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CS Historical Paper

No. 195

# CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)

THE ORIGINS OF

CIA'S CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION  
IN THE FAR EAST

(PERIOD)

1945 - 1952

## DO NOT DESTROY

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## S E C R E T

Inchon area. Between them, they established the presence

of [ ] staffers and sources [ ]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

[ ] with orders to make reconnais-

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

sance of the Inchon area. From Korean sources [ ]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

who had first-hand knowledge of the Inchon harbor and

coastal region, together with maps and charts which these

sources helped to compile, [ ] was able to supply excel-

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

lent reconnaissance information which contributed heavily

toward the success of the Inchon landing on 16 September. <sup>51/</sup>

There were a number of accomplishments of CIA oper-

ations personnel in the Korean War, not the least of which

was to continue to function as a relatively independent

organization in a theater of war (even if it was not so

declared) in the face of repeated efforts by the armed

forces to take over or to exercise strong control. <sup>52/</sup>

Two of the more dramatic incidents were the accomplish-

ments of [ ] in preparation for the Inchon landing already

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

referred to, and the placing of Surgeon General Sams

of the U.S. Army behind the North Korean lines to investi-

gate the truth of the enemy charges that United Nations

Forces were using bacteriological agents in warfare.

The suspicion was that North Korea had some kind of

epidemic running rife in its area and was laying it to

germ warfare by the United Nations forces. General Sams

## S E C R E T

was put ashore [ ] and there  
 verified the American suspicion. He was exfiltrated [ ]  
 [ ] and made his report so convincingly that  
 the germ warfare charge died out in a hurry.\*

(b)(1)  
 (b)(3)  
 (b)(1)  
 (b)(3)  
 (b)(1)  
 (b)(3)

The difficulties in trying to work with the military  
 command while avoiding being taken over by it are touched  
 on by [ ] but are covered more extensively  
 by [ ] the next commander of the combined  
 CIA forces in Korea, in two reports, one referred to in  
 Reference No. 52, and the other his review of the CIA  
 effort in Korea in his report to Admiral Overesch, whom  
 CIA Director Bedell Smith appointed in the summer of 1952  
 as Senior Representative heading the CIA North Asia  
 Command,\*\* which covered [ ] Korea, as well as  
 activities [ ] directed toward Com-  
 munist China and the Soviet Union.

(b)(3)  
 (b)(3)

(b)(1)  
 (b)(3)  
 (b)(1)  
 (b)(3)

\* These events, as well as the trials and tribulations of  
 the early period of the Korean War when the OSO and OPC  
 activities were combined under one commander, are related  
 in CS Historical Paper No. 52, The Secret War in Korea,  
June 1950-June 1952, by [ ]

(b)(3)

\*\*For an account of this experiment in funneling the re-  
 lations of several field components to their respective  
 Headquarters elements through a single command point in  
 the field, see CS Historical Paper No. 211, The North  
Asia Command, 1952-1956, by W. Lloyd George.

S E C R E T