published.

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Murphy took account of these long-standing differences with SIG in a four-page EYES ONLY memorandum to Fitzgerald on 23 August 1965. 161/ He documented his case by attaching [ ] earlier strictures on the subject, 162/ his February memorandum to the DD/S&T, 163/ and an SR paper on The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign. 164/

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In the memorandum, which he characterizes as "informal," he refers to a recent conversation with

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\*On the Routing and Record Sheet the routing shown is to DDP then CSR. There are no initials or other markings on the sheet to show how the memorandum was handled after it was received in the office of the DDP. Fitzgerald gave it to [ ] who in turn passed it to [ ]

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Fitzgerald concerning FI/SIG, and proceeds to review what he considers to be "the specific areas of disagreement." 165/ Murphy states that he "cannot agree that FI/SIG should have operating responsibility for, or should direct assets against, Soviet targets unless this is done within the framework of an SR Division operation." 166/ He is willing to accept SIG operational support and agrees that SR's "operational activity against S&T targets should be properly coordinated with FI/SIG, providing that...the need-to-know principle is strictly adhered to." 167/\*

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\*Author's italics. As noted earlier, very few of SR's S&T operations were "properly coordinated" with FI/SIG, in SIG's interpretation of coordination. That would have meant discussion with SIG in the planning and conduct of S&T collection activities. [redacted] did this on occasion, but it was the strong conviction in the Group that SR's application of the need-to-know principle effectively excluded the important and productive SR S&T cases from the coordination process. Indeed, Murphy cited the Penkovskiy case as an illustration of the Staff's necessary ignorance of the extent of SR's S&T effort: "Since the proponents of the FI/SIG concept were not privy to the full details of this case, the end impression may well have been that SR Division did not in fact operate against Soviet scientific targets." 168/ The Staff, of course, entertained no such impression and was well aware, all along, of the general extent of SR's collection efforts against S&T objectives, if not specific details of individual cases.

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The major point of contention with FI/SIG, as Murphy views it in his paper is over "two separate and mutually exclusive operational philosophies." 169/ SR's program is "carefully pinpointed," "tightly disciplined," "selectively targeted," using assets "extremely well trained" in "Soviet requirements, realities, and tradecraft," with "stature" in their scientific fields, and "managed against the background of the Clandestine Services' total experience in Soviet operations, which rests in SR Division." 170/ By implication, the SR S&T program has in it all the elements and qualities which FI/SIG's program does not and cannot have. More explicitly, Murphy later associates the FI/SIG program and methods with what he characterizes as "a random, shotgun approach to Soviet scientists with too wide use of insufficiently trained American scientists as access agents;" and he worries about the flap potential of that approach. 171/ A further aspect of the FI/SIG program to which he takes exception is its willingness to pursue Soviet Satellite scientists as possible sources of required information. In SR's view these scientists have no access to important information on Soviet military research and development and in consequence are not targets of the SR S&T effort.

At the end of his paper Murphy acknowledges that SIG may play a role in supporting other divisions which do not have S&T units of their own, for example, in "coverage of such subjects as nuclear proliferation." 172/ But the purpose of his paper has been to establish what he considers to be "absolutely fundamental," that is, the sufficiency of SR Division to handle clandestine collection against all Soviet targets, and the ancillary, if not entirely dispensable role of FI/SIG in that effort.

This paper and the review of SIG's activities which  had prepared in July, 173/ were to form the basis of discussions with Fitzgerald. These were not held, however, until much later -- early in 1966.\*

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Through the autumn of 1965 the ability of the Group to continue its operational program steadily declined. A number of its officers had sought, or were seeking, assignments elsewhere; those who remained were occupied more and more with purely staff duties, and the decreasing operational work was almost exclusively confined to support of collection activities outside the domain of

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\*There is no written record of the date of this meeting. It is the author's recollection that it occurred sometime during January.

