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Exposing the Cracks: Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Organizational Justice in the Intelligence Community

Dr. Chloe Wilson

Through their actions, supervisors have the ability to influence how employees feel valued and supported at work. How supervisors communicate information, enforce policies, endorse assistance, and treat personnel can cause employees to contemplate the equity in decisionmaking and the conduct of the organization.

Just as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 forced the Intelligence Community to recognize the critical need for integration, the COVID-19 pandemic is another catastrophic event that should prompt self-reflection within the IC. While the pandemic has produced new diverse challenges for organizations to counter, it has simultaneously exacerbated already existing and overlooked issues within the IC. One of the existing issues is the division between supervisors who embrace and those who neglect fostering a culture of organizational justice. Organizational justice is defined as "people's *perceptions* of fairness in organizations along with their associated behavioral, cognitive, and emotional reactions" (Greenberg, 2011, 271). Although organizational justice is not a new term in organizational psychology or intelligence literature (see Reed, 2019, for a review), the COVID-19 pandemic has brought about new circumstances that have heightened perceptions of injustice for employees.

Through their actions, supervisors have the ability to influence how employees feel valued and supported at work. How supervisors communicate information, enforce policies, endorse assistance, and treat personnel can cause employees to contemplate the equity in decisionmaking and the conduct of the organization. Research has highlighted the impact of organizational justice on workplace outcomes such as employee health, burnout, organizational commitment, and turnover intentions (e.g., Colquitt, et al., 2001). Although perceptions of organizational justice are influenced by everyday decisions and conversations, supervisors' behaviors have been found to be more consequential during difficult times, such as a global pandemic (Eisenberger, et al., 1986; Daniels, et al., 2022).

Organizational Justice

Perceptions of organizational justice affected clandestine activities and missions from our nation's beginning. Benedict Arnold, the first known American spy, was a loyal American asset prior to and during the the Revolutionary War (*Evolution of Espionage in America*, 2022). However, he was frequently overlooked for advancement and honors. After another general claimed responsibility for one of Arnold's successes at the Battle of Saratoga in 1777, Arnold grew disgruntled and defected to the British. Throughout the history of the intelligence services, many insiders have set aside their loyalty to the nation and engaged in espionage because they felt discontented and undervalued. Leadership plays a vital role in preventing and deterring insiders off the Critical Pathway for Insider Threat (CPIT) through

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> **Dimensions of Organizational Justice**
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> - Distributive Justice: The perception that outcomes and resources are distributed to employees fairly.
>
> - Procedural Justice: The perception that procedures and policies used to determine outcomes are fair.
>
> - Informational Justice: The perception that explanations improve perceived fairness through understanding.
>
> - Interpersonal Justice: The perception that individuals are treated fairly through dignity and respect.

implementing organizational justice principles in their actions (Shaw and Sellers, 2015).

Organizational justice refers to an individual's tolerance for observed fairness. Whether or not the outcome or decision *is* fair is less important than whether employees *perceive* it to be fair. The construct stems from the literature on psychological contracts, which describes the expectation of a reciprocal obligation between the individual and the organization (Rousseau, 1989). As a basic example, an employee expects that in return for productivity, the organization will provide financial compensation. However, this relationship extends beyond work for pay; employees expect their individual contributions, such as loyalty, civility, and time, will be exchanged for organizational incentives, such as career development, job security, and recognition (Rousseau, 1989).

When employees feel their organization or its organizational agents (e.g., supervisors, coworkers) have treated them unfairly, a breach in the psychological contract occurs and strains the relationship between employees and the organization. Examples of injustice can be seen throughout many areas of the workplace, such as perceived discrimination in promotion decisions, favoritism toward one or a group of individuals, or pay differences for the same work.

Researchers have categorized organizational justice into four dimensions based upon the source of inequity: distributive justice, procedural justice, informational justice, and interpersonal justice.

Distributive Justice

Distributive justice describes the perception that rewards and benefits are *distributed* to employees fairly (Adams, 1965; Greenberg, 1982; 1986). It involves three considerations. First, individuals determine fairness by comparing what they invest into and consequently receive from a relationship, which forms an input/output ratio. For instance, when two individuals both contribute equally to a project, they expect to be equally recognized.

Second, distributive justice is dynamic, in that individuals compare their input/output ratios to different referents. Individuals can compare themselves to a past decision that was made (a temporal referent), to coworkers (a social referent), or toward their idealized expectations (an internalized referent; Adams, 1965). And finally, individuals have different sensitivity to equity in distribution. Individuals can prefer to be under-benefited, over-benefited, or equity-sensitive (prefer balance). Individuals experience distress and perceive unfairness when their personal preference is not upheld (Huseman, et al., 1987). Thus, distributive justice will not be experienced the same for everyone, as it depends on their referent and sensitivity to equity for that particular decision.

Procedural Justice

Alternatively, procedural justice refers to the perception that the *procedures* used to determine outcomes are fair (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry, 1980). Individuals perceive the fairness of a process independent of the outcome that is received. If the process is perceived as fair, then individuals are more willing to tolerate negative outcomes (i.e., not being chosen for an opportunity).

Ultimately, the focus is on how decisions are made, rather than what decisions are made (Leventhal, 1980). For example, supervisors who use a standardized procedure to determine who receives travel funding would be perceived as having higher procedural justice by their subordinates than a supervisor who selects a subordinate based on favoritism. Based on their research of how to maximize perceptions of fairness, Leventhal, et al., (1980) developed six principles of procedural justice: procedures that are consistently applied, free from bias, accurate, able to be corrected, ethical, and leverage employee participation are the best predictors of increasing procedural justice. Further, Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) found that when procedural justice was high, employees responded less negatively to perceptions of

low distributive justice. Thus, when employees perceived that a procedure was fair, it mitigated the negative reactions to the undesirable outcome that was distributed.

Interactional Justice

Informational and interpersonal justice refer to the perception that individuals are *treated* in a respectful manner when decisions are being communicated, often referred to in a single term as interactional justice (Bies and Moag, 1986). Formal procedures tend to matter less to individuals than how the individual feels treated when rewards are distributed or procedures are implemented (Bies, 2005; Fassina, Jones, and Uggerslev, 2008; Greenberg, 2006).

Informational Justice

Informational justice highlights the importance of explanations in decisionmaking and promotes providing rationale when communicating both positive and negative news (Bies, 2005; Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt and Shaw, 2005; Greenberg, 1993).

Providing adequate and complete information surrounding the decisionmaking process can increase an individual's understanding of the circumstance and buffer against negative reactions. One of the biggest stressors for employees during a crisis is ambiguity and uncertainty; by providing employees transparency with regular updates and feedback, supervisors can ease an individual's anxiety through communication.

Interpersonal Justice

Finally, interpersonal justice highlights the need for compassion during communication of decisions (Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1990; 1993). Supervisors can demonstrate respect when communicating with

subordinates through nonverbal and verbal means. By engaging in eye contact, having awareness of one's posture and using encouraging gestures, supervisors can demonstrate that they are actively listening and giving the individual their undivided attention (Greenberg, 1993). Similarly, supervisors who express concern and empathy can demonstrate that they care about their employees' wellbeing by acknowledging their circumstances.

Justice Considerations

Supervisors who use any, or a combination, of the four components of organizational justice can drastically change an individual's reaction to negative news. Studies have shown not only changes in self-reported perceptions of fairness but also physiological differences. For example, in one study of organizational layoffs, employees whose supervisors were trained in interactional justice had decreased negative reactions and insomnia symptoms in a four-week period following a pay-cut than employees whose supervisors were not trained in interactional justice (Greenberg, 2006).

It is also important to note that individuals respond differently to fair and unfair treatment (Colquitt et al., 2015; Gilliland, 2008). When an individual receives a beneficial outcome (e.g., pay bonus), they tend to perceive the entire situation positively, regardless of how the outcome was decided or communicated. Whereas, when those same outcomes are viewed as unfavorable (e.g., pay cut),

> *Organizational justice is a cause for concern for the IC, as employee disgruntlement has been highlighted as a leading factor of insider threats.*

individuals tend to have intensified negative reactions to the situation and require increased need for explanations of the process and rationale. In other words, the reaction to perceptions of *un*fairness are magnified in comparison to perceptions of fairness (Gilliland, 2008).

This rationale explains why perceived injustice is a core determinant of workplace deviance (Bennett and Robinson, 2000; Berry, Ones, and Sackett, 2007; Fox, Spector, and Miles, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001). Therefore, while it is important to always demonstrate the justice principles in decisionmaking, the need is intensified when individuals do not receive the outcome they expected or desired.

Organizational Justice and Insider Threat

Organizational justice is a cause for concern for the IC, as employee disgruntlement has been highlighted as a leading factor of insider threats (e.g.. Claycomb and Huth, 2013; Shaw, Fischer, and Rose, 2009; Willison and Warkentin, 2009). In one study assessing the series of events that occurred before engaging in insider threat, 17 percent of the cases showed evidence of disgruntlement leading up to their transfer of classified information (Claycomb and Huth, 2013). Further, research has highlighted that workplace disgruntlement and employee dissatisfaction were identified as the two key underlying causes of deviance in the workplace and organizational

> ***Although organizational injustice often serves as an aggravating factor to insider threat, supervisors who demonstrate organizational justice in their actions can also serve as a protective factor in times of stress.***

crime (Greitzer et al., 2010; Moore, Cappelli and Trzeciak, 2008).

Insiders engage in deviant behavior as a way of restoring the balance of fairness, taking revenge for perceived injustices they experienced (Moore, Cappelli, and Trzeciak, 2008). For example, many case studies highlight that workplace deviance is often preceded by negative experiences, such as a poor performance review, dispute with coworkers, or unfavorable relocation. Researchers at the US Secret Service and Carnegie Mellon (2005) found that of the 49 cases of insider sabotage in their sample, 88 percent of the perpetrators held a "work-related grievance" before the act of sabotage.

Employees interpret perceptions of unfairness as a representation of how the organization values them (Eisenberger, et. al, 1986). Feeling unrecognized, unappreciated, or undervalued decreases employees' perceived organizational support. Extensive research has examined the consequences of decreased perceptions of organizational support for key business outcomes (e.g., Kurtessis, et al., 2017; Rhoades and Eisenberger, 2002). Feeling undervalued by one's organization can incite the desire to 'get back at' the organization through counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs; Furnham and Siegel, 2011; Greitzer, et al., 2010; Shaw, Fischer, and Rose, 2009). CWBs can range from minor disruptions of work productivity such as coming in late, gossiping, and slowing down one's pace of work, to more egregious acts of physical

sabotage of systems, violence toward coworkers, and engaging in espionage (Robinson and Bennett, 1995).

Although organizational injustice often serves as an aggravating factor to insider threat, supervisors who demonstrate organizational justice in their actions can also serve as a protective factor in times of stress. Shaw and Fischer (2005) noted that most of the insider threats in their study could have been prevented by timely and effective action to address the anger, pain, anxiety, or psychological impairment of perpetrators who exhibited signs of vulnerability and risk well in advance of their crime. Additionally, within the *Critical Path to Insider Threat*, Shaw and Sellers (2015) describe how insiders often experience a major change in their life (e.g., death of a loved one, divorce, organizational relocation or restructuring) that in combination with poor management facilitated an insider farther down the path.

Therefore, in reflecting on the variety of workplace changes that have been brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, the conditions for perceptions of unfairness have only increased. It is crucial for supervisors to foster a culture of organizational justice in order to increase perceptions of fairness and manage negative reactions before individuals propel down the pathway to problematic behavior.

Both the government and private sector have fallen victim to problematic behavior like employee retaliation. While selection and screening

precautions can help filter out bad actors, individuals who were once trustworthy employees can experience a triggering event at work that impacts their loyalty (Shaw and Sellers, 2015). Thus, ensuring that supervisors understand and implement organizational justice principles are paramount in deterring insider threats.

Exemplars of the Influence of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Organizational Justice

Beyond the obvious devastation, anxiety, and ambiguity surrounding COVID-19, the pandemic has caused many workplaces, including in the IC, to significantly change the way work is conducted, such as working through resource and personnel shortages, virtual environments, and strained communication channels. Researchers have discussed how employees have dealt with these conditions while experiencing work-family issues, discrimination against Asian-Americans, safety concerns, economic stressors, and reminders of death at work (e.g., Sinclair, et al., 2020). Experts have discussed the numerous occupational health consequences that have resulted from these circumstances, and organizational justice is no exception. Workers experienced new circumstances that have called into question the fairness of procedures and treatment of employees furthering the divide between supervisors who exhibit the principles of organizational justice over those who do not.

Vignettes

To demonstrate the divide, the author conducted informal interviews with employees from different

departments within the IC. The participants volunteered to participate in phone calls with the author during which they were asked to describe their work experiences during the pandemic. The interviews took approximately 30 minutes each. The following vignettes were developed based on a combination of the narratives that were provided by the participants to highlight examples of the presence, and absence, of organizational justice during the pandemic. They are intended for educational purposes only. No single vignette represents any one interviewee or experience. All names, affiliations, and identifying information have been removed to protect privacy of the interviewees.

Vignette 1: Distribution of Outcomes

Harry works as an analyst at a government agency. Some of his work is classified, however, on a day-to-day basis he works with open-source analysis tools. After the declaration of the state of emergency all employees at Harry's organization received a workforce notice that they should consider the safety concerns of coming into the office and should telework by all means necessary. However, moments later, Harry received an email from his direct supervisor stating that his team would not be following the same procedure as the rest of the organization, and his team must continue to come into the office.

As the weeks went by, Harry noticed that his team was the only team within his department who came in every day. Questioning this, Harry asked his boss why their team was the

only one in the office. His supervisor laughed and said "I don't trust you to stay focused at home with your kids running around! There are too many distractions, there is no way our team will produce sound, quality work remotely."

After his conversation with his supervisor, Harry began getting frustrated every morning as he walked into work. He couldn't figure out how it was fair that teams within the same department, who conducted the same type of work, and used the same skillset were expected (and trusted) to work differently. Harry was already concerned about his safety coming to work and exposing his family, so why were other teams allowed to work from home while his team had to come into the office to work on tasks that were unclassified? Harry thought to himself, "I am using all open-source tools anyway, what difference does it make if I did this at home?" It didn't seem fair.

With the high infection rate and uncertainty in virus transmission, many workplaces closed down their office spaces and transitioned their employees to work remotely. While some positions and organizations lend themselves more easily to telework opportunities, others were limited due to security concerns or the nature of the work (e.g., physical requirements, equipment needs, and classified materials). The Office of Personnel Management (2021) reported that 50 percent of federal employees were considered eligible for telework in 2020.

> **Workers experienced new circumstances that have called into question the fairness of procedures and treatment of employees furthering the divide between supervisors who exhibit the principles of organizational justice over those who do not.**

However, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2022), the use of telework varied based on agencies' missions and the portability of their work, resulting in differences in utilization of the policy, with some organizations expressly forbidding the use of telework. In the 2020 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, 4 percent of employees said they were prohibited from teleworking even though their job would allow for it. These variations were not always perceived as fair by employees.

Differences in telework eligibility could be seen within the same industry, organization, and even in offices within the same organization. Employees who were told they were ineligible to telework questioned the rationale and decisionmaking more than in previous years. One employee compared the security concerns of working in the IC with the security concerns of a multibillion-dollar technology industry (i.e., an external organization referent). She said employees who work at places such as Apple, "… protect billion-dollar proprietary information and they have security measures in place to allow them to work from home despite the security risk."

By comparing her position to industry with (perceived) similar circumstances, the employee was perceiving an imbalance in the input/output ratio. She perceived this as unjust, as her workplace could not provide the same opportunities despite having seemingly similar restrictions. Other

The discrepancy between supervisors who supported employees as they learned to adapt to the new way of work, compared to the supervisors who refused to endorse any form of flexibility, demonstrated the wavering trust that was exchanged between supervisors and employees.

employees expressed frustration even when comparing themselves with other federal employees (i.e., an internal organizational referent). Employees at some agencies were told by leadership that the government was incapable of supporting flexible work arrangements in general, but those employees were aware of colleagues across the executive branch who were permitted to work from home and in some instances are able to continue working from home.

Other employees reported frustration from the mixed messaging regarding telework eligibility. As seen in Vignette 1, one employee reported receiving an email from leadership stating that employees should telework by all means necessary so long as mission allowed, but his supervisor did not allow employees to telework because the supervisor did not trust employees to work without direct supervision. If your supervisor did not trust you to work without being in eyesight, would you feel betrayed? Other employees reported that their supervisors prohibited them from teleworking due to their faulty beliefs about teleworking (e.g., employees do not perform optimally when at home) and not supporting the concept due to the mentality of "if I [supervisor] have to come in, everyone else should too" creating a negative cyclical atmosphere.

Evidence of distributive justice can be seen as Harry contemplates the differences between his team's work and the rest of the department. Despite both teams having similar

"inputs" (e.g., similar work loads and skillset), their "outputs" differed (e.g., ability/inability to telework). The vignette demonstrates how fairness is not always perceived the same way. It is likely that Harry may have initially perceived that his inability to telework was fair, if he had compared himself to industry, rationalizing that his work in the IC was classified and unlikely to be able to be adapted to work remotely. However, Harry compared his input/output ratio to his colleagues in his department. It was this comparison that caused him to perceive the telework decision as unfair and experience frustration, questioning why he was treated differently than others with similar work roles.

It is important to note that not all supervisors were unsupportive in the distribution of benefits to overcome the pandemic's hardships. Other employees reported feeling increased appreciation for their supervisors during the initial months of 2020. Many employees described how their supervisors encouraged maximum flexibility in work hours and advocated for accommodations to a "new work schedule." Some employees had to share a workspace with others in their household, sharing technology and bandwidth, and others had the additional burden of working while assisting with virtual learning for their children.

Instead of enforcing the traditional 9–5 shift, some supervisors encouraged employees to work the hours that fit with their availability. Employees were able to work a few

hours in the early morning, afternoon, and late evening with multiple hour breaks in between, as long as work was completed by the end of the day. Supervisor support was perceived as fair because employees were still contributing and working the same hours, just at different times of the day, balancing the input/output ratio. The discrepancy between supervisors who supported employees as they learned to adapt to the new way of work, compared to the supervisors who refused to endorse any form of flexibility, demonstrated the wavering trust that was exchanged between supervisors and employees.

Vignette 2: Consistency of Procedures

During the middle of her workday, Paula began to exhibit some cold-like symptoms. After considering the onset of her symptoms and her recent attendance at a busy movie theater, she conscientiously left work early to visit a COVID-19 testing clinic. Later that afternoon, she received her results and found out she tested positive for COVID-19. To prepare for required quarantine, Paula called her workforce's COVID-19 response team to report her case. The representative notified her that she would not be allowed to enter agency buildings until she quarantined for 10 days and was symptom-free for at least 24 hours. The representative also told her that because she was exhibiting symptoms, she would be required to take sick-leave to cover her days out of the office. Paula experienced nasal congestion, reported feeling groggy, and had a slight cough for the first four days of quarantine but was relieved to feel much better a few days later.

Policies were not consistently applied across work teams or the government as a whole, were open to supervisor interpretations (increasing likelihood of bias and inaccurate interpretation), and rarely included employee participation.

On her first day back to the office, Paula attended a meeting with her federal partners which included employees from other agencies. At the beginning of the meeting, the group engaged in small talk, during which Paula spoke about her recent quarantine and concern over her limited remaining sick days. After explaining her circumstance to a work friend, she was surprised to find out that other agencies did not require employees to use their own personal sick leave on COVID-19–related days out of the office. Those employees were provided other leave allowances to accommodate for their time out of the office due to the pandemic. Paula was confused as everyone in the room worked for the government. "Why do I have to use my sick leave and you don't? How is it fair that agencies are using different procedures?" Paula felt disrespected. She couldn't make sense of the difference in guidance across agencies. It didn't seem fair.

