

~~SECRET~~

CS Historical Paper
No. 163

CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
<u>THE EVOLUTION OF GROUND</u>
<u>PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES</u>
<u>AT THE STAFF LEVEL</u>
(PERIOD)
<u>OCTOBER 1949 - SEPTEMBER 1955</u>

DO NOT DESTROY

Date published: December 1968

Controlled by : SO Division

Copy No. 2 of 2

Date prepared : November 1968

Written by :

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of the paper continued to be NSC 10/5, which has been described previously. On 15 March 1954, it was replaced by NSC 5412,^{67/} the first of several NSC actions referred to as the 5412 series.

NSC 5412 reaffirmed the responsibility of the DCI for ensuring that covert operations were consistent with U.S. policies, and that direct action such as support to resistance, GW, sabotage and countersabotage and E&E was included in the overall definition of covert operations. The DCI was made responsible for consulting with the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) and other departments and agencies as appropriate.

Ground PM Accomplishments, August 1952 - June 1954

It was rather bitterly ironic, at least to PM Staff personnel, that this period at the outset saw PM activity achieve its highest announced status and recognition as a principal staff function, then decline to its lowest depth of acceptance (in 1954^{and}) as a major Agency responsibility and effort, because of a series of failures, compromises and disappointments. It is unfortunately true that to a certain extent these unhappy results were the product of a lack of professional expertise in the planning, implementation and security

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Soviet Russia: The operational difficulties in establishing long-range PM assets in the USSR were practically insurmountable, particularly in view of the more pressing requirements for intelligence collection. The practicality and advisability of recruiting and training PM assets, to be held externally until required for operational employment, was taken under advisement. It was recognized that such an undertaking would present very large administrative and security problems.

Czechoslovakia and Poland: Within a few months after the disastrous BDJ exposure in Germany, PM projects which had successfully infiltrated trained agents into Czechoslovakia and Poland were badly

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

compromised by Communist penetrations of the sponsoring political groups. A number of valued agents were rounded up and executed. The projects were considered as compromised beyond salvage.

Bulgaria: A PM project for the introduction of trained agents into Bulgaria was also compromised, with resultant loss of agents.

East Germany: A PM project, based in Berlin, for the infiltration of trained PM agents into East Germany was initiated and appeared to give some promise of fruitful results.

The Near East

Iran: By late 1952 it became apparent that Iran was in danger of indirect takeover by the Soviets. The government of Iranian Premier Mossadeq, sorely beset by economic problems, was falling increasingly under the influence of extreme nationalists and Tudeh (Iranian Communist) Party. The Shah did not seem to have the will to act.

At the suggestion of

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~