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SR. In September [ ] was reassigned and replaced (b)(3)  
as Deputy Chief of FI Staff by [ ] As (b)(3)  
[ ] had been a strong, vocal, and persistent advocate -- (b)(3)  
and in many ways the architect -- of FI/SIG's opera-  
tional role, his reassignment at this critical juncture  
was seen in the Group as a further portent of basic  
changes in the Group's mission.

On [ ] arrival in the Staff, Fitzgerald (b)(3)  
asked him to look closely into the question of SIG's  
status and its relations with area divisions, and  
to report back. [ ] did this first by taking (b)(3)  
soundings informally in some divisions; then he asked  
[ ] to re-draft the CSI on Scientific Operations (b)(3)  
which [ ] had sent to Karamessines in June. The (b)(3)  
re-drafted CSI was sent to each division and staff  
for review on 1 November 1965; their comments were  
returned during November and early December. Finally  
[ ] was ready to report to Fitzgerald, which (b)(3)  
he did by memorandum on 10 December, attaching the  
draft CSI and the comments received from divisions  
and other staffs. 174/ On the same date [ ] (by (b)(3)  
this time in WE Division, preparing for assignment  
[ ] addressed another memorandum to (b)(1)  
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Fitzgerald\* attaching two rather lengthy papers which were, in his words, "the distillation of a great deal of thought that I have devoted to this problem over the last several years." 175/

[redacted] in his memorandum, reviewed the work of SIG since September 1962: its attempts to obtain well qualified staff, its contacts and operational assets in the U.S. scientific community, its staff agent operations, its technical guidance to area divisions (other than SR), and the variety of its staff functions. He recounted the results of his talks with area divisions concerning the proposed CSI and observed that only SR and FE Divisions took exception to it, declaring themselves "unwilling to accept a definition of FI/SIG functions which includes responsibility for all or any part of an operation." 176/\*\*

[redacted] concluded, after his fresh and dispassionate look

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\*His "swan song" on S&T Operations, as he later described the paper to [redacted]

\*\*Area division and staff comments on the proposed CSI (Tab B of [redacted] memorandum) may be found in Attachment F of this history. The lengthy objections of [redacted] essentially repeat, in different language, the objections to FI/SIG operations so often expressed by SR Division.

at the situation, that there was a need for a specialized S&T unit in the CS to exert a "measure of central management interest and direction" in the complex field of S&T collection activities. He found that

This requires a strong, competent staff element... such competence, if acquired...at great expense of time and effort, should not be used exclusively on intermittent staff chores...It is presumed that we all agree that we are far from having all the new ideas, energy, labor, and results in this difficult field that we need...divisions should be prompted...to get on with this problem,..they should welcome and encourage the professional partnership of the staff specialists in a positive, mature team effort. 177/

The tone of  paper was sober, measured, and temperate. It took due account of Fitzgerald's "concern about SIG operational functions which seem to compete or interfere with division responsibilities." 178/ Yet he believed that differences between SIG and area divisions could be resolved "given a spirit of accommodation on the part of SR and FE Divisions" and a

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definition of SIG's 'responsibility for constructive operational activity..which will complement, and not compete with, the work of other components." 179/

[ ] then recommended publication of the much-argued, long-delayed CSI.

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[ ] two concurrent papers were entitled "The Case for the Scientist-Case Officer" and "The Case for Centrally Guided S&T Operations in the Clan-destine Services." With some changes in emphasis and organization, they covered essentially the same ground treated in his September 1962 staff study. In his covering memorandum for the two papers, [ ] appealed for "strong support from the DD/P" for the program he had been espousing. If that was forthcoming and the program was vigorously pursued he foresaw that "the time will come when its detractors will readily recognize its value and recant...if it is deferred, we only destroy what little now remains of three years hard work, and postpone the day when we will start over from scratch." 180/

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Karamessines initialled the routing slip which [ ] used to transmit his and [ ] paper, but there is nothing on the slip or the various

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papers to show that Fitzgerald ever read them.