Over the course of the pandemic, workplace guidance on safety requirements fluctuated with the evolving conditions (e.g., transmission and local caseloads). To further complicate the circumstances, authorities (e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the White House, local governments) were not always aligned. As a result, agencies had to do their best to meet a variety of (and at certain times, conflicting) requirements to ensure the wellbeing of their workforce.

Across different teams and agencies, employees noticed differences in enforcement of mask wearing (e.g., what type of mask, when it had to be worn), testing requirements, parental leave flexibilities, telework eligibility, health accommodations,

travel restrictions, quarantine and leave requirements (e.g., different leave could be taken depending on whether employee was in quarantine due to exposure vs. quarantining because they were ill). In the midst of many workplace changes, employees reported frustration at the differing requirements among agencies.

Comparing the procedures and policies from the early months of the pandemic, it is evident that key tenets of Leventhal's (1980) procedural justice principles were violated. Policies were not consistently applied across work teams or the government as a whole, were open to supervisor interpretations (increasing likelihood of bias and inaccurate interpretation), and rarely included employee participation.

In the early months of the pandemic, government agencies had to be agile and adapt to accommodate their workforces while meeting imposed restrictions. While noble in their intentions, the inconsistent and unclear execution of the various health policies caused a disruption in procedural justice. One employee reported that initially their organization allowed employees with preexisting conditions or who were immunocompromised to receive administrative leave. This process did not require any documentation; employees could report that they had a condition and were automatically exempt from coming into the office.

Although this provided a great sense of relief to many individuals

in need of accommodation, some employees felt that their office's laid back approach allowed some individuals to take advantage of the system. As a result, "there was inequity among us … [Some] coworkers saw an opportunity to stay home and they jumped for it. It was like the lazy people were rewarded with time off and hard workers were given more work [to compensate for understaffing]." Employees were having to work on tasks outside of their work role to cover for individuals who did not come in. Without procedural guidelines from leadership on how to obtain the accommodation, employees perceived unfairness in its application and developed distrust of coworkers.

Vignette 2 demonstrates another example of a breach in the procedural justice principles. This vignette describes how the procedures used to determine outcomes were inconsistently applied for employees across the federal government. While Paula had to use her own personal time (sick leave) to comply with her organization's quarantine policy, other agencies allowed employees to take administrative leave without using their accrued leave. Multiple employees reported feeling that this discrepancy was unfair. This was further complicated when agencies had different quarantine policies when individuals reported being symptomatic and asymptomatic; symptomatic personnel were required to take sick leave, but asymptomatic personnel were able to take administrative

The inconsistent requirements throughout the IC caused employees to question why their agency was conducting business differently, signifying an underlying message of distrust.

leave. Two of the principles of procedural justice were overlooked within this context, ethicality of the content of decisions and consistency across decisions.

Another employee mentioned perceptions of unfairness regarding parental leave. To accommodate the disruptions in schooling and childcare caused by the pandemic, some agencies provided employees a specific amount of excused absence hours each week to care for young children. This assistance was intended to help working parents meet the needs of their family's schedule when childcare was limited. Even though this employee appreciated the organizational support from top leadership, she did not receive the same support from her supervisor. She was unable to use the leave time because her supervisor was unwilling to discuss the benefit with her despite being granted permissions, as her supervisor was not welcoming in conversations regarding utilizing the benefits.

This scenario demonstrates the inconsistent use of policy within an organization due to the supervisor belief that the employee was unlikely to use the leave for its intended purpose. While the agency made the effort to serve employees' needs, the impact of these efforts can be diminished if supervisors fail to support or implement them.

Additionally, vaccine requirements further complicated the inconsistency throughout the IC. As COVID-19 vaccines became readily available, agencies began administering the vaccine on-site. Perceptions of unfairness developed from employees working at various buildings outside of an organization's headquarters. Unfairness was perceived through favoritism of one location and the sense that employee participation (in having a voice) was not considered.

As discussions of vaccine mandates began, differences in requirements were also discussed. Initially, the military was one of the first organizations to mandate the vaccine. However, the requirements were complicated for agencies that employ military and civilian employees. While the military-affiliated employees were required to receive the vaccine, the civilian employees were not, despite working alongside each other.

In September 2021, when the president issued Executive Order 14043 mandating vaccines for all government employees, the procedures for attestation differed throughout the federal government. While some agencies relied on the honor system, some required a signature of consent and others required a copy of the vaccine card as evidence of compliance. The inconsistent requirements throughout the IC caused employees to question why their agency was conducting business differently, signifying an underlying message of distrust.

Vignette 3: Transparency with Information

During the initial months of the pandemic, Marco's agency sent all employees home to telework. Marco's supervisor hosted a team meeting to discuss weekly updates that the organization's leadership were providing, new protocols that would be implemented, and what to expect in the coming weeks. During the meetings, Marco's boss would inform team members of the different ways they could work during the week such as flexible hours, which days were quietest in the office if they needed to come in and other resources that employee assistance programs had distributed. Marco always felt like he knew what was going on despite working from home and felt just as connected to his team members as he had before.

After meeting with a colleague over Skype, Marco realized that not every team was hosting these weekly meetings. Marco's colleague mentioned that he was feeling really isolated from work lately; he felt abandoned as Marco had not heard from his supervisor in months. The colleague felt frustrated not knowing what was going on and felt disrespected that no one cared to check in on him. Marco's colleague asked if Marco would forward these supervisor updates so he did not feel so isolated. He said, "the pandemic is hard on us all, we should be treated as one team." It doesn't seem fair.

Research has shown that supervisor support can mitigate employee uncertainty, reducing long-term emotional exhaustion for employees (Charoensukmongkol and Phungsoonthorn, 2021). This was especially important during the early

months of the pandemic, when there was so much ambiguity surrounding COVID-19 transmission, symptoms, and safety requirements. In addition to keeping up with the novelty of the pandemic, employees were also expected to quickly adjust to work-from-home schedules, new technology, and requirements. During this time, many employees found support through supervisors who communicated information regularly.

Informational justice describes the importance of explaining decisions and providing context when communicating decisions. As seen in Vignette 3, supervisors who shared information eased their employees' sense of isolation. With regular and consistent updates from supervisors, employees felt they were "in the know" as they were aware their organization was actively working on solutions to various challenges and felt included in the process.

Not all supervisors were able or willing to provide regular updates to employees. Other employees reported feeling "in the dark" regarding team needs and workplace updates. These employees felt isolated and forgotten about, developing a sense of unfairness from a lack of attention, information, and awareness. As this was fairly common, employees reported having a chain of information sharing, where one supportive supervisor would update their team on information they had gained over the week, and members of those meetings would relay information to other coworkers who were not getting regular updates from leadership to supplement the information sharing.

Informational justice was also demonstrated during town hall

Research has shown that supervisor support can mitigate employee uncertainty, reducing long-term emotional exhaustion for employees.

sessions and through workforce notices. Leadership updated the workforce on pressing issues affecting employees and allowed employees to ask questions. Town hall meetings are a great opportunity to increase perceptions of informational justice because they allow leadership to explain why procedures are in place, provide rational for recent decisions, or present the status of upcoming changes. Employees may not be satisfied with the procedures or decisions, but with adequate explanation and rationale employees are more likely to understand why restrictions are in place.

Without justification for decisions, employees are left to assume the purpose and intent behind regulations and policy on their own. One employee described how their supervisor frequently asked them when they were returning to work. This employee felt they were being unfairly asked to come into the office and risk exposure to COVID-19 without knowing the necessity for working in the office or about the building's health and safety procedures. The employee reported feeling frustrated and did not understand why they were being pressured into the office when they were unaware of an immediate need that would require their physical presence. If the employee's supervisor had explained the reasoning behind the urgency, such as, "there is a growing backlog of work that needs to be addressed that we are unable to access remotely," in combination with an explanation of health and safety protocols that were in place, then the employee may have been

more likely to understand the urgency to return to the office.

The circumstances described above may have been heightened during the initial months of the pandemic in comparison to present times, however, the underlying message still applies. The pandemic has highlighted the importance of information sharing and the impact it has on perceptions of inclusion. Whether employees are physically present or behind a screen, informational justice promotes equity through awareness and understanding.

Vignette 4: Interpersonal Communication of Respect

Shayla has had a lot to worry about over the course of the pandemic. She has three small children who are not eligible for the vaccine yet, and she has underlying health conditions that increase her vulnerability to catching the virus. Shayla has had to juggle her family and personal concerns, while also managing a full-time job. At one point, her children's school closed down for one week, the next week she tested positive, and then her children tested positive the following week. Despite all this, Shayla managed to work her regular 8-hour day via telework.

Upon returning to the office, Shayla stopped by her supervisor's desk to check in. Despite Shayla standing at the door, her supervisor didn't bother to turn around, and instead barked, "What?" without making eye contact. Shayla was a little taken aback by the supervisor's

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Even the most engaged and organized employees struggled with adjusting to working during the pandemic.

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tone of voice and abruptness. While Shayla tried to request project and team updates, her supervisor dismissed her interest and said "I'm glad to hear you care about work again. You have been out for so long!" Shayla tried to shrug it off and mentioned that she has been working, despite not being physically present in the office. Her supervisor made some additional snide comments such as, "you are never in your office anymore, are you ever working?" Shayla felt disrespected by her supervisor's behavior; the treatment toward her didn't seem fair.

During the pandemic, many supervisors did not acknowledge the additional hardships their employees were facing, ultimately ignoring many challenges employees had to face. Employees were expected to perform at their regular pace while balancing professional and personal responsibilities, all while being cognizant of a deadly virus that was infecting the world. Even the most engaged and organized employees struggled with adjusting to working during the pandemic. During the initial months of working from home, employees faced new technical challenges, alternative communications methods with team members, workspace limitations, as well as juggling childcare and eldercare, and reducing exposure risk for those going into the office.

A factor that distinguished supportive supervisors was the time and consideration they took for their employees. Empathy is having intentional understanding of another's circumstance, rather than experiencing that employee's emotion. Supervisors can benefit from understanding why

an employee may be feeling a certain way, struggling in their current circumstance, or perceiving unfairness.

A supervisor does not have to agree or endorse the employee's perspective, but taking the time to understand the employee's point of view can greatly alter the conversation. The employee feels heard. Supervisors who tried to understand the additional hardships their employees were experiencing were able to be flexible in their requests while still getting the outcomes they needed. These supervisors demonstrated interpersonal justice through sincerity, respect, and compassion in their communication.

This was not the case in Vignette 4; Shayla's supervisor communicated many signs of disrespect through his verbal and nonverbal messaging. Shayla's supervisor did not make any attempt to understand why Shayla had to work from home nor did he consider any additional obstacles she may have had to face.

At the beginning of the pandemic, many services that help working parents were taken away (e.g., schools were shut down, daycare centers were closed). Supervisors who did not seek to understand why employees needed additional time off or required flexible work schedules did not take into consideration the additional changes employees had to balance outside of work. In our interviews, employees reported feeling disregarded as they read workforce notices; the general message that was communicated was, "Please take care of yourself, we care about you, but you have to come back now." Employees felt as though their

leadership was not considering their current experience.

Other examples of interpersonal justice could be seen from supervisors who intentionally excluded or belittled employees who participated in telework, who chose to wear masks, or used accommodation services. Some of the employees reported that supervisors did not take their requests seriously. While some health issues do not present themselves in an obvious manner (e.g., mental health), it is important that supervisors honor and respect the employee seeking assistance. One employee reported that when he had to leave work early to attend a doctor's appointment, he overheard his supervisor saying, "there he goes again, he has to go use his 'accommodations' at the doctor." Although supervisors do not have to share the same beliefs (e.g., as with mask wearing) or personally understand an employee's personal matters, being respectful and trusting employees can mitigate perceptions of unfairness.

Some employees reported feeling the parental stigma for the first time during the pandemic. Despite employees working a full-time job with children at home for years prior, during the pandemic some supervisors were discriminatory toward employees who had to work around childcare. One employee utilized her telework privileges while her children's school was closed. Despite being online and engaged in work projects throughout the day, she felt the additional pressure to prove she was online and working. She was accessible by phone, email, and video calls, yet she was still told by her supervisor that she was inaccessible and difficult to work with. She felt

she was going above and beyond to be helpful to the team but was treated unfairly by her supervisor. Other employees had similar experiences; employees reported feeling resistance from their supervisors during meetings and seeing body language communicating disrespect for the employee's input and heard comments such as, "well you wouldn't know; you weren't here when that decision was made."

Another illustration of how an employee perceived unfair treatment was during a discussion over mask wearing. This employee had young, unvaccinated children at home and was very cautious about exposing his family as he was going into the office every day. Other individuals in the office were not wearing masks, social distancing, or engaging in any observable safety precautions. The employee confided in his boss, expressing his concerns, and asked for assistance in reminding the office of the mask policy and safety strategies. From the employee's perspective, the supervisor rolled his eyes, turned back to his computer, and responded, "I don't want to have to do anything with this, who cares if they don't follow the policy?" From the verbal response and nonverbal cues in their interaction, the employee could tell it was not a priority for the supervisor, despite the employee's concerns. This employee felt disrespected and unsupported.

Interpersonal justice can be influential in the supervisor-employee relationship. By seeking to understand the employee's perspective, supervisors can be equipped to understand employee's needs and work toward a common goal that satisfies both parties. For example, demanding

Engaging in behaviors that promote organizational justice can be challenging. It is an oversimplification to say that when a supervisor is presented with a specific type of problem, they should engage in a specific justice principle; life is rarely that simple.

a deadline by close of business may seem reasonable to a supervisor, but the employee may be working nontraditional hours. By attempting to understand the employee's circumstance or communicating what each party needs, the two could come together to reach a time that accommodates everyone, and perceptions of interpersonal justice would be increased.

Practical Considerations

The vignettes present four examples of the Organizational Justice dimensions that IC employees experienced while working during a global pandemic. Although the vignettes were presented by each dimension separately, it is important to note that the dimensions do not occur in isolation. Even though the source of unfairness is what distinguishes one dimension from another conceptually, workplace events do not occur with such clear boundaries. Often, when individuals perceive that unfairness has occurred, multiple components can be identified within the situation. For example, in Vignette 1, where the distribution of telework was perceived as unfair, evidence of procedural injustice was also observed in the lack of consistency of protocols while evidence of interpersonal injustice was seen through Harry's boss belittling his ability to work from home.

While these vignettes discuss specific issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the world is beginning to adjust to a new normal, there are

still important implications to consider in the future. Supervisors serve as the front-line defense of employee reactions to workplace changes. When supervisors consider how perceptions of fairness are developed and perceived, they can act as protective factors in reducing employee disgruntlement. Practical applications can be extracted from understanding experiences from an employee's perspective in the vignettes and developing strategies to better address the circumstances.

Challenges Engaging in Justice

Engaging in behavior that promotes organizational justice can be challenging. It is an oversimplification to say that when supervisors are presented with specific types of problems, they should engage in a specific justice principle; life is rarely that simple. The supervisor's personality, leadership style, and the context of the situation will influence what skills will be effective for each circumstance. For example, an introverted supervisor who forces nonverbal communication techniques that are uncharacteristic of their personality to promote interpersonal justice would come across as disingenuous. There are many strategies to promote each of the justice principles; supervisors have the ability to pick-and-chose from a variety of approaches in ways that feel most natural to them and the situation. Therefore, it is imperative that supervisors understand the multitude of approaches to promoting justice in the workplace to remain

The supervisor's personality, leadership style, and the context of the situation will influence what skills will be effective for each circumstance.

flexible and agile across various situations.

On the other hand, not all circumstances provide supervisors with complete control over a situation, limiting their perceived ability to promote fairness. When considering the pandemic, legal regulations and organizational policy dictated some supervisor's actions. In these circumstances, a supervisor may have felt limited in their ability to employ distributive and procedural justice principles. These are moments when engaging in interpersonal and informational justice can be most effective and rewarding. By understanding how individuals perceive distributive and procedural justice, supervisors can use the dimensions to provide talking points or context in how they communicate and treat employees. Studies have shown the powerful impact that interpersonal and informational justice can have when supervisors feel as though their hands are tied (Greenberg, 2006).

Additionally, supervisors must go beyond developing fair procedures and ensure they are modeling and enforcing those procedures. The adage "actions speak louder than words" relays how a supervisor's enforcement of policies can promote increased fairness over simply documenting a fair process. In certain circumstances, supervisors may not follow policy, but they may have to rely on informational and interpersonal justice tactics to promote fairness through their communication of why a process has changed for a particular event or group of employees. Thus, supervisors must engage in the policies

themselves or otherwise acknowledge and provide a rationale for why a circumstance is unique.

Many factors can complicate a supervisor's ability to engage in the justice principles, however, one advantage is that organizational justice theory covers multiple domains and thus provides multiple avenues to achieve a culture of fairness. The only mistake would be to not consider any of the principles at all.

Conclusion

In response to the devastating events of 9/11, the IC shifted its priorities to focus on enhancing collaboration and information sharing. Now, as we reflect on the three years of a global pandemic, we should adapt and learn from our experiences. Although it is not yet known what the impact of the pandemic is going to be or has been on insider threats in the IC, industry has reported a significant increase in insider cases over the past two years (e.g., Cybersecurity Insiders, 2021; Gips and Trzeciak, 2022; Ponemon Institute, 2022). One study reported that employees are 85 percent more likely to leak files today than they were before COVID-19 (Code42, 2021). The findings from industry, in combination with the anecdotes from employees' experiences, are concerning. If employees are more likely to leak than during prior times, supervisors are more important than ever in ensuring organizational justice for their employees.

Encouraging and enabling supervisors to promote cultures of organizational justice will improve how

employees feel valued and supported at work. Through increased awareness and understanding of the impact that organizational justice can have on employee intentions for harm and retaliation, we can strengthen our insider-threat toolkit. Information campaigns, supervisor training, and empowering supervisors to apply these principles in practice can advance the IC to a more just and respectful workplace.

Supervisors throughout the IC who understand the importance and implications of organizational justice principles have the ability to deter, detect, and mitigate perceptions of unfairness before they develop into insider threat concerns. Increasing awareness of the importance of organizational justice and the unintentional messaging that can be interpreted when resources are distributed, procedures are followed, and decisions are communicated can affect an employee's reactions. Perceptions of unfairness are often accompanied by strong negative reactions and motivations for retaliation.

Prior research has revealed that coworkers and supervisors were often aware of an insider's grievances with injustice and noted instances of deviance prior to discovery of an individual's behavior (Claycomb and Huth, 2013; Greitzer, Kangas, Noonan, and Dalton, 2010). Training supervisors in justice perceptions can serve as a protective factor against insider threat. Conversely, without understanding and purposeful action, intentional and unintentional supervisor actions can lead an employee to engage in retaliatory behavior.

Supervisors must recognize the influence they have on employee

perceptions and their ability to prevent future insider-threat attacks while strengthening relationships with employees (Reed, 2019).

Understanding the factors that can influence an individual's sense of justice can provide opportunities to change the course of action and

ultimately, the integrity of national security.

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Introducing the Kinetic Predictive Analytic Technique

Chris Batchelder

> ***The purpose of this article is to provide an analytic framework that will facilitate strong predictive judgments and their corollary, the detection of strategic surprise, sometimes referred to as discontinuous change or the idea that present-day capabilities or dynamics will change abruptly and unexpectedly.***

No intelligence analyst wants to be a part of an intelligence failure or see their analysis described in an Intelligence Community post-mortem as "quite simply, obviously, and starkly—wrong," as was the case after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.[a] Nowhere in intelligence analysis is the risk of this outcome higher than with predictive analysis, yet despite the difficulty in detecting strategic surprise, the bane of predictive analysis, there is no escaping the inevitable policymaker or agency-generated request to provide a predictive judgment or strategic warning on some issue of great national importance.

Policymakers might thank analysts for alternative analyses such as a What If, Alternate Futures, or Devil's Advocacy, which are all useful in expanding the horizon of what *might* happen and can be appended to strategic warning analysis. There will be times, however, when analysts are called to forecast the likelihood that an event *will* happen. Will Russia invade Ukraine? Will Afghan forces collapse after the US withdrawal? Will Iraq invade Kuwait? Will a foreign terrorist organization attack the United States?

While acknowledging the complexity, high degree of difficulty, and potential impact on US national security of such questions, the purpose of this article is to provide an analytic framework that will facilitate strong predictive judgments and their corollary, the detection of strategic surprise, sometimes referred to as discontinuous change or the idea that present-day capabilities or dynamics will change abruptly and unexpectedly.

In the first section of this article, I will discuss a proposed Structured Analytic Technique (SAT) that I have dubbed the Kinetic Predictive Analytic Technique (KPAT) because of its emphasis on behavior, action, and the requirement to develop a pathway of antecedent steps or conditions leading to a future event. It is based on declassified documentation of intelligence successes, post-mortems of intelligence failures, and my experience working in the Intelligence Community.

KPAT uses the concept of dynamic capabilities, or capabilities in action, to better gauge strategic intent. An armored brigade parked in garrison represents a static capability, but the same brigade moving toward a border represents a dynamic capability. In the second section, I will show examples of intelligence successes that successfully applied the essential components of this technique and two

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a. Director, Central Intelligence Agency, *The Performance of the Intelligence Community Before the Arab-Israeli War of 1 October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report* (December 1973), 4, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1973-12-20-CM.pdf.

intelligence failures that might have benefited from applying KPAT to avert a strategic surprise.

Assumptions

The goal of KPAT is to detect changes in fundamental conditions that in turn change the likelihood of an event's occurrence. It is not to determine the exact time and place of an event, barring a rare windfall of direct evidence reporting that conclusively answers an intelligence question, e.g., the U-2 imagery of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba.

Analytic humility is required for sound predictive judgments. This includes an alertness to the impact of new information on the reliability and validity of an analytic framework and its conclusions, an awareness that IC and policymaker consensus on an issue may signal the existence of a strategic assumption that has been the source of past intelligence failures, and that sound arguments can often be made for both sides of most issues.

All analysis—whether current intelligence products such as talking points or briefings, or longer forms like a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)—reflects an analytic framework comprising key assumptions and an understanding about how a phenomenon works, usually derived from a personal experience or from external sources.

Time pressures caused by a firehose of urgent taskings often lead analysts and managers to assume that the underlying framework of an argument is correct if the analysis follows the prevailing analytic line, contains strong argumentation, and receives managerial and senior analyst approval. The realities of policy and operational support should be balanced with a sober awareness that this approach is unlikely to detect strategic surprise.

KPAT differentiates between a theory that provides an explanation of a phenomenon that is based on a study of many examples and a model that is a representation created to explain a theory. It also distinguishes between personal mental models that analysts use as filters to interpret or process information and a scientific model that is used to explain or predict behavior of a phenomenon, e.g., climate, military buildup, or voting behavior.

Developing the Framework

A doctor diagnoses symptoms in a patient through a variety of tests, each revealing evidence of disease in the form of images, markers, or activities in the body. In the same way, the intelligence analyst has a variety of frameworks such as Structured Analytic Techniques (SATs) to aid in diagnosing and interpreting evidence in response to an intelligence question. Frameworks are used in KPAT to structure an analyst's thinking and explain how a certain type of analysis will be conducted to include the selection and organization of key factors and evidence. The analyst might adapt frameworks from academic literature, subject matter experts (SMEs), or internal agency holdings. In some cases, the analyst may create a new framework to deal with an intelligence problem.

An analyst's interpretation of Russia's military buildup near Ukraine in January 2022 depended on the framework used to evaluate Russian offensive operations and Russian intent. For example, an analyst who used a framework that stressed Russia's use of military demonstrations to intimidate opponents might have played down its significance as a predictor of a Russian military offensive. In another example, one analyst applies a framework that stresses a government's control over the instruments of coercion to forecast stability; another uses a framework focusing on disaffected elites who leverage mass discontent and paralyzing protests to overwhelm security forces and forecasts instability.

Tradecraft can be impeccable with compelling evidence and analysis and yet come to the *wrong* conclusion by misapplying or using the wrong framework. Framework is crucial with predictive judgments because the discovery of a strategic surprise is dependent on using the correct framework. For this reason, it is important to make the underlying framework of an argument transparent and subject to debate, and to update it with the introduction of new information.[a]

In his post-mortem of intelligence failures related to assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, Robert Jervis observed that asking an if–then question—such as "If Iraq has reconstituted its nuclear program, what would it have to do?"—could have pointed analysts to areas for further examination.[b] The KPAT would have built on Jervis's question by asking analysts to use or create

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a. Richards J. Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 55–56.
b. Robert Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 29:1. (February 2006).

a model, derived from a general or specific theory of the IQ event, which described the precipitating steps or conditions for Iraq to reconstitute its nuclear program. The KPAT requires that the analyst build a plausible pathway with key indicators to the IQ event and then assess where the IQ actor is currently on the pathway. It gauges the intent of an IQ actor to pursue an action based on dynamic capabilities.

KPAT Process

KPAT provides analysts with a framework for developing sound predictive judgments in support of policy decisions concerning critical US national interests. It is similar to the "What If?" SAT in that it constructs a pathway to the IQ event consisting of key antecedent steps or conditions, but differs because it also seeks to assess the likelihood of the event in contrast to What If, which suspends judgment about the outcome and focuses on the process. KPAT is most effectively employed when there is sufficient time to apply a fully developed conceptual framework. Time constraints governing current intelligence production may preclude a full application of KPAT, although a shortened form could be adopted.

KPAT is an SAT designed to generate a predictive judgment about the likelihood of an event in response to a policymaker or internal tasking. It meets the definition of an SAT through a transparent analytic process that reduces cognitive biases. Its focus on predictive judgments contrasts

KPAT is an SAT designed to generate a predictive judgment about the likelihood of an event in response to a policymaker or internal tasking.

with other SATs that strengthen argumentation or expand the scope of analytic outcomes, but do not seek to root out strategic surprises. KPAT is diagnostic in its exposure not only of the underlying assumptions, but the framework or theory that underpins the assumptions, making it subject to debate and review—a key criteria for an SAT.[a] It is a contrarian vehicle for challenging strategic assumptions, and imaginative in its ability to develop alternate outcomes and can incorporate other SATs such as scenarios analysis.

KPAT is also unique among SATs because it uses the concept of dynamic capabilities as the most accurate measure of strategic intent. Employing this integrated view of capabilities and intent helps analysts to avoid a primary cause of past intelligence failures, making "overly strong conclusions about the intentions of political actors."[b] KPAT cautions analysts against overweighting statements made by government officials or actors who may be engaging in denial and deception, are undecided on an issue, or lack sufficient information to make an informed judgment.

The Method

KPAT requires the analyst to build and apply a predictive model of the event identified in the intelligence question. It includes a pathway of precipitating steps or conditions that are extracted from a broadly

applicable general theory that describes what would have to happen for the IQ event to occur. The analyst then determines the likelihood of the IQ event based on the assessed location of the country's current situation on the pathway. This process distinguishes KPAT from other SATs because it requires not only that the drivers of an argument be identified, but also the underlying theory that produces the drivers.

KPAT consists of six key steps:

- Refine the IQ to include the consideration of a worst-case scenario.

- Build a general theory based on antecedent steps or conditions necessary for the event to occur that is applicable across countries or scenarios.

- Adapt and apply the general theory in the form of a pathway to the specific IQ event.

- Interpret strategic intent by assessing dynamic capabilities.

- Assess IQ event probability based on the location of the IQ actor on the event pathway.

- Revise the framework in accordance with new information.

Step 1: Refine the intelligence question
Refine the policymaker's or internally generated IQ by adding the clause, *what is the most likely*

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a. Heuer, "Taxonomy of Structured Analytic Techniques," *International Studies Association* (March 26–29, 2008), 4, at http://www.pherson.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/03.-Taxonomy-of-Structured-Analytic-Techniques_FINAL.pdf.
b. Douglas J. MacEachin, *Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community's Record* (CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, April 15, 2007), 46. See https://cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/predicting-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan/

A general theory must be tested and applicable across multiple countries and scenarios, providing a larger body of supporting evidence and greater confidence in its utility.

path—consisting of concrete steps or conditions that must precede the worst-case IQ event or greatest strategic surprise for US national interests—and where is the IQ actor (country, terrorist group, etc.) assessed to be on that continuum? For example, a US policymaker might ask for an assessment of the al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) terrorist threat to the United States. In coordination with the policymaker, an analyst might determine that an AQAP bioterror attack to be the worst-case scenario and add the following clause to the initial IQ, *what is the most likely path for AQAP to conduct a successful bioterror attack on the United States, and where is AQAP now assessed to be on that continuum?[a]* Identifying a worst-case scenario/greatest strategic surprise will require analytical judgment and should include feedback from SMEs throughout the IC and the policymaking and academic communities.

Adding this clause to the IQ is crucial for several reasons. It will expose the underlying framework or theory of how the event will unfold, making it subject to debate, discussion, and coordination. This is critical because framework drives conclusions and can be the Achilles heel of an otherwise well-constructed argument.

Analysts must assume the IQ event is possible no matter how out-of-step it may seem with the prevailing wisdom among policymakers, managers, or the IC. It challenges the fallacy of the strategic assumption

which tends to dismiss worst-case scenarios based on overly confident assessments of strategic intent: North Korea in 1950 will not invade South Korea, Egypt in 1973 will not attack Israel, and Iraq in 1990 will not attack Kuwait.

This approach strengthens judgments of a continuous future with no strategic surprises because an analyst who understands a likely pathway to instability will have a much stronger basis for assessing that a country will remain stable in the future: how can you be confident of an assessment of future stability without a rigorous understanding of a likely path to instability? The 1979 Iranian Revolution, addressed later in this article, highlights the perils of neglecting or underweighting this step.

Similarly, it moves the analysis away from an overreliance on "smoking gun" direct evidence of the IQ event, such as imagery of a weapons system, to the consideration of indirect evidence of the event's precipitating steps or conditions. Direct evidence of a weapon system or bioterror delivery capability is the ideal, but in predictive judgments it may not be available in time to impact policy decisions, if it is available at all.

Step 2: Develop a general or specific theory

The analyst adopts an existing theory of the IQ event or creates one where none exists from academic research, SMEs working in the government and outside of it, and internal agency holdings. The analyst

will need to develop a specific theory, a theory that only applies to the IQ event, when time constraints, limited academic research, or a breakthrough development unique to the IQ actor negate the use of a broader general theory that is applicable beyond the IQ event.

The analyst conducts research and meets with SMEs, including data scientists, from think tanks, academia, and the policymaking community to vet, identify, or build a theory of what would have to happen for the IQ event to occur. Ideally, a reliable and relevant theory already exists such as a theory of how a military conducts offensive operations or how an insurgency evolves, and the analytic challenge is to adapt it to the specifics of the IQ. There may be cases where the analyst will have to create a new theory or combine elements of two or more existing theories. A strong general theory or framework is important because it identifies the assumptions and key factors used in the argument and provides a clear pathway to the IQ event.

A general theory must be tested and applicable across multiple countries and scenarios, providing a larger body of supporting evidence and greater confidence in its utility. The exception to this is when a specific theory is the only option because there is no general theory.

It must be evidence based, even if it is historical evidence, because it will allow others to examine the evidence and verify that it is consistent with the conclusions. For example, Jack A. Goldstone developed a plausible theory of revolution drawing on the English and French

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a. The worst-case analysis might be included in a response that includes a broader treatment of threats.

revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries, respectively.[a] The theory must include a pathway consisting of the precipitating steps or conditions that the analyst will use to assess the likelihood of the IQ event.

Analysts should integrate data scientists to ensure Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) is effectively leveraged into a collection plan that covers information gaps and key warnings and indicators, enabling analysts to focus on other essential tasks. A full treatment of AI/ML for intelligence collection and analysis is beyond the scope of this article, but efforts under way in government and industry highlight its promise.[b] AI/ML can facilitate geospatial intelligence modelling of indications and warning scenarios; process large data streams from multi-platform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms to monitor battlefield threats; track demonstrations and violent incidents through textual mining and video monitoring; and evaluate foreign-language materials.

AI/ML could also check the validity of KPAT assessments and alert analysts and managers to imbalances between new evidence and current assessments. It could quickly mine historical evidence of an IQ event that would assist analysts in forming a specific theory. For example, algorithms could find examples of military deployments that occurred with the purpose of deception or intimidation, but not to conduct combat operations. This could assist analysts responsible for assessing the intent of a military buildup on a border.

Analysts should integrate data scientists to ensure Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) is effectively leveraged into a collection plan that covers information gaps and key warnings and indicators, enabling analysts to focus on other essential tasks.

Step 3: Develop pathway to the IQ event

Analysts next need to adapt the general theory to the specifics of the IQ event by building a pathway consisting of antecedent steps or conditions. For example, an analyst evaluating the likelihood of an underground nuclear test in a given country would apply the general requirements for a suitable underground test site applicable to any country to determine the most likely locations in the target country.

Analysts would then identify relevant historical cases that approximate the IQ event to observe how the key actors and antecedent steps or conditions interact to gain greater insight. A recent history of rebellions or violent regime change might offer clues to elite behaviors or the interaction of key social and economic factors, for example.

In coordination with data scientists, apply advances in AI/ML to identify intelligence gaps and indicators that warn of shifts in underlying fundamentals of an IQ event. It is likely that collection gaps will become clearer as the event pathway is developed. Identifying information gaps on the event pathway will assist the analyst in assessing how near or far the IQ actor is to operationalizing the IQ event.

Step 4: Interpret strategic intent through dynamic capabilities

Analysts should overweight dynamic capabilities when judging intent. Avoid overly confident conclusions about strategic intent based on public or private statements or dominant strategic assumptions in the IC and/or the policymaking community. Carl von Clausewitz, who applied an integrated concept of intent and capability, stated in his book *On War* that "war is not an independent phenomenon, but only the continuation of state policy by other means." In other words, the conduct of war (including preparations for war), which we describe in this article as dynamic capabilities, are a reflection of political intent that we ignore at our peril.

Capabilities in action such as a convoy of tanks moving toward a border, the evacuation of civilians from a potential conflict zone, or the stockpiling of military supplies reveal strategic intent. The distribution of campaign literature or the mobilization of supporters to raise money, protest, or contact voters, the ability to deliver goods and services, and resolve grievances are examples of dynamic political capabilities.

Identify dominant themes within the IC and policymaking communities and avoid projecting them into the analysis. KPAT defines a

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a. Jack Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*, (University of California Press, 1991).
b. See inter alia Vincent Dennis, "The future of intelligence analysis," *Deloitte Insights*, December 11, 2019, and Joseph Gartin, "The Future of Analysis," *Studies in Intelligence* 63, no. 2 (June 2019).

Graphic is intended to show the kinetic or dynamic relationship between the general theory steps or conditions that could lead to a relevant intelligence question event and the increase in the event's probability.

dominant theme as an overly confident assessment of the intentions of political actors that generally promotes a continuous future and is a common thread in many intelligence failures.

Analysts should identify private and public statements of key political actors and technical experts for awareness, but avoid overweighting statements of intent at the expense of demonstrated capabilities. Be aware of the possibility of deception for internal domestic or external foreign policy reasons or misinformation stemming from indecision, shifting priorities, and impulsive actions. The actor's ability to follow through on their statements of intent will be dependent on their capabilities. When in doubt, overweight what the IQ actor is doing, not what it is saying.

Analysts should ask, does the country or actor have a history of feigning action such as a military attack or developing dynamic capabilities to intimidate or pressure without following through?

Step 5: Assess probability of occurrence

The analyst will identify evidence of key antecedent steps or conditions in the current situation to assess the IQ actor's location along the pathway identified in Step 3. The probability of the IQ event occurrence is a function of the IQ actor's position on the event pathway.

Research indirect evidence of the precipitating steps and conditions in the current situation. Be open to the possibility of finding direct evidence of a strategic surprise and remember that its absence does not equate to the absence of an impending surprise and may be due to a collection shortfall or an effective denial and deception campaign.

KPAT recommends that probabilistic language be linked to the IQ event pathway. Event probability should include a percentage rating, a descriptive word or phrase, and an estimated location on the IQ pathway. The analyst will assess the position of the current situation on the event pathway based on evidence of the requisite steps or conditions

and estimate the probability of the IQ event using the following suggested terms or their equivalents. Percentages are assigned to probabilistic language to provide greater clarity for the consumer.

The most important justification for the terms and percentages is their linkage to the event pathway. Consider the case of a potential gas leak in a house. What is the likelihood of explosion?l

- Unlikely (1–20 percent). There is minimal evidence of any precursors, e.g., we detect no traces or only faint traces of a gas leak in the house. An explosion is unlikely.

- Possible (20–50 percent). The event has crossed the threshold of improbability to the realm of the possible—there is some evidence of event precursors. A one in five chance of a terrorist attack makes it a "possibility" that should not be ruled out. There is definitely a gas leak in the basement. An explosion is possible.

- Likely, probable (50–80 percent). The gas leak has filled the basement, making an explosion likely.

- Highly likely, almost certainly, and/or imminent (80–99 percent). The event could occur at any time, e.g., the gas leak has spread throughout the house and it is only a matter of time before a spark causes an explosion.

The warning staff built and applied a general and specific theory of an Iraqi invasion and demonstrated the utility of using dynamic capabilities as an indicator of strategic intent.

Step 6: Monitor and revise framework with new information.

Be alert to new information that requires revisions of the framework and probability estimates. Analysts maintain a flexible mindset that is focused on discovery. There is high risk and uncertainty in predictive judgements. Welcoming new information that brings analysis closer to the truth helps avoid surprise.

Applying the KPAT to Historical Intelligence Successes and Failures

To explore how KPAT could be applied to future intelligence problems, I applied my framework to some well-known intelligence successes and failures. In retrospect, we can see when IC analysts applied elements of KPAT, as in the case of warning of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, they were able to come to correct judgments. In contrast, when analysts failed to use elements of the KPAT approach, as in the case of anticipating the Iranian Revolution, they were likely to come to incorrect judgments. For space, I have limited the discussion to these two well-documented examples, but in the course of my research I found the model holds true for other famous intelligence successes, including the IC's anticipation of the Soviet Sputnik program and the collapse of Yugoslavia, and conversely failures like the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

As the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Warning (1988–94), Charles Allen and his staff applied the essential features of the KPAT when they provided accurate warning of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The warning staff built and applied a general and specific theory of an Iraqi invasion and demonstrated the utility of using dynamic capabilities as an indicator of strategic intent.[a] Despite their successful predictive analysis, they faced significant headwinds in their efforts to warn the policymaking and intelligence communities because of the widely accepted strategic assumption that Saddam Hussein would not attack Kuwait while he was focused on rebuilding from the effects of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88). This view was further reinforced in the minds of senior US officials by regional leaders who confidently predicted that Iraq would not attack Kuwait.