In early January 1966 Murphy wrote the last in his series of memoranda for the DD/P on S&T operations. 181/ By this time he had concluded that SR Division's program to obtain important information by attempted approaches to Soviet scientists was essentially unproductive. He declared his intention to reduce the effort against [redacted]

[redacted]

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retain his "S&T Headquarters Branch because we cannot afford to permit its expertise in the Soviet S&T field to be dissipated." 182/ He appended a lengthy review, prepared by [redacted] of his Branch's S&T collection efforts over a six month period. Again, the original of Murphy's memorandum reached [redacted] from Fitzgerald's office, and again without evidence that Fitzgerald had seen it.

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At the January 1966 meeting in Fitzgerald's office Karamessines, Murphy (and others from SR), George, [redacted] [redacted] were assembled. Murphy presented, orally, the main elements of the arguments he had used in the

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various earlier papers he had submitted to Karamessines and Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald asked  to review the operational work and accomplishments of SIG. There was considerable discussion of the merits and demerits of using professional scientists within the CS on operations -- a subject of particular interest to Fitzgerald. He expressed himself as being persuaded that good scientists were not likely to remain viable for long in operations, that the best course for the CS was to make effective use of the variety of scientific talent available in the DDS&T, but that he was not opposed to retaining a few scientific specialists for general use in operations at a central staff location. After a full hearing of the SR and the FI Staff positions, he stated his conclusion that operations by a staff element should be held to a minimum, and that they should be developed mainly to assist and "pilot" divisions without much S&T experience. He felt that SR was well equipped to handle its own S&T program, but wanted the FI Staff nevertheless to play an effective coordinating role in operations, and to stimulate the development and expansion of S&T collection activity throughout the Clandestine Services. He asked

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that FI Staff prepare a paper for him reviewing the points and concepts just discussed in the meeting, and to draft another paper based on those concepts which he might issue in place of the CSI proposed by the Staff.

In mid-March these papers were completed after much discussion and re-writing within the FI Staff. The memorandum drafted for Fitzgerald's signature, to go to staffs and divisions, was prepared by [redacted] then edited and reworded in some passages by [redacted] [redacted] in the office of the DDP. The "philosophy" statement which Fitzgerald had asked for was worked up by [redacted] Both papers were submitted under a covering memorandum from Lloyd George to Fitzgerald, recalling the "long session in your office some time ago when you tried to resolve the differences principally between the SR Division and the FI/SIG group." 183/

The philosophy paper reviewed several functions which FI Staff felt SIG ought to perform. First, it "should serve as a repository of knowledge and experience concerning agent and related technical collection operations to acquire S&T intelligence." 184/

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Divisions had frequently neglected to make use of this accumulated experience, or had too often chosen to turn to OSI for counsel. Second, the Group should be able to "provide authoritative S&T guidance to operating branches and stations...especially to most area division elements which have little experience in S&T cases." 185/ The conduct of clandestine [redacted] [redacted] was cited as a notable example of the need for central guidance and the DDP was once again urged "to consider early approval" of the long-deferred CSI on the subject. 186/ Third, SIG "should do more on-the-desk training of new officers (primarily Career Trainees) during a tour of duty in SIG," and the Staff saw "distinct advantages" in acquiring "a few officers specially competent in a scientific or engineering field who at the same time have a taste and talent for operations." 187/ Fourth, it was urged that "Before-the-fact consultation with SIG on the major S&T operational plans and actions of the Clandestine Services is essential." 188/ This had long been one of the most serious problems faced by the Group and, in the meeting with Fitzgerald, [redacted] and other FI Staff officers had attempted to impress

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him with its importance. The philosophy of the Staff on this subject was summarized in the paper as follows:

...we cannot assure the best application of our knowledge to an operational problem unless the divisions feel willing to inform SIG before the fact of divisional S&T activities. This applies especially to preparatory planning. It should not be necessary for staff officers, with assigned responsibilities in the S&T field, to go sleuthing among divisions for occasions to use their abilities. These officers should not be left in the position of patching up preventable errors, or pressing unwanted guidance and advice on inexperienced desk officers. If the staff must be alert and active in seeking opportunities to help, the divisions must have a reciprocal obligation to make the best use possible of existing S&T expertise available inside the CS. That expertise will not improve or even survive unless it is constantly called upon, activated by important as well as trivial cases, and not repeatedly by-passed or ignored in favor of outsiders. 189/

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Fifth, the Group should have knowledge of the various desk-to-desk contacts of area divisions with OSI officers on operational matters and should provide counsel during those contacts, both to preserve good operational security and to avoid "the development of OSI as the knowledgeable staff on CS operational matters..." 190/ Sixth, there was a useful function for the Group in serving as a central point of contact with various U.S. agencies on S&T operational matters. 191/

The controversial issue of SIG's role in operations was, somewhat resignedly, resolved in the blandly worded conclusion of the paper that

At this point in time, SIG would probably be more helpful if it confined its operational activity to cooperative assistance to area divisions when and where this can be effectively utilized. 192/

This language, which was carefully chosen by Lloyd George, reflected acceptance of the Fitzgerald point of view; but in a parting comment on the issue George observed that he saw little hope for cooperation of divisions with the Staff unless the DDP himself provided "some stimulus...which will admonish divisions

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to inform centrally and to use SIG as the knowledgeable S&T staff in the CS." 193/

This paper was an acknowledgement and recognition by FI Staff that the Helms charter of 1962 had been terminated. Formal notice of this was given in the relatively brief memorandum drafted for Fitzgerald's signature, which was to go to all staffs and divisions (see Attachment G).

The subject of the memorandum clearly indicated Fitzgerald's intention as to how he wished to use FI/SIG; it stressed "staff coordination and support" of S&T collection activities. At the same time, divisions were expected "to consult with FI/SIG on S&T operational problems or objectives before seeking counsel or support outside the Clandestine Services" and to coordinate their communications and correspondence on S&T matters "with the Group to the maximum extent feasible." 194/ The Fitzgerald memorandum stated flatly that

FI/SIG will have no operational responsibilities except for those which it may from time to time perform in collaboration with an area division, or to carry out operational

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or developmental tasks which may transcend  
divisional area responsibilities. 195/

Fitzgerald signed the memorandum on 17 March 1966;  
copies were distributed to every staff, every division,  
and every country branch in the CS.

With that action FI/SIG reverted to the staff  
role it had performed under Bissell. In June 1966 [redacted]  
on the eve of his departure for [redacted] wrote one  
last paper on the subject "to which," in his words,  
"I have given so much of my time and interest in the  
last five years..." 196/ He deplored the "negative  
statement" in Fitzgerald's memorandum on SIG's opera-  
tional responsibilities and the lack of attention in  
the paper -- "a major weakness" -- to the problem of  
S&T requirements in clandestine collection operations;  
and he clings to his conviction that ... "there are  
types of operational activity that can be conducted  
more economically, more effectively, and perhaps only  
by a central unit." 197/

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Through the remainder of Fitzgerald's regime,  
until his death in July 1967, and on into the period  
of Karamessines' incumbency as DDP, FI/SIG functioned  
under the terms of Fitzgerald's 1966 memorandum. The

number of officers in the staff dropped to [ ] by  
the end of 1969. In May, 1970, during Peer de Silva's  
tour as C/FI, the Staff as a whole was re-organized.  
FI/SIG was abolished. Its personnel and functions  
were incorporated into a revived FI Plans Group, and  
[ ] became Chief of that new Group. The develop-  
ments leading up to that change, covering the period  
1966 to May 1970, must form a separate and later portion  
of this history.

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Appendix A

Glossary of Abbreviations

AD/SI -- Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence.

[Redacted]

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OSI -- Office of Scientific Intelligence.

TSS -- Technical Services Staff (later Technical Services Division).

BW -- Biological Warfare.

CW -- Chemical Warfare.

IPC -- Inter-Agency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee.