Refine the intelligence question

Refine the IQ by adding the clause, *what is the most likely path—concrete steps or conditions that must precede an Iraqi attack on Kuwait, the worst-case scenario or greatest strategic surprise—and where is Iraq now assessed to be on that continuum?* The NIO warning staff almost certainly worked with an internally driven intelligence question to assess the likelihood of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, judging from Allen's retrospective account.

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a. This section relies on Allen's own account in "Warning and Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: A Retrospective Look," *Defense Intelligence Journal* 7-2 (1998), 33–44, and Zachary Karabell and Phillip Zelikow, "Prelude to war: US policy toward Iraq 1988–1990," *Kennedy School of Government Case Program* (1999), at https://case.hks.harvard.edu/prelude-to-war-us-policy-toward-iraq-1988-1990/.

Saddam Hussein's public criticism of Kuwait on 17 July and reporting received on 19 July that Hussein ordered two Republican Guard divisions to the Kuwaiti border alerted the warning staff to a possible Iraqi threat.

Develop a general theory of an Iraqi attack

Before 1990, the warning staff developed a general theory of military attack that focused on the underlying structure of various threats to understand the total process by which countries prepare for war, or political systems become unstable. Focusing on the underlying structure of a phenomenon is a key feature of KPAT. The staff differentiated between national war preparations that affected social and economic activities and military attack preparations.

They also categorized military attack preparations as general attack preparations such as logistic activities and military mobilization and final attack preparations that include the movement of combat units to attack positions. They learned "that countries with centrally planned economic systems such as the Soviet Union, North Korea, Syria, Iraq, and even India prepare for war by first initiating measures across the spectrum of social, economic, political, and military life that divert resources away from civilian life and into the armed forces" and that, "without large logistic buildups, combat force movements will always remain important but ambiguous indicators of intentions."

Develop a pathway to an Iraqi attack

The warning staff built and applied a specific theory with a pathway containing steps to an Iraqi invasion that included a deployment timeline, and indicators such as large logistic buildups as a decisive sign of final attack preparations. They assessed

that an attack would be preceded by several months of preparation and that it would take roughly 12 days to mobilize and position an Iraqi corps-size force for such an attack. They developed a series of indicators and scenario events corresponding to an attack.

Allen recalled that "On 21 July, we confirmed by national technical means, the first movements of Republican Guards elements and, on 23 July, we detected the start of a large logistic buildup just north of the Kuwaiti border. Reporting of large truck movements stretching southward from Baghdad to Basrah indicated that civilian resources were being diverted to support large-scale military movement, a powerful indicator that the military preparations were not a bluff or an exercise."

Allen further observed that as of 31 July "the indicators of a large-scale military movement were obvious and were continuing to build." The staff assessed that Iraq initiated war preparations as expected, "virtually mirroring the scenario events and indicators that my Staff had provided to Central Command and the J-5." In January 1990, CENTCOM requested help in reviewing indicators of a potential Iraqi attack against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Interpret strategic intent through dynamic capabilities

Allen and his staff understood and successfully interpreted Iraqi dynamic capabilities as an expression of political intent. Allen commented, "critical to our judgments was the

large logistic buildup which indicated that disruption of civil life was occurring inside Iraq to accomplish the large military buildup north of Kuwait."

Saddam Hussein's public criticism of Kuwait on 17 July and reporting received on 19 July that Hussein ordered two Republican Guard divisions to the Kuwaiti border alerted the warning staff to a possible Iraqi threat. In this case, Saddam's public rhetoric was consistent with the dynamic capabilities of two divisions moving to a border.

In contrast, the IC and policymakers with few exceptions did not correctly extrapolate Iraqi intent from the buildup of military force on the border with Kuwait. In general, they viewed intent and capabilities as separate entities and adopted an overly confident view of Iraqi intent. The IC assessed that "no major military attack was likely," during a 31 July teleconference. Senior Pentagon officials did not consider an invasion likely based on conversations with "a number of leaders in the Middle East as well as the Soviet Union, all of whom were of the opinion that Saddam did not intend to attack." President George H.W. Bush spoke with the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan who "assured him that they knew Saddam Hussein, and no attack was imminent."

Assess probability of attack

The warning staff analyzed evidence of the antecedent steps or conditions leading to an Iraqi attack and assessed that an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was likely. They began drafting a "warning of war" memorandum on 23 July, the same day an Iraqi logistics buildup was detected north

of the Kuwaiti border and two days after first detecting Republican Guard movements. Allen issued a warning of war memorandum on 25 July to senior political and military policymakers that assessed the chances of a military incursion were better than "60 percent." On 1 August, he called senior members of the National Security Council, Department of State and Defense to warn them of an imminent attack. The Iraqi army invaded Kuwait on 2 August.

Monitor and revise framework in accordance with new information

Allen and his staff did not need to revise their assessment because the attack immediately followed their efforts to warn.

In retrospect, the warning staff successfully predicted the attack because they developed and applied a framework for a worst-case scenario that included a pathway of key antecedent steps for an Iraqi military attack and linked capabilities and intent when interpreting evidence. Unfortunately, "both warning of war and warning of attack were not heeded, either by senior intelligence officials or policymakers," who prioritized statements of intent by regional leaders over changes in dynamic military capabilities.

Iranian Revolution

The KPAT's utility can be further highlighted by applying it retrospectively to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Analysts in CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) responsible for assessing Iranian stability in 1978 interpreted events through

> **The IC tracked the growing size and intensity of opposition demonstrations in 1978, but did not adjust its assumption that the opposition would fracture in finished intelligence until November 1978, when the shah's hold on power was rapidly diminishing.**

the lens of a strategic assumption that strongly influenced their analytic conclusions. Application of the KPAT would have created an alternate framework for interpreting the evolving situation in Iran that *might* have improved their odds of anticipating strategic surprise and allowed them to more quickly adjust to new information that challenged their strategic assumption.

Analysts held the view that the shah's "proven record of survival, loyalty of armed forces, weakness of political (secular) forces, the belief that the shah was ready and willing to use the force necessary to suppress opposition" would enable him to remain in power.

Refine the intelligence question

NFAC analysts were employing a variation of the IQ, *assess the prospects for Iranian regime stability*, based on the title of the unpublished NIE dated August 23, 1978, *Iran: Continuity Through 1985*.[a] Analysts applying the KPAT would have added a clause to the IQ such as, *what is the most likely path—concrete steps or conditions that would have to occur—for a revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini and where is Iran now on that continuum?* Analysts were aware of Khomeini's intent to overthrow the shah and would have likely considered his ascension to power to be among their worst-case scenarios. Applying this clause would have

opened the scope of their research and identified a pathway to regime change, although the prevailing strategic assumption quoted above would have likely constituted a major obstacle to the wide-spread acceptance of any alternative analysis. Even so, analysis based on the revised intelligence question would likely have gained adherents as the internal situation deteriorated through the summer and fall of 1978 and enabled analysts to more quickly interpret new information that challenged the strategic assumption.

Develop theory of Iranian stability

Before the revolution, NFAC analysts were using a theory of Iranian stability based on three pillars: past evidence of the shah's willingness to use force against the opposition, Iranian security force capabilities to successfully suppress demonstrations, and opposition disunity. A senior political analyst argued in a February 1976 paper that the shah had been in power for 34 years and "outlasted the many official and unofficial observers, who two decades ago, were confidently predicting his imminent downfall." The shah restored order during mass demonstrations in 1963 that developed after the arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini, who criticized parts of the shah's efforts to initiate reforms and his overreliance on foreign support, through "brutal, but short and effective repression." Analysts prior to 1979 observed the

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a. National Intelligence Council, NIC 9079-83/2, *Intelligence Estimates on Iran in Senior Review Panel Report on Intelligence Judgments Preceding Significant Historical Failures: The Hazards of Single Outcome Forecasting* (January 6, 1984), 1. Approved for release on January 30, 2009, CIA-RD-P86B00269R001100100006-2.

The purpose of the KPAT is to give analysts and managers a structured analytic technique to use for predictive judgments that draws on lessons learned from past intelligence successes and failures.

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opposition's inability to unify during the decades of the shah's rule, and pose a significant threat to his regime.

Develop a pathway to Khomeini-led takeover

Analysts using the KPAT would have likely developed a pathway to a Khomeini-led revolution based on the unwillingness of the shah to use force, eroding security force capabilities, and growing opposition unity of effort. It would have also likely led analysts to consider several examples in Iranian history such as the Tobacco Protest (1891–92) and the Constitutional Revolution (1905–11), that were led by a coalition of discontented citizens, including merchants and activists that forced the ruling shahs to abandon a tobacco concession granted to the United Kingdom and to institute a national consultative assembly. These historical examples along with the failed 1963 rebellion almost certainly would have provided additional detail in fleshing out the antecedent steps and conditions on a pathway to regime change.

Interpret strategic intent through dynamic capabilities

The IC in 1979 was invested in an overly confident assumption that the shah intended to use sufficient force against a fractured opposition to preserve his government. Applying the KPAT's integrated concept of dynamic capabilities as the best measure of strategic intent might have caused analysts to at least question the shah's resolve to use force and the assumption of continuing opposition weakness.

The KPAT's requirement to avoid overly strong conclusions about the intentions of political actors would have counseled analysts to use extreme caution when making the shah's intentions the centerpiece of their analysis.

In November 1977 and in the spring and summer of 1978, the IC was aware that the shah did not crack down on protests as expected. Analysts interpreted this development by comparing it to extensive historical evidence of the shah's past willingness to use force against the opposition. Not surprisingly, the prevailing view that the shah would eventually use security forces to suppress the opposition remained intact. The KPAT could have provided an alternative basis of comparison by requiring analysts to develop a pathway to the shah's unwillingness to use force against demonstrators. Hesitancy in deploying security forces against the opposition would likely have been considered a key indicator along that path, possibly leading to greater uncertainty over the shah's future intent to use force.

The IC tracked the growing size and intensity of opposition demonstrations in 1978, but did not adjust its assumption that the opposition would fracture in finished intelligence until November 1978, when the shah's hold on power was rapidly diminishing. The KPAT's unified concept of dynamic capabilities and intent might have led analysts to interpret the frequency, breadth, and intensity of demonstrations as evidence of the intent to achieve greater opposition unity, regardless of their internal policy differences and disputes.

Assess probability of event occurrence

Following the aforementioned KPAT probability guidelines, the idea that the shah might not use decisive force against the opposition could have easily crossed from "unlikely" to "possible." The previously discussed evidence of the shah's hesitancy to use force in 1977, 1978 could have justified a probability rating of at least "possible, 20 percent" along an event pathway ending in his refusal to use decisive force to restore order. The same could be said of the opposition's intent to unify its efforts as evidenced by the growing impact of their demonstrations that represented capabilities in action. A probability rating of "possible, 20 percent" on the pathway to opposition unity would have been consistent with the pattern of demonstrations through the summer of 1978.

Monitor and revise framework in accordance with new information

Insights derived from the application of the KPAT would have likely created an awareness of an alternate interpretation of events that would only grow stronger with increasing evidence of the deteriorating domestic situation. A path to regime instability would have given analysts a vehicle to more quickly contextualize new information related to the shah's survivability.

Conclusion

The purpose of the KPAT is to give analysts and managers a structured analytic technique to use for predictive judgments that draws on lessons learned from past intelligence

successes and failures. It fills a need in the current menu of SATs because it is designed to answer a policy-maker question about what "will" happen, not what "might" happen.

The KPAT could reduce bias associated with mindset and personal mental models because it uses a framework derived from experts that is transparent, evidence based, and subject to coordination, comment, and revision based on new information. It uses the concept of dynamic capabilities as the most accurate measure of strategic intent in contrast to overweighting statements made by government officials who may

be engaged in denial and deception, misinformed, or undecided about a course of action. In doing so, the KPAT avoids one of the primary causes of past intelligence failures: the tendency to make "overly strong conclusions about the 'intentions' of political actors," sometimes referred to as a dominant theme or strategic assumption.[a]

The KPAT reduces the risk of the reliance on assumptions of future continuity. Rather, it assumes that a discontinuity in the form of a worst-case event or a strategic surprise could happen, which puts the analyst in a forward-leaning posture by

requiring them to identify the underlying antecedent steps or conditions that constitute a pathway to the event.

We must remember that despite the reality that strategic surprises are comparatively rare events, we cannot assume that past or present capabilities will translate into a future capability. If we are to uncover a future discontinuity which by definition is an unexpected change, we can only find it by identifying a pathway to the surprise. My hope is this SAT will be adopted, tested, and refined as it is applied to the challenging problem of detecting discontinuous change.

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The author: Chris Batchelder is a former CIA analyst.

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a. MacEachin, *Predicting the Invasion of Afghanistan,* 53.

The Life and Wrongful Death of Gregg David Wenzel: Clandestine CIA Officer Star 81
Sharon Levy Siegel, editor (First Edition Design Publishing, 2021), 217 pages, photos.

Reviewed by Mike R.

Gregg Wenzel was a junior CIA case officer who died in a car accident in Ethiopia in 2003, just two years after joining CIA. Assigned for his first tour to Addis Ababa, he was killed, along with an Ethiopian passenger, when his car was struck by a vehicle that had swerved to avoid a dead horse in the road. Gregg was soon thereafter added to the CIA Memorial Wall—as the title's eponymous 81st star—honoring those individuals from or detailed to the agency who gave their lives in the service of their country. This act, however, would mark just the beginning of his family's fight for fuller recognition and remembrance of their son. This included an extended effort to publicly acknowledge him as a CIA officer; until that happened, the space next to his star in the Book of Honor would remain blank and his affiliation classified. It also led to efforts to commemorate him in the broader community and to lobby for changes that would assist other families who have lost loved ones serving with CIA. This book is both a testament to Gregg's life and a recounting of many of these separate endeavors.

The Life and Wrongful Death of Gregg David Wenzel: Clandestine CIA Officer Star 81 is an odd amalgam, unlike anything else that has come before it. Authors have written about CIA officers memorialized on the wall. Witness, for example, Kai Bird's *The Good Spy: The Life and Death of Robert Ames* about the legendary Middle East expert who perished in the 1983 bombing of the US embassy in Beirut. Ted Gup's *The Book of Honor: Covert Lives and Classified Deaths at the CIA* paid tribute to a wide assortment of these stories. Never before, however, have family members of the deceased been the driving force behind such a work, and the tale is as much that of parents fighting for the legacy of a child as it is of the child himself.

Gregg's father, Mitch, and late mother, Gladys, who died in 2020, loved their son and were proud of his service. Although their lives changed forever on July 9, 2003, when they learned of their son's passing, they channeled their adoration into an unremitting push to carry his memory forward. *Star 81* took shape in earnest

in 2016 when a woman offered to take on this literary project on their behalf. She completed a draft in late 2020 but months later succumbed to complications from the COVID-19 virus. Her sister took over editorial duties and made finishing touches, listing her sibling and Gregg's parents all as co-authors. A true labor of love, their affections practically pour out of the pages.

The final product, however, is a bit ungainly, a collection of many different pieces that do not always flow in a linear narrative. At its core, though, it reads like a funeral program in a book's clothing or the collected postings from an electronic memoriam site. Besides telling Gregg's story, it includes chapters devoted to "Gregg's Poems" and "Gregg's Words to Live By," inspirational selections from authors like Robert Frost and Rudyard Kipling, and letter and journal excerpts from various family members. It is some 200 pages, but large font makes it an even quicker read, and it has a homemade, self-published feel.

Star 81's intensely personal character also gives it a degree of poignancy. Gregg's story is noteworthy enough, but the parents' efforts to make sense of what happened add considerably to the saga. As they try not just to understand but to have an impact on the insular world of intelligence—in David versus Goliath fashion, even writing letters to CIA directors and the president to press the US government to do right by their son—one feels for them.

It almost hurts to see that the parents' knowledge heading into this journey was skewed from the start, however. When Gregg was still learning his trade, he tried to see that they gained a flavor of his work via film and book recommendations, but these selections might only have made matters worse: "Mitch and Gladys also read books to learn more about what CIA officers were trained to do. A classmate of Gregg's told Mitch that Lindsay Moran, an earlier CIA graduate, wrote a book, *Blowing My Cover*, which described their training in detail." (100) Capitalizing on mystique at the expense of message, Moran's work makes for a jaunty read but would have

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done little to boost substantive knowledge—and probably would only have served to steer them away from the truth. The Wenzel book reflects an outsider's difficulty in grasping the profession through repeated use of incorrect lingo—referring to CIA officers as "agents"—and via such claims as the CIA credo matching something taken from the Oliver Stone film about the fugitive unauthorized discloser of secrets, *Snowden:* "Secrecy is security and security is victory." (99)

The parents walk a fine line in their relationship with CIA and the intelligence world. Nothing brings people together like tragedy, and CIA embraced Mitch and Gladys upon Gregg's death; it hosted them at a memorial service soon afterward and regularly invited them to the annual ceremony for all of those remembered on the Memorial Wall. The parents make clear that they hold the agency in high esteem and have felt honored to be included. Yet they have also pushed against bureaucracy in their fight for their son, resulting in repeated references to perceived CIA foot-dragging in waiting to publicly recognize Gregg. That said, this concern gives way to acknowledgement at various points that CIA might have been holding on this action precisely to allow the parents to pursue a potential lawsuit in Ethiopia against the alleged offender. The parents also note the importance of allowing sufficient time to take measures to ensure that anyone who might have been dealing with Gregg in professional capacity does not come to harm based on his affiliation. Regardless of the reason for delay, once the parents decided that they had taken potential judicial action against the driver of the other vehicle as far as they could and were ready to move on, wheels moved quickly. In 2009, Gregg's CIA employment was acknowledged. His name was added to the Wall's accompanying Book of Honor, and he was celebrated publicly as a fallen CIA officer.

One issue that remains unclear is the degree to which the authors put stock in a contention that Gregg might have been murdered instead of being the victim of a random car accident. They revisit this theme numerous times in varying degrees of directness. At one point, the father expresses general concerns: "As Mitch once told *The New York Daily News*, he felt the circumstances surrounding Gregg's death were murky. What really transpired will always remain a mystery." (105) Later, one of the mother's more pointed diary entries is quoted: "They say your death was an accident. Either the whole story is true or there was a cover-up. I don't know if we will

ever find the truth." (129) And elsewhere a friend from Ethiopia writes, "I have no doubt in my own mind…that Gregg was killed and it was no accident." (92)

The "wrongful death" allegation takes on bizarre and convoluted overtones when the parents discover a suspicious blog entry on the www.dailykos.com website, "Book of Honor: CIA Agent Killed in 2003 by Plame Leak?" It alleged that Gregg might have been caught up in the public outing by columnist Robert Novak—five days *after* Gregg's death—of Valerie Plame, a CIA officer under non-official cover. (168) Plame's husband, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, went to Africa in 2002 at CIA's request to investigate reports of Iraqi attempts to purchase uranium and found no such evidence. However, unhappy over President George W. Bush's 2003 State of the Union speech in which he referred to these acquisition efforts, viewed by Wilson as providing impetus for the Iraq war, Wilson wrote an opinion article alleging that the administration had twisted intelligence to justify the invasion. His article appeared in *The New York Times* on July 6, 2003, three days *before* the Ethiopian incident.

Like many aspects of *Star 81*, readers are left to sort out for themselves what to make of the claims about Gregg's demise. The book has a tendency to sprinkle in curious tidbits seemingly at random and then move on to other topics. They often are uncorroborated and, as with the years-long effort to win public recognition for Gregg, can be contradictory. That said, they all help create an impression of the confusion and uncertainty that no doubt has been a major undercurrent in the parents' lives following the loss of their son.

Gregg is frequently portrayed as exemplifying the spirit of the post-9/11 CIA—a member of the agency's first class of clandestine service officers to graduate after the attack. While technically correct—the class graduated in December 2001—the terrorist events of September were not his motivation for joining, as he had already started with the CIA. His service naturally aligns with this most recent generation of recruits, but Gregg's story is bigger than that. His motivations were classic ones that have echoed throughout the ages. Then Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet cited an excerpt of Gregg's application at a memorial service in his honor the month after his passing: "First, without question, the opportunity to serve my country. Second, to live for a purpose greater than myself." (49)

Gregg had already demonstrated a commitment to public service through his work for several years as a public defender in Florida, and his strong Jewish upbringing instilled a similar ethos. A rabbi celebrated him in death as a "Truly righteous person in hiding," saying Gregg "did not announce all of his good deeds, he did things quietly." (97) Service above self, sacrificing glory for the good of others—those have been guiding principles for countless CIA veterans. In this sense, Gregg represents so many who came before him. However, the watershed moment of 9/11 created in many peoples' eyes a division between the old and new generations, and the subject of this book is that rare breed who transcends this barrier. In his enthusiasm and patriotism, he is emblematic of the post-9/11 influx of intelligence volunteers, even if preceding them in time slightly, but one could make a case for Gregg being a poster child for CIA writ large.

Just as public relations, advertising, and recruitment efforts need occasional refreshes, the book's publication in the run-up to CIA's 75th anniversary in 2022 might present an opportunity to reflect upon how to represent the CIA workforce in the modern public consciousness. Langley touts demographics, but statistics only say so much. Sometimes the public needs a more tangible connection. Far from a Yale pedigree traditionally associated with the agency's founding generation, Gregg attended the State University of New York at Binghamton and the University of Miami Law School, where he was at times an average student. His devout Jewish faith also flies in the face of lingering perceptions of a WASP-dominated culture at the CIA.

Physical attributes drive this message home as well. Gregg did not match Hollywood's version of a CIA officer. Making light of his "short and stocky" build, he called himself a "Coke machine." (73) But coworkers described him as the fittest person they knew. He was in fact a marathon runner and Ironman triathlete. In the Navy SEALS, it is not the biggest or strongest who necessarily makes it through the grueling training to don the famed trident. Many who become SEALs do not look the part on the outside; it is what is on the inside that matters. In this way, so, too, CIA employees might be indistinguishable from one's next-door neighbor.

Thanks to Mitch and Gladys's efforts, the reader learns how their son has already become an everyday hero in ways that have never occurred before for a CIA almnus.

On top of a number of scholarships, awards, and runs established in Gregg's name, the book celebrates some unique recognitions in his hometown of Monroe, New York. In 2009, the year of his public acknowledgement on the CIA Memorial Wall, the town rechristened a street as "Gregg Wenzel Drive." Then in 2015, an Act of Congress renamed a local post office the "National Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency NCS Officer Gregg David Wenzel Memorial Post Office." This marked the first—and thus far only—time in US Postal Service history that a CIA officers's name was given to one of their facilities: just one out of more than 1,500 since Congress began the naming practice in 1967.

Most recently, in 2019, the Wenzels succeeded in yet another initiative many years in the making when Congress passed a law that broadened death benefits for CIA officers. Originally limited to those killed in hostile circumstances, such moneys also were payable only to dependents of the deceased. In situations like Gregg's where the official cause of death was an accident and the victim had no dependents, no benefits were distributed to the parents, and their case was not unique among surviving families of the deceased. The book ends by noting that on December 15, 2021—two years after the bill's passage and some 18 years after Gregg's death—CIA notified the father that the law was finally being implemented; the Wenzels and other afflicted families would now be entitled to these benefits.

In his life, Gregg was, in the words of someone who trained with him, "the spirit and soul of our class" – "a pillar of professionalism, patriotism, humor, friendship, and compassion." (83). He also challenged conventions. Having joined a profession in which subtlety and discretion are watchwords, he had a larger-than-life profile; a colleague described how he could be perceived in Ethiopia's capital as akin to "the Stay-Puft Marshmallow Man in *Ghostbusters* thundering through Manhattan." (86) In death, Gregg has achieved a higher calling. Those who tell his story and honor his legacy have achieved that which CIA has long struggled to do. They have made the agency more accessible and real to a public long accustomed to it being out of reach and either nameless or known only via select sensationalized stories. *Star 81* and its protagonist are far from perfect – but this very imperfection and ordinariness are their strength and help humanize CIA and its workforce.

At the post office dedication, a rabbi drew comparisons between the Postal Service and the nation's defenders, including intelligence officers. He said they shared a dedication to mission and cited an advertisement that the Postal Service ran after 9/11 that rang of familiarity while speaking to the latest threats. In such words, more commonality might be found than many would admit. Centuries ago, long before the United States existed, European postal services were enmeshed in spying, secretly unsealing letters and reading codes on behalf of their monarchs. And the CIA, rather than a collection of James Bonds, is in reality staffed by dedicated faceless servants who carry out their duties in much the same spirit as the postal carriers:

> *We are mothers and fathers. And sons and daughters. Who every day go about our lives with duty, honor, and pride. And neither snow, nor rain, nor heat, nor gloom of night, nor the winds of change, nor a nation challenged, will stay us from the swift completion of our appointed rounds. Ever. (187)*

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The reviewer: Mike R. is a member of CIA's history staff.

Why Democracies Develop and Decline

Michael Coppedge, Amanda B. Edgell, Carl Henrik Knutsen, and Staffan I. Lindberg (eds.) (Cambridge University Press, 2022), 378 pages, appendixes, bibliography.

Reviewed by Anthony T. Sutton

Whence democracy? A few centuries of political philosophy invited us to imagine democracy developing stepwise from the state of nature; a few generations of civics courses portrayed it as the brainchild of European republicans reared on tales of antique Greek polities. This volume provides newly empirical answers. It will prove a handy citation for the analyst needing to source some truism about democratic development. It may inspire further rigorous exploitation of rich data sources, given its high standards and grand scope.

This volume's achievements rise from statistical analysis of V-Dem data, a recently created rating of five dimensions of democracy and hundreds of subsidiary concepts in nearly every country since 1789. The editors outline their case —expanded elsewhere[a]— that V-Dem enables superior analysis because it distinguishes among dimensions of democracy, develops indicators that are conceptually valid, and aggregates the indicators logically and transparently.

Working atop this new foundation, chapter authors shape the building blocks of an answer to the question of which countries become democracies. In sequence, chapters explore hypotheses for the providential, international, economic, institutional, and social factors that cause democracy to develop. A keystone chapter integrates the findings.

Taken as a whole, the book predicts current levels of democracy in countries by looking at deep factors like geography and latitude that favor social and economic modernization, including intermediate factors such as literacy and prosperity. In turn, these tend to produce proximate factors, like civil society, political parties, and state capacity. The book further observes that democracy develops via punctuated equilibriums: a country's natural level of democracy evolves slowly alongside socioeconomic development, opening a gap from the actual level of democracy in an inertial political system, until an economic crisis or political movement snaps the two into congruence.

John Gerring's chapter connects long-run factors to modern levels of democracy, testing many candidates before settling on latitude and natural harbors as potential causes by way of their contribution to socioeconomic modernization. Gerring also correlates democracy with European ancestry, Protestantism, and not Islam, although he suspects these latter three are proxy for other causal explanations. Together, the five long-run variables account for half the variation in levels of democracy among modern countries.

In addition to their own innate characteristics, countries are influenced by the levels of democracy among neighbors, allies, and colonizers. So finds a chapter by Coppedge, Benjamin Denison, Paul Friesen, Lucia Tiscornia, and Yang Xu. These international contributions raised democracy in Western Europe and North America by 0.2 on a 1-point scale, relative to expected levels. The authors extrapolate long-term trends from short-term numbers, however, making the finding sensitive to small initial variations.

Knutsen and Sirianne Dahlum take up the oft-repeated search for economic determinants of democracy. They ratify the present consensus that wealthier countries are more likely to *be* democracies but not more likely to *become* democracies. Rather, wealth seems to operate to prevent democratic reversals. The correlation of wealth and democracy could also be explained in the opposite direction: that is, democracy to a degree causes economic development, a point the authors note in passing here and substantiate more fully elsewhere.[b] The chapter also finds unsurprising support for the idea that natural

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a. See Michael Coppedge, et al., eds., *Varieties of Democracy: Measuring Two Centuries of Political Change* (Cambridge University Press, 2020).
b. See Carl Henrik Knutsen, "A Business Case for Democracy Regime Type, Growth, and Growth Volatility," *Democratization* (2021);

resources can curse a country by facilitating autocracy and surprising support for the idea that an economy dominated by agriculture is even less hospitable to democracy. Economic inequality plays no detectible role in motivating democratization or endangering existing democracies.

Institutional factors occupy Allen Hicken, Samuel Baltz, and Fabricio Vasselai, who find state capacity makes democracy more likely to develop and less likely to reverse, as does the very act of holding elections. The chapter also adds nuance to an old debate, siding with Cheibub[a] in finding no general danger from presidential rather than parliamentary systems but exculpating Linz[b] by noting that presidentialism is riskier for weak democracies, whereas parliamentary systems are riskier for strong democracies. The authors summarize this finding along with another —that single-party dominance is heterogeneously more dangerous than party fragmentation— by proposing that countries at low levels of democracy risk more by concentrating power than by dispersing it.

Michael Bernhard and Edgell consider social factors, deepening the evidence that civil society is helpful in creating and preserving democracy. Combining V-Dem information with NAVCO data on mass-mobilization campaigns, the authors find popular movements endanger existing regimes, making autocracies more likely to democratize and democracies more likely to autocratize. Specifically, right-wing and violent campaigns more often bring down democracies, whereas nonviolent campaigns more often build them up.

Each chapter distills data into easily grasped generalizations, sometimes creating new insights, occasionally contradicting received wisdom, and often expanding the evidentiary base for preexisting theories. As a litany of stylized facts, these findings justify the book. The editors deliver additional value by synthesizing authors' research projects, culminating in a working understanding of multiple factors operating on several timescales to produce democracy.

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The reviewer: Anthony T. Sutton is a governance analyst at the CIA.

Knutsen, "Democracy and Economic Growth: A Survey of Arguments and Results," *International Area Studies Review* 15, no. 4 (2012).

a. See Jose Antonio Cheibub, *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

b. See Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 1 (1990).

Putin

Philip Short (Henry Holt and Company, 2022), 854 pages, notes, index.

Reviewed by J.E. Leonardson

Who is Vladimir Putin? It may seem a strange question at this date, as the KGB officer-cum-dictator never has been reticent about describing his geopolitical views and plans while, during his more than two decades in power, the number of dead opponents at home and in exile has grown almost as fast as the pile of books seeking to explain him.a Still, despite the large number of insightful Putin studies by scholars and journalists, Putin's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and his escalating brutality since then somehow have taken many by surprise, especially in Western Europe. Sadly, it seems the need still exists for an updated, thorough explanation of what drives the man.

This is the gap that Philip Short seeks to fill in his new biography, *Putin*. Make no mistake: at 670 pages of text and another couple hundred of notes and references, this cinder block of a book is the longest and most detailed biography of Putin to date, as well as the first to include the early stages of the Ukraine war. It is not for the weak. Beyond its physical heft, *Putin* dives deep into the details not just of its subject's life story but also of recent Russian political history and personalities, as well as Moscow's relations with the United Sates and the West. Short, a British journalist and author of biographies of Mao and Pol Pot, writes clearly and as concisely as his topic allows, but the complexity and detail make for slow going. Reading *Putin* takes commitment.

Nonetheless, *Putin* is worth the effort. Much of the ground Short covers is, not surprisingly, well-trod, and the basic story of Putin's journey from poverty in postwar Leningrad to the Kremlin has been told many times. But unlike some who have recounted Putin's rise to power, such as Masha Gessen and Catherine Belton, Short doesn't write with outraged passion. His is a cool, dispassionate approach, more like that of Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy in *Mr. Putin*.

Critical to understanding Putin, Short says, is realizing that since his childhood and youth in Leningrad he has displayed two distinct, intertwined characteristics. The first is that Putin never, ever has shied away from a fight. Whether on the streets or the schoolyard, "whenever a fight broke out, Putin was the first to pile in," and no matter the odds, he fought to the end. (28) Related to that was his demand for respect, which has carried through to adulthood. "Respect was fundamental for Putin," writes Short. "Whether for himself as a boy…or for Russia as a great power, the need to be respected was a constant principle all his life." (194) These traits combined, moreover, to make the young Putin a risk taker "who refused to be bound by the same rules as everyone else." (47)

The teenage Putin channeled his aggressions into martial arts training and then, after university, his unemotional calculations of risk made him an ideal candidate for the KGB. Short thus gives us a Putin who, even if he no longer brawls on the streets, hasn't changed a bit. "Anyone who insults Russia won't be long for this world," Short quotes him as saying soon after he became president. (293) Since then, any number of oligarchs, dissidents, Chechens, Syrians, Georgians, and now Ukrainians have learned that he always seeks to crush his opponents and never backs down once he has taken his stance. (293)

With this as the foundation of his analysis, Short goes on to chronicle Putin's rise in the 1990s from functionary in Leningrad to the presidency of Russia, and then on to the gradual consolidation of almost total power. This is a complex tale, filled with detail and subtleties, and all but the most determined readers will skim parts of it. Short's bottom line, however, is that Putin is far from a cartoon villain. Rather, he is a shrewd and cunning operator, working relentlessly toward his goal of restoring Russian pride and power. At home, "Putin's ultimate goal was to

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a. For a sampling, see Lillia Shevtsova, *Putin's Russia* (2003); Masha Gessen, *The Man Without a Face*, (2012); Fiona Hill and Clifford Gatty, *Mr. Putin* (2012); Karen Dawisha, *Putin's Kleptocracy* (2014); Catherine Belton, *Putin's People* (2020); and Richard Sakwa, *The Putin Paradox* (2020).

refashion the body politic, to control the regional satrapies and the main political parties and, above all, the central apparatus of power." This, in turn, required deft maneuvering in a system unforgiving of failure and, "to a large extent he succeeded," says Short. (458–59) Here is the Putin who brought order from the chaos of the 1990s, tamed the oligarchs, suppressed the Chechen rebellion and, by the late 2010s, had doubled the size of the economy. Abroad he reasserted Moscow's role in global affairs by taking advantage of opportunities in Georgia and Syria to make sure the West no longer could ignore Russian interests, as he believed it had in Eastern Europe and the Balkans after the Soviet collapse.

So far, so ordinary, at least as strongmen go. Had this been the extent of Putin's achievements, he might be seen as a run-of-the-mill dictator, rather like Franco or the pre-Ethiopia Mussolini—thuggish, but not an outcast. Instead, however, Putin set about developing an ideology to support his power and, as Short details, it was one that gradually became harsher and more reactionary. Russia's history meant that Putin could not use an updated Communism or, because the turmoil of the 1990s had done much to discredit Western-style democracy in the eyes of Russians, anything that seemed too similar to Western liberalism. Thus, while Putin made soothing statements early in his tenure with the idea that Russia could become a "normal democratic society," accepted by the West, what truly appealed to him was the idea that what Russia needed "was not a state ideology but 'an organic unification of universal human values with the traditional values of Russia,' first and foremost patriotism and belief in the country's greatness." (294, 442) To Western ears this may sound like empty platitudes, but Short notes how it appeals to Russian social and cultural conservatism, much as defenses of states' rights or the Progressive tradition resonate with Americans.

As relations with the West gradually declined, Putin's views hardened. Starting in the mid-2000s, he began to read the political philosopher Ivan Ilyin, a refugee from the Bolshevik Revolution who flirted with fascism in the 1930s and wrote of Russia's special mission in the world. Going forward, Putin decided, Russia would have a unique Eurasian identity "under the banner of Russian culture and Orthodoxy…guided by a strong centralized power." (445) Putin went further in the 2010s, proclaiming Russia to be a "civilizational state, bonded together by the Russian people, Russian language and Russian culture…which unites us and prevents us dissolving into this diverse world." (549) From this flowed an embrace of Orthodoxy, accompanied by a vehement rejection of Western notions of tolerance and a growing conviction that Western talk of human rights and democracy was merely a cover for provoking color revolutions that would destroy Russian civilization. These ideological threads came together in Ukraine, which led Putin to become obsessed with the idea that the United States and the West were using events in Kyiv as another front for attacking Russia.

While this might hold domestic political appeal, Short makes clear that Putinism isn't much of a guide for day-to-day governance. In fact, his centralized team is a collection of corrupt mediocrities and incompetents, cronies appointed for loyalty rather than ability and kept on so as not to risk alienating powerful allies. Unable and unwilling to hold his subordinates responsible for their poor performances, Putin shuffles them from job to job; only in particularly egregious cases has he sent a few off to retirements, their landings made comfortable by stolen fortunes. Meanwhile, Putin has concentrated power in himself to the extent that "nothing [can] happen unless he personally [signs] off on it," thus leaving him to spends his days immersed in minutiae but accomplishing little. (459) Short leaves no doubt that Putin has created a hollow regime, unable to do much more than stay in power for its own sake.

This would matter little were it not for the real-world catastrophe that has resulted from the regime's ossification, of which Short's account of Putin's relationship with the military is emblematic. When the submarine *Kursk* sank in August 2000, the military leadership assured Putin that all was under control and, as the truth emerged, Short says that he was shocked to learn that they had lied to him. This revelation, coming on the heels of the army's disastrous performance in Chechnya, led Putin to approve a complete overhaul of the military, with the aim of turning it into a modern, Western-style professional force. Unfortunately, corruption and bureaucratic resistance made the reform effort a failure—something that became painfully apparent in the war with Georgia in 2008. Another decade of reform and modernization followed, costing additional billions of dollars, only to produce a Potemkin military that has failed miserably in Ukraine. It should be no surprise, moreover, that almost a year into

the war, neither the defense minister nor the chief of the general staff has been fired.

Short's analysis has stirred some controversy. When *Putin* appeared in Britain and then, a few weeks later, in the United States, some reviewers accused Short of excusing much of Putin's behavior. Indeed, as he sets out the story of Putin's actions, Short bluntly summarizes what he sees as various Western missteps—failing to consider how Russia would view the eastward expansion of NATO; confused and inadequate responses to his moves in Georgia and Syria; and casual statements about Ukraine possibly joining NATO—that either angered Putin or reinforced his conviction that the West would stop at nothing to destroy Russia. Short also notes that not all assumptions about Putin's culpability for various crimes have been proven; whether he was responsible for the apartment bombings and Boris Nemtsov's murder, for example, still is uncertain. The criticisms of Short,

however, confuse excuses with carefully considered judgments. The United States and its partners made decisions and issued statements that looked very different in Moscow than they were intended to in Washington and Brussels, and Short is right to point out how these affected Putin. Nowhere does Short say that Putin's actions, especially in Ukraine, have been justified, only that context makes them more comprehensible.

Putin is one of those books that comes along at just the right moment. While much of what Short has to say is familiar, his contribution to Putin studies is to show how Putin's personality and ideology have brought him to grief in Ukraine and, perhaps, Europe and the United States to the brink of war with Russia. This is not the end of the story, of course, and how it will end is anyone's guess. But at least a reader of *Putin* will have a solid understanding of how we got there.