OO -- Office of Operations [Redacted]  
[Redacted] of the Directorate of Intelligence.

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JOT -- Junior Officer Trainee (later Career Trainee).

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NIH -- National Institutes of Health.

CERN -- European Organization for Nuclear Research.

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Appendix B

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[redacted] (b)(3)  
16. S.
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111. [redacted] (b)(1)  
[redacted] (b)(3)
112. Memo, C/FI/SIG for C/FI, 29 Jul 1965, sub: Scientific Intelligence Group - Operational Activities. Annex B, page 1. S. (b)(3)
113. Conversations between [redacted] on the Scaglion case in early 1965. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)
114. Memo, C/FI/SIG for DDP, 18 Oct 1967, sub: [redacted] 1828 (IN 73961) of 17 October 1967. Telephone [redacted] (b)(1)  
[redacted] (b)(3)
- 114a. Memo, DC/FI/SIG through C/FI for DDP/PG, 21 Jun 1965, sub: Termination of [redacted] S. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)
115. Memo, Chief FI/SIG for ADD/P. 25 Oct 1967, sub: Termination of Project [redacted] SIG Memo No. 8656. S. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)
116. Memo for the Record, [redacted] 16 Mar 1967. sub: The Assignment of [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted]
117. Op. cit. (115, above), p. 3. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)
118. Op. cit. (112, above), p. 5.
119. Op. cit. (99, above), p. 1 and passim. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)
120. Ibid., p. 5.
121. Ibid., p. 7.
122. Ibid., p. 1.
123. SR Division Notice No. 64-4, 7 Feb 1964, sub: SR Division Program for Collection of Soviet Scientific and Technical Information. S.
124. Ibid., paras 1 through 5.

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125. Ibid., [redacted] hand-written comments on p. 4. (b)(3)
126. Ibid., para 6.
127. Ibid., para 7.c.
128. Memo, Chief, SR/CG/H/S&T for Chief, FI/SIG, 14 Feb 1964, sub: Transmittal of SR Division S&T Notice. S. (b)(3)
129. Memo, [redacted] WE/SPO for C/FI/SIG, 27 Feb 1964, sub: Draft CSN, Scientific Intelligence Group, Foreign Intelligence Staff. S.
130. Memo, Chief, FI/SIG for Chief, RID through Chief, FI, 22 Jun 1964, sub: FI/SIG Routing and Action Indicators. SIG Memo No. 7071. S.
131. Memo, Chief, RID for Chief, FI/SIG, 29 Jun 1964, sub: Assignment of Indicators. S. (b)(3)
132. Notes on Routing and Record Sheet for DDP/Publications by [redacted] [redacted] C/FE/FI, 19 Mar 1965. A. (b)(3)
133. Memo for DDP/Publications from Chief, SR [redacted] [redacted] acting), 22 Mar 1965, sub: Comment on Draft CSN Concerning Assignment of [redacted] [redacted] S. (b)(3)  
(b)(1)  
(b)(3)
134. Memo, Chief, EE for DDP/Publications, 30 Mar 1965, sub: Assignment of SIG Indicators. (b)(1)  
(b)(3)
135. Discussion between [redacted] early Nov 1964. No written record available. (b)(3)
136. Memo, Chief, Operations FI/SIG for Chief, FI/SIG, 12 FEB 1965, sub: Problems in Scientific Operations. S.
137. Discussion, [redacted] with Karamessines, approximately mid-January, 1965, as recalled by [redacted] No written record. (b)(3)
138. Memo, Chief, SR for DD/P, 23 Aug 1965, sub: FI/SIG-Soviet S&T Operations: with Attachments. S. Eyes Only-By Hand. (b)(3)