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The reviewer: J.E. Leonardson is the pen name of a CIA analyst.

Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World
Benjamin R. Young (Stanford University Press, 2021) 335 pages, illustrations.

Reviewed by Yong Suk Lee

The phrase Third World, coined by French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952, is viewed as antiquated and has largely been replaced with phrases like developing world. Before falling out of favor, however, Third World was a label that newly independent nations themselves embraced for a time. It was supposed to represent a continuing path toward diplomatic independence from legacies of colonialism—a third way, instead of adhering to the bipolar model of the Cold War world. Benjamin R. Young, professor of history at Virginia Commonwealth University, in his first book dives into North Korea's adventures in third worldism and breaks new ground, chronicling a period in international history when other nations looked up to North Korea as a role model.

Since the armistice ended the Korean War in July 1953, the two Koreas have waged a diplomatic war for legitimacy, each trying to claim the title as the sole legitimate Korea. For the international community in 2022, this war for legitimacy has long been over. North Korea is a pariah: a hereditary communist dictatorship with nuclear weapons. South Korea is a G-20 country, exporting cars, TVs, cell phones, and pop culture around the world. This was not always the case. In the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea was frequently touted as a Third World role model. With an infusion of Soviet aid after the Korean War, the North rebuilt quickly and founder Kim Il Sung solidified absolute control.[a] South Korea, on the other hand, was mired for years in poverty, political instability, and military coups.

Beyond cement, machinery, and pre-fabricated statues, North Korea was most interested in exporting revolution. Young shows that Kim Il Sung, an anti-Japanese partisan fighter who saw himself in another revolutionary fight against the United States, prioritized relations with other revolutionaries that he saw as his brothers in arms, such as Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara.

In the end, Young makes a compelling case that the Kim family helped other revolutionaries to help themselves, and North Korea's foreign policy toward the Third World echoes the old adage that all politics are local.

Although preaching internationalism and global unity among progressive and revolutionary forces, Pyongyang's adventurism in the Third World was rooted in its competition against Seoul and the desire to rid the world of imperialist forces, especially the US military presence on the Korean Peninsula. Instead of finding an independent path for nonaligned nations during the Cold War, for North Korea the Third World became an off-Peninsula venue to continue to fight the Korean War. For example, we now know that in the skies over North Vietnam, the Korean People's Army Air Force 1967–69 lost 14 personnel killed in action and claimed 26 US aircraft shot down.[b] Young cites a conversation, in an account found in Romanian Foreign Ministry archives, between a North Vietnamese official and a Romanian diplomat to clarify North Korea's military objectives in Vietnam. "The North Koreans had plenty of people active in South Vietnam. They are active in those areas where South Korean troops are operating, so as to study their fighting techniques, combat readiness and morale of the South Korean Army, and to use propaganda against the South Koreans." (69)

Young notes that North Vietnamese leaders appreciated North Korea's consistent support for their cause but avoided requesting direct military assistance. They finally acquiesced in 1967 and asked for air assistance, in an effort to level the playing field against the United States. While the team of North Korean pilots and ground crew left Indochina in 1969, the North's intelligence cadre remained active in South Vietnam until 1972, waging a proxy war against the South until at least 1971. (69)

The Vietnam experience between the two Koreas is a little known episode. South Korea took an active role in

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a. There are multiple ways to romanize Korean. In this review, we employ the convention used by Dr. Young.
b. Merle Pribbenow, "North Korean Pilots in the Skies over Vietnam," North Korea International Documentation Project, E-Dossier #2, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 2021.

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the Vietnam War. From September 1964 to March 1973, the South sent some 350,000 troops to Vietnam, with 5,099 killed in action and 10,962 wounded, according to official accounts. North Korea was an early supporter of the North Vietnamese cause and volunteered to send troops and material support independent of South Korea's involvement, driven by desire to support a revolutionary fight against the US. These appeals to provide troops took on more urgency when South Korea started sending troops to support the US and South Vietnam and started winning battlefield accolades. It is not clear why Hanoi resisted Pyongyang's troop offers and Young does not explore the subject. An informed observer could surmise that Vietnamese officials had little interest in hosting a proxy war in their backyard or that Moscow, Hanoi's primary military backer, vetoed Pyongyang's proposal.

Once North Vietnam opened the door, North Korea took full advantage of its foothold in Indochina. "The North Korean intelligence cell in South Vietnam produced and disseminated more than one million propaganda leaflets directed at South Korean troops, provided Korean language lessons to Vietcong soldiers, helped the Vietnamese Communists kidnap South Korean soldiers, broadcast Korean-language propaganda on the radio, and conducted data research and radio monitoring of South Korean armed forces." (69) Young further concludes the "Vietnam war presented a unique opportunity for Kim Il Sung to evaluate South Korea's military without directly engaging them in an all out war on the Korean peninsula. The Vietnam war served as a useful litmus test for the North Korean military and intelligence." (70)

North Korea's Third World foreign policy by the end of the Vietnam War was more about guns and guerrillas than cultural exchanges and trade. Young shows that, even as a nation-state, the North's ideology was firmly rooted in the founding myth of a guerrilla dynasty and North Korea as a nation of revolutionaries in a perpetual battle against capitalists and reactionaries, as represented in the form of the United States and its ally South Korea. This proxy war reached all the way to the Middle East. According to Young, "from 1963 to the early 1990s, the DPRK covertly trained fighters from the Palestinian liberation movement and supplied them with weapons. (173) North Korea's material supported included the Abu Nidal Organization and Muhammad Da'ud Awa, one of the planners of the attack against Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. (171) In the end, Pyongyang

overreached in its perceived fight against the US and South Korea abroad, and Young blames Kim Jong Il for finally turning off the Third World against the North.

When North Korea's current leader Kim Jong Un first came on the scene as his father's heir apparent, he was known as the Young General of the Korean Revolution. This was not the first time this moniker was used to describe a Kim family member. The first Young General in North Korean propaganda was Kim Il Sung's son Kim Jong Il, Jong Un's father. As a Young General taking the battlefield, Kim Jong Il sought military honors and he found them in the Third World, waging war against the South. Young notes that "Kim Jong Il's version of diplomacy prioritized revolutionary violence as the key to undermining the ROK's legitimacy and paving the way to his succession as the next leader of the DPRK." (144)

Kim Jong Il is widely credited with orchestrating two bloody attacks against South Korea that resulted in the North being listed as a state sponsor of terror and sent Pyongyang's international reputation on a downward spiral. North Korean agents planted a bomb at the Aung San Martyr's Mausoleum in Burma on October 9, 1983, in an attempt to assassinate the visiting South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan, killing four Burmese and 16 South Korean dignitaries and reporters. On November 28,1987, two North Korean agents planted a bomb aboard Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight 858 that was flying from Baghdad to Seoul. The agents planted the bomb and deplaned during a refueling stop in Abu Dhabi. The plane blew up over the Andaman Sea, killing all 115 people aboard, many of them South Korean construction workers returning from Iraq. Afterward, the State Department in 1988 listed North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.

North Korea still denies involvement in the attacks but suspects were quickly apprehended after both incidents. The Burmese military pursued three North Korean suspects who had arrived in Burma the month before aboard a North Korean merchant ship. One was killed during a firefight with and two were captured. The two agents responsible for the KAL bombing were apprehended in Bahrain. Both tried to commit suicide by poison capsule; one died, and the survivor was extradited to South Korea for trial. Young argues that the two attacks combined dealt a fatal blow to North Korea's global campaign for legitimacy against the South. Even the most ardent

supporters of the regime overseas found it difficult to defend Pyongyang's behavior.

Within Pyongyang's world view, terrorist attacks that made North Korea a pariah nation probably were considered successful. From Kim Jong Il's perspective, they had struck a blow against South Korea and by extension the United States and earned him battlefield accolades in a field of combat other than war. The goodwill the North acrued decades before as a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement and a supporter of revolutionary movements was squandered to help solidify the political legitimacy of an heir-apparent. In his final analysis, Young shows that North Korea's Third World diplomacy was provincial instead of international. Instead of finding an independent third way to navigate the bipolar world, Pyongyang was obsessed with gaining a perceived advantage in the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula.

Professor Young's first book is a welcome addition to the international history of Korea. It is insightful, engaging, and shines a light on a topic frequently discussed among students of Korean history but covered only in obscure academic journals, and a book-length study in English was long overdue.

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The reviewer: Yong Suk Lee is a former deputy associate director of CIA and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

The KGB and the Vatican: Secrets of the Mitrokhin Files
Sean Brennan (Catholic University Press of America, 2022), 103 pages, index.

Reviewed by John C.

On May 13, 1981, Turkish gunman Mehmet Ali Ağca shot and critically wounded Pope John Paul II as the pontiff's motorcade entered St. Peter's Square in the Vatican. CIA Director William Casey, himself a practicing Catholic who often spoke of US-Soviet conflicts in religious terminology and even briefed the pope on various Cold War policy developments,[a] was eager to know if the Soviets were involved in the assassination attempt of a Polish pope widely known as an opponent of communism. Indeed, although the United States did not at the time have access to it, a 1980 report from KGB headquarters to its Warsaw field office labeled the 1978 election of Cardinal Karol Józef Wojtyła to the pontificate as reflecting the Vatican's "support of world imperialism" and an attempt to "divide socialism from the inside." (31)

Whether the Soviets were behind the attack is, as former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates recounted, "one of the great remaining secrets of the Cold War."[b] Regardless of culpability, it is certainly true the Kremlin viewed Catholicism as a threat, as Sean Brennan's short and very readable new book *The KGB and the Vatican: Secrets of the Mitrokhin Files*, makes clear. A translation of transcripts of KGB records regarding the policies of the Soviet secret police toward the Vatican and the Catholic Church in Communist-controlled countries as provided by KGB archivist and defector Vasili Mitrokhin, the book offers fascinating insights into the Soviet regime's policy toward Catholicism from the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) to the first decade of the pontificate of John Paul II.

Brennan's introduction offers valuable historical background explaining that KGB antagonism toward Catholicism can be traced to the very beginning of communist Russia. Feliks Dzerzhinsky (1877–1926), a baptized Polish communist and Lenin's choice as director of the first Soviet secret police force, the Cheka, was deeply suspicious of the Catholic Church. In 1920, he wrote,

In my opinion, [Catholic] clergy have played a large role in espionage and conspiracies. They need to be deactivated. For this, I propose the publishing of a circular to be sent to provinces that all priests must be registered and under supervision. Furthermore, the clergy hear the confessions and fantasies of Catholics…. (96)

There were certainly plenty of Catholics in Soviet-held territory—approximately 1.2 million of them as of 1921. Two years after Dzerzhinsky's comments on Catholicism, Lenin published an essay entitled "On the Significance of Militant Materialism," urging all party cadres to disseminate scientific-materialistic propaganda with the goal of eventually eradicating religious faith and institutions. By the late 1930s, practically all Roman and Byzantine rite Catholic churches in the Soviet Union were forcibly closed, and hundreds of Catholic clergy had been sent to the gulags.

Mitrokhin's writings, which are not transcriptions of individual KGB reports but summaries of numerous documents he secretly transported to his home from the KGB archives, discuss Soviet activities against the Catholic Church after World War II. *The KGB and the Vatican* serves as a tidy consolidation of that archive as it relates to the KGB's position on all things Catholic. Surveying the Mitrokhin archive, translator Sean Brennan observes that no institution "dominated the attention of the Kremlin more than the Catholic Church and the state that directed it—the Holy See." (1) That certainly meshes with Mitrokhin's own summary: "The anti-Soviet nature of the churches and the incompatibility of their beliefs with Marxist-Leninist ideology mandated that the organs of the state security in the USSR put a stop to their activities. The Vatican is one of the main targets of observation and penetration by agents of the KGB." (33) The KGB viewed the church as preventing the spread of communist ideas, distracting workers from the fight for social

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a. See Joseph E. Persico, *Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey: From the OSS to the CIA* (Viking, 1990).
b. Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows* (Simon and Schuster, 1996), 356.

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progress, and using ideological diversions to weaken the Soviet Union.

Brennan's effective organization of the Mitrokhin archive—which include extensive footnotes providing essential historical and religious context—indicates that the KGB interpreted the church as representing two distinct threats to communism. The first of these was ideological. As one KGB document explains,

The Catholic clergy are trained to have an irreconcilable position toward the politics of the Soviet government with regards to questions of religion, to win independence of the Church from control by the Soviet state, and to create opposition on the part of their parishioners towards socialism. (49)

This concern was not unfounded: beginning in the 19th century, popes had issued various statements and documents censuring socialism and Marxist doctrines. As early as 1846, Pius IX condemned socialism, specifically in its atheistic manifestations. Leo XIII in his 1891 encyclical *Rerum Novarum* declared: "the main tenet of socialism, community of goods, must be utterly rejected."

Yet it was not simply that the Catholic Church on a matter of principle repudiated Marxist political, economic, and social doctrines. The KGB also perceived the church as acting on behalf of capitalism and imperialism, particularly as the Vatican was often aligned with those historically (and predominantly) Catholic nations (e.g. France, Spain, Italy) that maintained overseas possessions and participated more freely in the global economy. After World War II, KGB propaganda even portrayed the Vatican as pro-fascist because of its positive relationship with regimes like Portugal under António de Oliveira Salazar.

The second perceived threat to the Soviet Union and its allies was the Catholic Church's role in fomenting nationalist fervor. For example, KGB documents regularly cite concerns regarding widespread beliefs among Poles and Lithuanians that that their respective nations' cultural and religious identities were inseparable from the church. Moreover, several of the non-Latin rites of the Catholic Church were distinctly national in origin (e.g., Ukrainian, Ruthenian), which created a space for Eastern European peoples to preserve their unique cultural identity and traditions. For a Soviet regime seeking to curb if not eradicate those nationalist tendencies, these alternative

Catholic rites (often called Uniat) represented an obstacle to that geopolitical objective. By extension, the KGB also viewed the church's identity as an international (if not explicitly political) entity that vied for the allegiance of people across the world as a competitor to global communism.

For these reasons, the Mitrokhin archive makes clear that the KGB viewed the Vatican as "one of their primary subversive opponents abroad." (25) Soviet intelligence thus exerted efforts to resist the Catholic Church, both within the Eastern Bloc and across the world. In 1969, Chairman of the KGB Yuri Andropov approved a strategic document aimed at combatting the influence of the Catholic Church. Its aims included gaining influence over members of the Roman Curia, infiltrating various Catholic institutions via KGB agents, discrediting Catholic officials, forcing the Vatican to suspend its support for Catholic activities in the USSR and satellite states, and disseminating disinformation against the Catholic Church. These were all classic examples of KGB active measures.

In the mid-1970s, the KGB sent several code-named agents to "compromise the activities of the Vatican and its abilities to inspire people," (78) and to foster divisions within the Catholic hierarchy. Within the Eastern Bloc, KGB recruits included the head of a Uniat monastery, priests, and nuns. The KGB coopted one priest by threatening to kill his sister. The KGB published anti-Catholic propaganda across Western Europe, including one tract in France that accused the Vatican of fascism. In Poland, more than 800 members of the country's security organizations worked as agents within Catholic institutions.

The Vatican itself, however, proved a more difficult nut to crack, though not for lack of effort on the part of Russian intelligence officers. A 1975 document from the KGB's First Main Directorate and Fifth Department outlined Soviet intelligence requirements and covert action objectives vis-à-vis the Vatican. This included seeking to "obtain information about the intentions and activities of the state organs of the Vatican." (81) Yet the KGB often had difficulty collecting on the Catholic hierarchy. The KGB *rezident* in Rome in 1968 noted the difficulties of infiltrating the Vatican, because of its small, insular nature and the "considerable mistrust" toward outsiders. (71)

Nevertheless, some individuals in the Vatican, with papal approval, pursued a policy later termed *Ostpolitik* ("Eastern Politics"). During the pontificates of John XXIII

(r. 1958–63) and Paul VI (r. 1963–78), Vatican officials attempted to open limited dialogue with Soviet satellite regimes in Eastern Europe and even the Soviet leadership in Moscow. A delegation of clerics from the Russian Orthodox Church, which included several (undercover) KGB agents, were invited to attend the Second Vatican Council as observers. Soviet premier Nikolai Podgorny met with Paul VI in 1967, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met with the pope six times between the late 1960s to the late 1970s.

The KGB, perhaps unsurprisingly, looked with suspicion at Ostpolitik. A 1966 report composed by the KGB's Second Directorate called the Vatican policy of rapprochement a "diversionary maneuver." (22) Another 1971 report from the KGB's Fifth Directorate called the Vatican a "well-organized apparatus" with an "anticommunist orientation." (22)

Those descriptions of the Vatican (and the church more broadly) were more or less true. Yet in reading the Mitrokhin archives, one gets the impression that as much as the Soviets appreciated the ideological and national threat posed by the Catholic Church, the KGB also failed to fully understand how church leaders understood themselves. "Prominent members of the clergy and the laity continue to attempt to organize local children in religious life, to extend greater influence over them," (47) reads one KGB assessment. Yet if Catholic clergy actually believed they were in the business of saving souls, exposing children to religious catechesis would not, at least from a Catholic perspective, be "indoctrination," but the imparting of objective, necessary goods.

Perhaps because of the Soviets' own ideological commitments, as well as a deep skepticism toward religion and religious persons, the idea that Catholic officials actually believed what they taught, seemed, cynically, irrelevant. Perhaps beholden to a manifestation of confirmation bias stemming from the fact many, if not most KGB officials did not think religiously, they were in certain senses unable to understand why Catholics (and the Vatican) did what they did. Otherwise, they might have identified the church's self-understanding as a moral check on *all* regimes not just communist ones. Indeed, as Brennan explains in the introduction, in the 19th and 20th centuries, popes had issued plenty of criticisms of global capitalism and the exploitative qualities of imperialism. Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* spoke quite concernedly of the detrimental effects of industrialism and capitalism on families and human labor, while expressing support for labor unions, social welfare organizations, and a living wage.

The final documents cited by Brennan in this important contribution to continued scholarship on the Mitrokhin archive note the Soviets' grave concern with the pontificate of John Paul II, as well as various KGB strategies to combat the Polish pope's influence. This included, among other intelligence activities, disinformation campaigns, infiltrating the pope's inner circle, and even discouraging Orthodox churches from communicating or collaborating with the Catholic Church. A document from a May 1982 conference of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia made clear the Soviets' concerns about John Paul II's pontificate, claiming that the Vatican had "openly embarked on the path of support of world imperialism." (93) Whether or not Russian intelligence ultimately had any connection to that 1981 assassination attempt, Moscow certainly feared John Paul II. And, as the remainder of Soviet history would bear out, that fear was not entirely misplaced.

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The reviewer: John C. is a targeting officer in CIA's Directorate of Operations.

The First Counterspy: Larry Haas, Bell Aircraft, and the FBI's Attempt to Capture a Soviet Mole
Kay Haas and Walter W. Pickut (Lyons Press, 2022), 371 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Reviewed by David A. Welker

I selected this book initially hoping to learn more about a spy case that bridged US counterintelligence's awkward transition from carefully observing the Soviet Union as an ally to intensely monitoring it as an enemy. As a native Western New Yorker, I also wanted to learn more about Soviet spying in my former backyard and more generally about the facts of this largely overlooked case. Sadly, this volume would disappoint on nearly every level.