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139. Op. cit. (99, above), pp. 6 and 7.
140. CSI No. 50-21 (Operations-General), 27 Jan 1964, Soviet Operations. S.
141. CSI No. 1-11 (Organization), 27 Jan 1964, Organization and Functions of SR Division. S.
142. Op. cit. (140, above), p. 3.
143. Ibid., p. 5.
144. Memo, Chief, SR Division for DD/S&T, 24 Feb 1965, sub: Request for DD/S&T Support of Clandestine Services Collection Efforts Against Critically Important Soviet Scientific and Technical Targets. S. P. 10.
145. Ibid., p. 11.
146. Memo, Chief, SR Division for ADDP, 13 Apr 1965, sub: Discussion with DD/S&T of OSI Support for SR Division's S&T Effort, with attached Memo for the Record, 13 Apr 1965, same subject, signed by Chief, SR Division. S.
147. Memo, Chief, SR Division for ADDP, 23 Jun 1965, sub: Status of DDS&T Support of CS Collection Efforts Against Soviet S&T Targets. S.
148. Memo, Chief, SR Division for ADDP, 24 Feb 1965, sub: Discussion with DOST Officers on Soviet S&T Operations. S.
149. Ibid., para 1.
150. Ibid., para 3.
151. Memo, [redacted] 4 Feb 1965, sub: Comment on the Organization of the Clandestine Services for Scientific Operations. S. (b)(3)
152. Discussion between [redacted] early July 1965, as recalled by [redacted] (b)(3)

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153. Memo, C/FI/SIG for C/FI, 29 Jul 1965, sub: Scientific Intelligence Group-Operational Activities, with three Annexes. SIG Memo No. 8294. S.
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155. Memo, C/SR/CG/S for C/FI/SIG, 25 Aug 1965 (SR/CG/S 65-467), sub: Responsibility for Operational Management of Coverage of the Soviet Target  
[redacted] (b)(1)  
(b)(3)
156. Mem, C/FI/SIG for C/SR, 7 Sept 65, sub: Memorandum for C/FI/SIG from C/SR/CG/S, dated 25 Aug 1965 (SR/CB/S 65-467). S.
157. Memo, C/SR for ADDP, 26 Jul 65. sub: SR Comments on 12 May 1965 Draft CSI [redacted] (b)(1)  
(Received 9 July 1965). S. (b)(3)
158. Memo, DC/FI/SIG for ADDP. 7 Sep 1965, sub: Proposed CSI on [redacted] Two Attachments: A. CSI on [redacted] B. Comments on SR Memorandum. SIG Memo No. 8324. S. (b)(1)  
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160. Op. cit. (158, above).
161. Op. cit. (138, above).
162. Op. cit. (105, above).
163. Op. cit. (144, above).
164. The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign, dated September 1965. No author. U.
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166. Loc. cit.
167. Ibid., p. 2.
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173. Op. cit. (153, above).
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175. Memo, [redacted] for DDP, 10 Dec 1965, sub: Clandestine Services S&T Operations. With attachments. S. (b)(3)
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177. Ibid., para 5.
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179. Loc. cit.
180. Op. cit. (175 above), para 2.
181. Memo, C/SR for DD/P, 6 Jan 1966, sub: Status Report, SR Collection Group Scientific and Technical Branch Activities, May-November 1965. S. By Hand.
182. Ibid., paras 2 and 3.
183. Memo, C/FI for DDP, 15 Mar 1966, sub: Scientific Intelligence Group. Attachments: (1) Memo for DDP from C/FI, 18 Feb 1966, sub: Responsibilities of FI/SIG. S; (2) Draft Memo, DDP for Chiefs of Staffs and Operating Divisions, sub: Staff Coordination and Support of Clandestine Collection of Scientific and Technical Intelligence. S.
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186. Loc. cit.
187. Ibid., para 5.
188. Ibid., para 6.
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190. Ibid., para 8.
191. Ibid., para 9.
192. Ibid., para 12.
193. Loc. cit.
194. Op. cit. (183, above), Attachment 2, para 5.
195. Ibid., para 6.
196. Memo, [redacted] for DDP via ADDP, 8 Jun 1966,  
sub: DDP 6-1130, Staff Coordination and Support  
of Clandestine Collection of Scientific and  
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