The First Counterspy seeks to tell the story of how Andrei Ivanovich Shevchenko, a Soviet government representative managing Moscow's purchase of Bell P-39 Airacobra fighter planes during World War II, was in truth an NKVD (Soviet secret police) intelligence officer developing three Americans to provide him engineering and other details of the United States' classified jet-engine research project. Unfolding largely at the Bell Aircraft factories during the war's last years and early transition to the Cold War era, the book focuses heavily on Shevchenko's development of Bell Aircraft trainer and aspiring aeronautical engineer Loren G. "Larry" Haas. Father of coauthor Kay Haas, he joined with Bell technical librarian Leona Franey and her husband in cooperating with the FBI to uncover and expose Shevchenko's espionage. Although this case has been eclipsed by the more damaging and significant Soviet penetration of the Manhattan Project atomic bomb effort, it was featured in 1949 House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA) hearings, focusing on top level Washington decisions that enabled Shevchenko's early January 1946 escape from US justice by returning to Moscow.

The book is throughout an easy, sometimes exciting read. The authors take you along as Haas meets repeatedly with Shevchenko, and eventually the FBI, too, offering blow-by-blow details of the back and forth of his recruitment and development. That the book reads like a spy novel is both is greatest strength and its downfall.

The first warning of trouble is that well-known intelligence issues and terminology are frequently used

(U) A restored P-39Q at at the National Museum of the US Air Force. The display represents the deployment of P-39s on Adak Island in the Aleutian Islands during World War II. (USAF photo)

clumsily or inaccurately. The cover alone bears two such examples, including the title itself. Haas was not "the first counterspy"—not for the US, the FBI, nor even this case—because the Bureau had long doubled agents back against Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and other nations, while librarian Leona Franey had been approached prior to Haas's involvement, both by Shevchenko and the FBI. Similarly, the subtitle "the FBI's attempt to capture a Soviet Mole" misconstrues Shevchenko's position; he was no mole—a recruited spy hiding within an organization—but rather an intelligence officer operating under cover as a Soviet commercial official. Frequently these errors seem to appear for sensational reasons, but regardless, they mar the text.

Most misleading, however, is this book's claim to be a serious work of history. First encountered in the introduction, this assertion is reinforced by the trappings of a history book such as endnotes, bibliography, index, and the back cover's descriptive tags "History/Military/WWII." Although there is actual history hidden within, it is concealed by a thick layer of outright fiction. Most glaring is the frequent fabricated dialogue that defies introduction and postscript claims to be grounded in FBI

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

P-59B at the National Museum of the United States Air Force, photographed while being moved into new display hangar, October 8, 2015. (USAF photo)

debriefing transcripts. Repeatedly the reader will ask "how can the author know and record detailed, extensive dialogue of two men meeting in secret nearly 80 years ago?" The authors' loose claims that this was shared by Haas with his daughter, who is implied to have remembered it to be recounted for readers, simply unravels as the book unfolds.

Most jarring is the inclusion of clearly fictional accounts and claims that grow more ludicrous as the book unfolds and wanders ever farther from the facts of well-known HCUA transcripts. For example, the authors claim Larry Haas twice met with President Truman—again, with detailed dialogue—so the president could personally impart Haas's importance and persuade him to remain involved when contemplating ending his FBI collaboration (in the authors' defense, an endnote admits one such meeting is completely made up). Most absurd, however, is the fanciful story that instead of Shevchenko disappearing home behind the Iron Curtain, he was murdered by Larry Haas, who secretly slipped aboard his Soviet

ship in the North Atlantic. All this to pay him back for supposedly abducting his young daughter (the author) for use in leveraging Haas to become a full-blown Soviet spy. Although demonstrating author Kay Haas' adoring devotion to her frequently absent father, these and other clearly tall tales make the book impossible to accept as a work of history.

The account of Soviet efforts to steal technology behind America's development of a jet engine and aircraft that resulted in the Bell P-59 Airacomet (above), deserves to be told. So, too, does the real account of NKVD/KGB officer Shevchenko, whose real name was Andrei Raina and is noted as ARSENIJ and ARSENIUS in both the Venona recordings and Alexander Vassiliev's more recent notebooks of KGB records. Perhaps most deserving of an accounting are the actions of those FBI agents and their doubled assets, the Franeys and Larry Haas, who at considerable personal risk protected America's secrets. They still await a full and accurate treatment.

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The reviewer: David A. Welker is a member of the CSI History Staff.

Bridge to the Sun: The Secret Role of the Japanese Americans Who Fought in the Pacific in World War II

Bruce Henderson (Knopf, 2022) 480 pages, maps, photographs, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Stephen C. Mercado

The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu in his classic treatise *The Art of War* famously pointed to the importance of intelligence in warfare: "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril." Knowing the enemy is difficult enough for a kingdom or country that goes to war with a neighbor, as with China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Intelligence becomes a more formidable challenge when the adversary is distant and unfamiliar. Such was the case when the United States and Japan went to war in 1941 across the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean. Neither side knew much about the other. Each side faced the challenge of coming to grips with an alien enemy language in order to gain intelligence. Few in Japan, other than those born and raised in the United States, had a good grasp of English. Few Americans, other than those of Japanese heritage, had ever studied Japanese. These few thousand, mostly young, Japanese Americans thus became a key resource for both Washington and Tokyo in seeking to "know the enemy" and win the war.[a]

In the 1930s, many Japanese immigrants (the first generation, or *Issei*, in Japanese) in the United States sent their children (the second generation, or *Nisei*) to Japan for their education, often having them stay with relatives, or the parents took their American children to Japan when they left the United States for one reason or another to go home. Japanese Americans who "returned" to Japan were known as *kikoku shita Nikkei Nisei* (帰国した日系二世). Those who later returned to the United States after having lived some years in Japan were known as *kibei shita Nikkei Nisei* (帰米した日系二世). These *Kibei* Nisei (Kibei, for short) were an elite group within the Japanese-American community, their fluency and literacy distinguishing them from the majority of Nisei who had grown up entirely within the United States.

Like other groups in the United States, most Nisei had grown up hearing their immigrant parents speak their native language at home. Weekend language classes for some Nisei supplemented this "kitchen Japanese," but the children were far from fluent or literate in their parents' language. Kibei, particularly those who had attended high school and in some cases college in Japan, could function at a high level in both languages and in both societies. In effect, they constituted a bridge between the United States and Japan.

Bruce Henderson, who has penned many popular works of nonfiction on his own and in cooperation with others, has written a highly readable history of the Kibei contribution as Japanese linguists in the United States Army's Military Intelligence Service (MIS) in the fight against Japan in World War II. In *Bridge to the Sun*, the author settles on six Kibei as his main characters. Henderson divides the book into two main parts. The story's prologue and the five chapters of Part One set out the background of the main characters: the stories of their Issei parents in America and their own lives growing up and attending school in the United States and Japan. Two of the Kibei—Tom Sakamoto and Nobuo Furuiye—attended Kyushu Gakuin, a prominent Lutheran high school in Kumamoto Prefecture on Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan's four main islands.

Many Kibei in Japan excelled in their studies. Both Sakamoto and Grant Hirabayashi, who attended high school in Nagano Prefecture on the main island of Honshu, were outstanding students who received offers to join the Japanese army as officers; Hirabayashi received an invitation to the Imperial Military Academy. (33) Part Two's chapters relate different episodes of the war, from language training at the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) to various campaigns in Asia and the Pacific.

The Kibei encountered prejudice in their lives at every turn. In Japan, they were expected to act as loyal imperial subjects, no matter the passport they held. When

a. For a discussion of Great Britain's approach to filling the language gap, see my review of *Eavesdropping on the Emperor; Interrogators and Codebreakers in Britain's War With Japan* by Peter Kornicki, *Studies in Intelligence* 66, no. 1 (*Extracts* – March 2022).

Sakamoto explained to the Japanese major who extended to him the honor of an officer's position that he was an American citizen and was returning home to the United States after high school, the major "angrily berated" the young man as a traitor to the emperor before dismissing him. (xix–xx) After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Washington ordered the army to oversee the forced relocation of ethnic Japanese—both immigrant Issei and their American Nisei children—from the West Coast states to camps in the interior. The army then called on Nisei to leave their parents behind in the camps and serve in the war as Japanese linguists. The navy, for its part, simply refused to recruit Japanese Americans. When Nobuo Furuiye and other Nisei army linguists went to work in Hawaii at the US Navy Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA), they were relegated to a "JICPOA Annex" located outside the base. (242–43) In Burma, a captured Japanese platoon leader in his interrogation denounced his military interrogator, Grant Hirabayashi, as a "traitor." (209)

The US Army's own program for training Japanese linguists was built on a prejudice of a kind: that the Japanese language was so difficult that only Japanese Americans and a handful of European Americans born and raised in Japan were suited for a crash course. Yet growing up with "kitchen" Japanese was no guarantee that a student could master standard written Japanese, let alone arcane Japanese military vocabulary (*heigo*) or the intricacies of Japanese shorthand "grass script" (*sosho*). Kazuo Komoto, a Kibei who had attended high school in Japan, in 1942 became valedictorian of the first MISLS Japanese class at Camp Savage, Minnesota, from which 117 Nisei and 12 white students graduated; nearly one in five students failed the course.

In the field, army linguist teams performed best in combinations that paired a Kibei with a Nisei raised and schooled entirely in the United States or a linguist strong in Japanese with a partner who excelled in English. On the Red Combat Team in Merrill's Marauders in Burma, for example, Grant Hirabayashi partnered with Hawaiian

Nisei Eddie Mitsukado who, having never been to Japan, was only a "passable linguist." (181) The Higa brothers—Takejiro and Warren—also worked together for a similar reason. Takejiro was a top linguist, a Kibei who had attended school for years in Okinawa; brother Warren had only taken some Japanese lessons in Hawaii. (266)

On the front lines and in rear echelons, the Army's Nisei linguists went to work translating captured documents, interrogating prisoners, and otherwise proving useful. In Burma, Roy Matsumoto, serving with Merrill's Marauders deep behind enemy lines, intercepted Japanese military communications that led to the demolition of an enemy division's ammunition dump. In another case, he overhead Japanese soldiers discussing plans for a dawn raid on his platoon. Not only did Matsumoto warn his unit in time for a successful ambush but, at one point in the fight, he barked the military command to charge, which he remembered from his military training as a student in Japan, prompting the Japanese soldiers to rise to the attack and expose themselves to deadly American fire. (201) Before the Battle of Okinawa (April–June 1945), Takejiro Higa informed photo interpreters that what they took to be fortifications were in fact tombs. The only linguist in MIS fluent in the Okinawan language, Higa went on to save a number of civilian lives in the course of the battle by coaxing them in Japanese and Okinawan to abandon the caves where they were preparing to commit mass suicide and surrender. (340)

In an otherwise engaging and informative book, Henderson errs in writing that the several thousand Nisei who served on the Japanese side in the war did so with their language skills "largely unappreciated and unused." (83) In fact, Nisei who were studying and working in Japan played roles similar to those of the Kibei in MIS. Nisei in Japanese service interrogated Allied prisoners of war, translated documents, monitored radio broadcasts, intercepted pilot voice communications, and produced propaganda.[abc] James Wada, for example, like Tom Sakamoto and Nobuo Furuiye, attended Kyushu Gakuin. Unlike them, however, Wada stayed in Japan to attend

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a. For the story of two Japanese-American voice interceptors on board the *Yamato*, see Tachibana Yuzuru. *Teikoku Kaigun shikan ni natta Nikkei Nisei* [*A Second-Generation Japanese-American Who Became an Officer of the Imperial Japanese Navy*] (Tsujiki Shokan, 1994).
b. Several Japanese Americans who monitored US radio broadcasts for the Japanese Foreign Ministry played leading roles after the war in establishing Japan's Radio Press monitoring service. See Tachibana, *Teikoku Kaigun*, 230.
c. For the Japanese-American role in Japan's communication intelligence efforts, see Torii Hideharu, *Nihon Rikugun no tsushin chohosen: Kitatama Tsushinjo no bojutashatachi* [*Communications Intelligence War of the Japanese Army: The Interceptors of the Kitatama Communications Station*]. Keyaki Booklet series (Keyaki Shuppan, 2011).

Meiji University. When war erupted, he volunteered for service in the Japanese navy, where he worked on communications intelligence.[a] *Bridge to the Sun* tells only one side of the Nisei intelligence contributions during the war.[b]

Bruce Henderson has written less a detailed intelligence history than an engaging story of six Kibei who in difficult times applied their exceptional talents in the war against Japan. He has mined everything from military histories to personal memoirs to provide intimate portraits of these six Japanese Americans as individuals. The numerous photographs of the Kibei as children and soldiers, of other Nisei linguists, and of senior Army officers complement the text and add value to the book. The story's epilogue, a moving account of Takejiro Higa meeting in Okinawa in 1995 a woman who had survived the horrible battle there thanks to him, ends the story on a high note. This is a book well worth reading.

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The reviewer: Stephen C. Mercado is a retired CIA officer and regular contributor to *Studies*.

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a. Takeda Kayoko. *Taiheiyo Senso. Nihongo choho senso. Gengokan no katsuyasku to shiren*, 17–20.
b. For another story of later Nisei contributions during the Korean War, see Yong Suk Lee's review of *The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History* (Princeton University Press, 2019), by Monica Kim, in *Studies Intelligence* 66, no. 3 (*Extracts* – September 2022)

"Vincere!" The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa, 1922–1940

Frederica Saini Fasanotti (Naval Institute Press, 2020), 202 pages, forward, photos, acknowledgements, acronyms and abbreviations, glossaries, notes, index.

Reviewed by Joseph Gartin

In October 2022, as voters elected Giorgia Meloni of the radical right Fratelli d'Italia party as prime minister, Italy also contemplated the 100th anniversary of Benito Mussolini's fateful march on Rome. His rivals and doubters greatly underestimated him. And like Adolph Hitler to come, the table was laid for him by a disorganized and ineffectual opposition, a feckless king and timid generals, compliant bishops and businessmen, demobilized and demoralized soldiers. The list goes on. As historian David Gilmour observed in his masterful *The Pursuit of Italy*, "it was a remarkable case of collective liberal suicide." That Mussolini set Italy on a course toward political repression, ill-chosen alliances, world war, and eventual defeat is familiar to even casual students of World War II. Less familiar, perhaps, are Italy's two colonial conflicts in North Africa before the war: Libya (1922–31) and Ethiopia (1936–40).

Dr. Frederica Saini Fasanotti explores these fateful wars of choice in her excellent *"Vincere!" The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa, 1922–1940.* For the intelligence practitioner or scholar who regularly encounters discussions of counterinsurgency operations in the pages of *Studies*, *"Vincere!"* (to conquer) is a slim but tightly packed book that explores the military dimensions of Italy's arduous and fleetingly successful counterinsurgency efforts in its would-be North African colonies. Although Libya and Ethiopia differed significantly in many ways, they shared characteristics that would test Italian generals and soldiers alike: vast distances, terrain that favored the defender, complex and shifting alliances, and capable foes. Italy's efforts ought to be as studied by counterinsurgency experts as much as well-known cases such as Kenya, Malaya, Vietnam, and, more recently, Afghanistan and Iraq. Fasanotti has made that possible after years of prodigious scholarship, combing the Italian military archives and walking the ground where battles were waged.

Rome's strategy in both operations would be partly shaped by the army's victory in the Italo-Turkish War (1911–12), in which it won the Turkish provinces of Tripolitana and Cyrenaica (modern day Libya). That war featured the world's first aerial reconnaissance mission and the first aircraft bombing (both by Italian pilots). The Italian high command was also intent on avoiding the mistakes of Italy's costly involvement in World War I on the side of the Allied Powers. Lured by the prospect of seizing territory from a weakened Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy would see some 600,000 men killed and nearly a million wounded, many high in the mountains in desperate fighting along the border with Austria. In North Africa, Italian military planners envisioned a modernized, rapid style of warfare enabled by airpower, mobile ground formations, and limited logistics trains. Cooptation of local leaders and the construction of *perni di manovra*, small forts strung along important lines of communication, were adaptations that would be echoed in later colonial wars from Indochina to Algeria. Fasanotti notes, "territorial control required two things: the absolute safety of the garrisons and the search for weapons and insurgents using mobile columns, which would make stops in those secure outposts." (103)

Intelligence was essential to help plan and execute counterinsurgency operations across such large territories; *L'Africa Orientale Italiana* (AOI—Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian Somalia) alone comprised some 990,000 square kilometers, three times the size of Italy. *Regia Aeronautica* aircraft were used for reconnaissance and surveillance, border patrols, and aerial photography, again presaging technological advancements in counterinsurgencies to come. (174) Liaison with local troops provided tactical intelligence, and Italian intelligence officers compiled profiles of key leaders. (182) Over time, in both conflicts, primary responsibility for counterinsurgency operations fell increasingly to indigenous forces, again calling to mind similar strategies in Vietnam and elsewhere.

Fasanotti offers extensive notes along with helpful glossaries of Libyan and AOI terms and key players in the conflicts. Archival photographs give a flavor of the

austere conditions facing combatants in both theaters. The publisher might have spared a few pages for maps; a single, dated map of the continent (showing Zaire, for example, which existed from 1971–97) is of no use to the reader trying to make sense of geographic demarcations of the 1920s and 1930s.

Throughout, Fasanotti reminds us that civilians paid a fearsome price in both theaters. General Gugielmo Nasi, one of Italy's best commanders in East Africa, remarked, "It is not an army we have to defeat but an armed population which we have to submit, disarm, pacify." (101) To that end, countless civilians in both theaters were shot, bombed, and gassed. Others were driven from their homes, robbed of crops and herds, left to the mercy of bandits, or shunted into austere camps to perish of disease and starvation. At times, "on both sides" logic intrudes. Fasanotti offers that Italians "did not distinguish themselves as diplomats and humanitarians" but "the

insurgents did not give the best account of themselves during the periods of Italian government." (81) She repeats the argument almost verbatim 40 pages later.

On balance, though, Fasanotti makes a concise and compelling case that Italian Royal Army operations in Libya and Ethiopia ought to be included in the body of literature on counterinsurgencies. This is true even if success was hard won and short lived, even if Rome was motivated by colonial ambitions and justified by fascist ideology. As W.E.B. Dubois wrote for *Foreign Affairs* in October 1935 of the looming war in Ethiopia, "The world, or any part of it, seems unable to do anything to prevent the impending blow, the only excuse for which is that other nations have done exactly what Italy is doing." By 1940, war in Europe was a certainty, the colonies were lost, the colonizers were left to their fates,[a] and soon enough, Fasanotti ruefully concludes, "what remained of the Fascist imperial dream was only ruins." (139)

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The reviewer: Joseph Gartin is managing editor of *Studies* and a long-suffering student of Italian.

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a. Pamela Bellinger offers a superb examination of Italy's highly contested concepts of identity, citizenship, and the right of return for overseas Italians stranded at war's end in Africa, Albania, and the Balkans, among others, in *The World Refugees Made: Decolonization and the Foundation of Postwar Italy* (Cornell University Press, 2020).

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf—December 2022

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake, *unless otherwise noted.*

Contemporary Issues

Spymaster's Prism: The Fight Against Russian Aggression, by Jack Devine

Surveillance State: Inside China's Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control, by Josh Chin and Liza Lin

Intelligence Process/Tradecraft

Lying for Money: How Legendary Frauds Reveal the Workings of the World, by Dan Davies. Reviewed by J. E. Leonardson

Spies on the Sidelines: The High-Stakes World of NFL Espionage, by Kevin Bryant. Reviewed by David A. Welker

History

US Intelligence History

Agent Josephine: American Beauty, French Hero, British Spy, by Damien Lewis

The Cuban Missile Crisis: When Intelligence Made A Difference, by Regis D. Heitchue

Espionage and Enslavement in the Revolution: The True Story of Robert Townsend and Elizabeth, by Claire Bellerjeau and Tiffany Yecke Brooks

The Liar: How A Double Agent in the CIA Became the Cold War's Last Honest Man, by Benjamin Cunningham

Last Call at the Hotel Imperial: The Reporters Who Took On A World at War, by Deborah Cohen. Reviewed by Graham Alexander

Scorpions' Dance: The President, the Spymaster, and Watergate, by Jefferson Morley

The Secret History of the Five Eyes: The Untold Story of the International Spy Network, by Richard Kerbaj

Wise Gals: The Spies Who Built the CIA and Changed the Future of Espionage, by Natalia Holt. Reviewed by Janice Felt

Intelligence History Abroad

Britain's Plot To Kill Hitler: The True Story of Operation Foxley and SOE, by Eric Lee

The Grey Men: Pursuing the Stasi Into the Present, by Ralph Hope

Hitler's Spy Against Churchill: The Spy Who Died Out in The Cold, by Jan-Willem van den Braak

Saboteur: The Untold Story of SOE's Youngest Agent at the Heart of the French Resistance, by Mark Seaman

Spies Who Changed History: The Greatest Spies and Agents of the 20th Century, by Nigel West

Soviet Defectors: Revelations of Renegade Intelligence Officers, 1924–1954, by Kevin P. Riehle

Tunnel 29: The True Story of an Extraordinary Escape Beneath the Berlin Wall, by Helena Merriman

The Unquiet Englishman: A Life of Graham Greene by Richard Greene

Contemporary Issues

S*pymaster's Prism: The Fight Against Russian Aggression,* by Jack Devine. (Potomac Books, 2021) 266 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In his memoir *Good Hunting: An American Spymaster's Story*,[a] Jack Devine writes about his impressive CIA career from his entry on duty to the most senior positions in the clandestine service. In *Spymaster's Prism* he provides a different view—from 30,000 feet, to use a popular contemporary term—one derived from his CIA experience and his realization that "Russia never abandoned its spying program or its active measures operations." (xvi)

The purpose of the book is "to provide a unique spymaster's analysis of how to effectively respond in light of Russia's (and others') ongoing intelligence assaults on the United States." To accomplish his goal, he proposes "thirteen key intelligence lessons" as a prescription for action to help "navigate the current state of play between Russia and the United States." (xx)

The first lesson is that Russia is a strategic adversary of the United States. The 13th lesson is "never trust the Russians." (209) In between, Devine presents background material on CIA and Russian spycraft, Putin as a spymaster, and the problems resulting from Russian agents penetrating elements of the US government. Then he turns to how, within limits, counterintelligence should deal with moles, arguing "it takes a spy to catch a spy." (85) Acknowledging that the United States needs to develop

its own sources in foreign countries, Devine considers the options associated with this difficult task, whether they be military or civilian.

The often controversial topic of covert action also gets serious attention. Devine contends it is a necessary option because the Russian counterpart, called active measures, has continued unabated since the Soviet Union collapsed. He gives several examples, stressing the need for legality and disruptive penalties when prohibited methods are employed.

As a cautionary comment in support of his final admonition, "never trust the Russians," Devine points out that Russia ignored Director of CIA John Brennan's warning not to interfere in the 2016 election. (211) This supports Devine's argument that it is critical to maintain a strong national security posture that will deter Russia until Putin recognizes the inherent strength and resiliency of US democracy.

Spymaster's Prism adds professional depth to each of his lessons that presents the reader with an important perspective on US intelligence as well as its Russian adversary. A very worthwhile contribution.

S*urveillance State: Inside China's Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control,* by Josh Chin and Liza Lin. (St. Martin's Press, 2022) 310 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

China's early attempts at societal control were the subject of Geoffrey Cain's book, *The Perfect Police State*.[b] In *Surveillance State*, *Wall Street Journal c*orrespondents Josh Chin and Liza Lin provide an account of the Chinese Communist Party's more recent efforts to achieve total societal control in support of President Xi Jinping's efforts to reclaim China's lost glory. A key step toward this goal is the modernization of social surveillance, with emphasis

on the Uyghurs, the Turkic Muslims found in the Xinjiang area of Western China, which is twice the size of Texas. This region is part of Xi's Belt and Road Initiative to extend China's influence beyond its borders.

The authors stress that "Xinjiang had been crawling with surveillance for years, but the old systems required huge amounts of manual labor." (3) *Surveillance State*

a. Jack Devine*, Good Hunting: An American Spymaster's Story* (Sarah Crichton Books, 2014), reviewed by Hayden Peake in *Studies in Intelligence* 58, no. 4 (December 2014).

b. Geoffrey Cain, *The Perfect Police State*: *An Undercover Odyssey Into China's Terrifying Surveillance Dystopia of the Future* (PublicAffairs, 2021), reviewed by Hayden Peake in *Studies in Intelligence* 66, no. 3 (September 2022).

illustrates the impact of the new systems on Uyghur life by describing how they were applied to Tahir Hamut, his wife Marhaba, and their two daughters. Detailed descriptions of China's human data collection are provided. First, the face is photographed from several angles. Then skin complexion is recorded, and blood samples taken. Lastly, other distinguishing features such as hair and eye color are noted. In some cases, passports are confiscated and DNA samples are eventually taken. These characteristics—combined with regularly updated collection of information on financial, social, and political behavior—are used to create a numerical measure of an individual's trustworthiness, which is then recorded on identity cards. From then on the ubiquitous city cameras and card readers can track a citizen's every move, almost.

The authors emphasize that the system is "riddled with blind spots. The overwhelming majority of Chinese people can still find refuge from the Party's prying eyes inside their own homes…. Broad stretches of public space likewise fall outside of the government's field of vision." Gaps exist in Chinese cyberspace as well. (216) It is for a combination of these reasons that the Tahir family eventually escaped to the United States and experienced freedom for the first time.

Before that happens in their narrative, the authors discuss the political, business, and technical conditions that account for the successes already achieved. Examples on the international front include China's tech companies like Huawei and its role in establishing a Digital Silk Road. (131) Of special interest are China's early dependence on US facial-recognition software and the development of contacts in US universities.

Surveillance State reveals China's new era of social control that has allowed the Communist Party to wrap "its hand firmly around the steering wheel of history." (251) This condition, the authors conclude, can only be defeated by transparency, however it is imposed. (262)

Intelligence Process/Tradecraft

Lying for Money: How Legendary Frauds Reveal the Workings of the World, by Dan Davies. (Scribner, Kindle edition, 2021; originally published in 2018) 304 pages.

Counterintelligence officers have long known they have much to learn from reading in other areas, such as sociology, economics, and even spy novels.[a] To that we can add another, unexpected, field that has plenty to teach us about validating our assets and the information they provide: financial fraud. After all, for an investor to verify the claims of a company about its finances and prospects is a task little different from that of intelligence officers assigned to determine if assets are who they claim to be and whether their reporting is truthful. Both are efforts at risk management, and lessons learned in one endeavor can inform the other.

Fortunately for our purposes, we seem to live in a golden age of fraud. Scams are as old as money and commerce, but today's thefts are orders of magnitude greater than ever before. Localized frauds that stole millions of dollars have been eclipsed by transnational schemes that cost investors billions. One of the biggest scams of the 1960s, for example, involved nonexistent vegetable oil in New Jersey and cost American Express $150 million. Some five decades later, globalization made it possible for Sino Forest, a Chinese logging company, to issue $3 billion in bonds and shares to US and Canadian investors, all of whom lost their money when the company's trees turned out to be fictional. Around the same time, the collapse of Bernie Madoff's Ponzi scheme cost investors more than $60 billion, a number likely to be eclipsed by recent tech-enabled crypto collapses. Such frauds are impressive by any standard and, along with many others, provide a large pool of examples for study.

Sorting these frauds is an enormous problem, but Dan Davies's *Lying for Money* is an excellent starting point for understanding the phenomenon. Davies, a former Bank of England regulatory economist, tells us that fraud is about "trust and betrayal," which should be enough to capture the attention of any intelligence reader. From that starting point, he provides concise typologies that show how various frauds—the "long firm," in which a crook collects

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a. John Ehrman, "What are We Talking About When We Talk about Counterintelligence?" *Studies in Intelligence* 53, no. 2 (June 2009).

money in advance of delivery of goods and then absconds with the funds; various types of counterfeits; cooked books; and so on—work and differ from one another. What is striking, however, is how much they have in common. "Greedy people, desperate people, and people who didn't know what they were doing" parade through his pages, ignoring red flags or warnings that promised results are too good to be true, only to see their dreams crash and burn. Whether it is the vegetable oil in New Jersey or promises of the riches to be had in far-off (but also nonexistent) lands, there is no shortage of people to be fleeced.

As interesting as Davies's case studies and examples are, the counterintelligence value of his book lies in what he has to say about due diligence, the financial industry's term for asset validation. His first major point is that due diligence takes time and money, which are scarce resources and thus expensive, which then forces hard choices about how much to spend on it. "We can't check up on everything, and we can't check up on nothing," he says early on, "so one of the key decisions … is how much effort to spend on checking. This choice will determine the amount of fraud." Because wiping out fraud completely would be prohibitively expensive, the "optimal level of fraud is unlikely to be zero" and the world is left to decide how much fraud to live with.

Davies does not see this as a major problem, however. Instead, he suggests, the existence of a certain level of fraud is actually a net positive for society, as it shows that good things are happening overall. In the 19th century United States, he says, railroad and stock-market fraud were endemic, but the "very reason that there was so much dishonesty is that there was so much to steal because so much wealth was being created." In such a situation, "people don't find it worth their while to waste time minimizing their fraud losses."

In that light, a high-performing intelligence service may therefore view the discovery that a certain percentage of its assets are fabricators or double agents simply as the cost of doing business. This is especially so in view of the likelihood that trying to reduce the number of bad agents to zero will entail enormous costs in time, money, and

likely lead to the creation of a risk-averse culture that is unwilling to recruit agents who might have even a slight chance of turning out to be bad. Such a determined effort to eliminate bad assets will send a service down the road to paralysis and irrelevance.

That said, matters might easily get out of hand. It's one thing for a naïve or hopeful individual to fall prey to a fraud, but why does it keep happening to professional investors and corporate managers? These are the very people whose experience and resources ought to enable sophisticated analysis. The answer, says Davies, is that "vulnerability to crime … tends to scale with the cognitive demands placed on the management of a business," especially because managers try to "administer things that are too complicated to be aware of every detail." For overwhelmed managers to delegate the job to specialists is the obvious solution, but even if a manager is willing to do this, the results will be disappointing. "People who are able to catch fraudsters when they are employed to do so are quite unusual," and anyone good at the job generally "is an uncommonly persistent and blunt individual and not always necessarily someone who got on well with his colleagues." A grim situation, indeed, and one that sounds painfully familiar.

There is one approach, however, that Davies believes offers hope. Just as anything that sounds too good to be true inevitably is, Davies says to bear in mind that "anything that is growing unusually fast, for the type of thing that it is, needs to be checked out. And it needs to be checked out in a way that it hasn't been checked out before." In other words, when things are going well is the time for maximum skepticism and a good ops test. Not a new point, perhaps, but one that often is overlooked.

Lying for Money by no means is a comprehensive guide to coping with counterintelligence issues. It is, however, a thought-provoking book that makes important points regarding what we can do to improve our processes and, at the same time, the limits of what we can expect to achieve.

The reviewer: J.E. Leonardson is the pen name of a CIA analyst.

*S*pies on the Sidelines: The High-Stakes World of NFL Espionage, by Kevin Bryant. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2022) 25 pages, bibliography, notes, index.

Those of us who follow NFL football—I am a long-suffering Buffalo Bills fan (Maybe it will be different this year!)—are well aware of the high stakes in its games, seasons that make or break vast fortunes and careers, and the drama that uplifts or crushes the hopes and spirits of fans and the cities or regions these teams represent—now with online gambling applications adding to the mix. Reflecting this, football is often compared to warfare and the strategic competition between nations, so it should come as no surprise that NFL teams have sought to gather intelligence on their competitors, frequently adopting national intelligence tradecraft to do so. Although fans and even casual observers are aware of these efforts, no single publication has explored the NFL's growing use of intelligence—until now.

Kevin Bryant's new volume is an enjoyable, easy read that, for the first time, allows readers to grasp just how important intelligence collection is to the NFL. Bryant frames the work around issues critical to all teams: plays and game strategies, team playbooks that capture those plays, the draft and free agency process in which teams acquire players to suit their strategies. He wraps up with a final case study section that correlates these applications of intelligence to the game. This approach allows Bryant to blend the intelligence and football worlds to show how NFL teams employ intelligence practices across each of these key areas in pursuit of a Super Bowl ring.

The opening section, looking at collecting opposing teams' plays and strategies, includes chapters on information-gathering during practices and in the locker room, obtaining restricted documents, placing listening devices, eliciting information from witting and unwitting sources, developing penetrations of opposing teams, exploiting former players' knowledge, and rapidly gathering and employing intelligence during games. This approach also enables Bryant to share accounts from throughout US football history, and frequently examples from the 1920s are paired with those from the 21st century to show the enduring nature of intelligence within the game. In each chapter, Bryant formats the text into smaller, theme-aligned subsections that help readers move smoothly between examples that otherwise might have seemed to lack coherence or required the author to repeatedly remind readers why an example has been included in a given section.

The book is replete with examples from throughout football history illustrating the longtime use of intelligence. These are fascinating and often humorous. For example, ahead of the 1994 opening game, Oakland Raiders owner and general manager Al Davis was detected lingering on the opposing San Francisco 49ers sideline, clearly collecting play signals or other intelligence ahead of the opening snap. Coach Mike Shanahan put an end to this by having Steve Young drill a pass right at Davis, sending home his displeasure with Davis's spying and forcing the Raiders owner to dive to the turf for safety.

Ahead of the 1956 draft, the Los Angeles Rams conducted a deception campaign to protect their draft targets that was so successful it fooled the Baltimore Colts into drafting a player sight unseen to deny him from the Rams, only to find in training camp he lacked even basic skills to play at the professional level. Providing counterintelligence measures before a 2013 New England Patriots home game, quarterback Peyton Manning had his Denver Broncos bused to a remote forest for the team's pregame walk-through to deny the undoubtedly watching Patriots any hint of their plans. These stories alone make the book a must-read for football fans.

The book's fourth case-study section adroitly wraps together all the operational tradecraft Bryant has noted throughout the book, showing how important gathering intelligence is for success in today's NFL. Patriots fans, however, should be forewarned that this section will be unsettling because it examines in unflattering terms the team's behavior during the notorious intelligence-driven scandals that rocked the NFL during 2007–15. Bryant weaves a clear narrative of these often-complicated events, explaining the Patriots' filming and surveillance of opposing teams dubbed "Spygate," the ball-inflation tampering and related deception efforts of "Deflategate," tapping of opponents' supposedly secure coach-to-player headsets and subsequent signal jamming, and more.

As with other situations noted in the book, Bryant uses primary sources to illustrate his points, such as quoting

Pittsburgh wide receiver Hines Ward's allegations that during the 2002 AFC championship game Patriots defenders responded to Steelers offensive plays immediately after they had been sent in from the sideline but before his offense had made its on-field adjustments. Such overly aggressive use and exploitation of intelligence by the Patriots had pushed the NFL too far, and some intelligence practitioners will see parallels between this series of events and the Intelligence Community during the Watergate era when, like Coach Bill Belichick's Patriots, overreach exposed intelligence activities to outside scrutiny with painful consequences.

The book would have benefited from illustrations, which curiously it lacks. Similarly, a glossary of football terms would help those readers not familiar with the sport's unique terminology, which Bryant understandably employs throughout. Even so, this is a fun read, both for football fans like this reviewer and for casual readers looking to learn about yet another sphere of modern life that has adopted our intelligence tradecraft and techniques.

The reviewer: David A. Welker is a member of CSI's History Staff.

History

US Intelligence History

Agent Josephine: American Beauty, French Hero, British Spy, by Damien Lewis. (Public Affairs, 2022) 466 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Former BBC correspondent, Damien Lewis, was intrigued when family members told him about the French Resistance Room in the Château des Milandes that had once belonged to Josephine Baker, the famous Black, exotic, and highly paid entertainer in the 1920s and '30s. Seeking the story of the room and Baker's relationship to it, Lewis examined material in European and American archives. *Agent Josephine* reveals what he learned.

A St. Louis, Missouri, native, Freda Josephine McDonald was born in 1906. She married Willie Baker in her teens (her second marriage) and left him forever in 1921, when she abandoned the segregated life in the United States for Paris.

Lewis sketches Baker's rapid rise to international celebrity that led to her acquiring a nightclub in Paris—Chez Josephine—and her denunciation by the fascists internationally. At the height of her fame just prior to World War II, she was proposed for recruitment as an "Honourable Correspondent" by a member of the Deuxième Bureau, the French military intelligence agency.

Baker was initially opposed by some, who thought her too eccentric and well known for clandestine work. After all she danced half-naked and walked the streets of Paris with "her cheetah, Chiquita, on a diamond-studded leash." (24) But she was accepted because who would suspect her? And in that unpaid voluntary position, Baker collected information from Nazis attending her club in Paris and her performances in other countries. Lewis doesn't provide many details about the specific data collected, but he does discuss the professional background of her French handlers as well as the Allied intelligence officers she supported.

After the Nazis occupied Paris, Baker, at the request of the Deuxième Bureau, entertained German and Vichy French troops, although she had vowed never to do so until the Nazis left France. Using her stardom as a cover she traveled with a large entourage of helpers— Deuxième agents—and "piles of trunks carrying the tools of her trade, plus the hidden, secret contents that might change the course of a war and that might help save an island nation which, under Winston Churchill, was holding out against all odds." Lewis doesn't describe the "secret contents" and his assessment of their impact is overstated, but her efforts are well documented. (117)

Then after the Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942 and the Nazi occupation of Vichy France, Josephine was forced to leave for Morocco. She took with her a "thick dossier with the latest intelligence … with instructions to take the information to Lisbon." (165). By this time she is part of an MI6 pipeline setup by Wilfred Dunderdale, the former head of station in Paris.

For the remainder of the war, Josephine served as a courier and, when not traveling, used her quarters for resistance meetings. When she became ill toward the end of the war, she held clandestine meetings in her sick room.

Curiously, and without explanation, Lewis notes that after her secret work was over she was "drawn into the ranks of the Free French armed services and appointed a Second Lieutenant in the Women's Air Force Corps, with the role of Propaganda Officer." (355)

Although the details remain obscure, there is no dispute that Josephine's wartime exploits earned her the Médaille de la Résistance avec Palme, the Croix de Guerre, and the Légion d'Honneur, France's highest decoration for civil or military service.

In 1951 she went to the United States to perform at a Miami nightclub, on the condition that her audiences would not be segregated. (369) But she was not treated well and suffered threats from the KKK, while not being admitted to first-class hotels in New York. In 1963, she returned once more to deliver a talk on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, shortly before Dr. King's historic "I have a dream" speech. (371)

Baker's senior years saw financial hardship, but she continued performing until overcome by a brain hemorrhage in Paris, where she died on April 12, 1975. Her story is a compelling example of professional ability, patriotic loyalty, social tolerance in Europe, and intolerance in America.

***T**he Cuban Missile Crisis: When Intelligence Made A Difference,* by Regis D. Heitchue. (Dorrance Publishing Co., 2022) 243 pages, footnotes, bibliography, photos, no index.

Former CIA officer Regis Heitchue spent most of his 50-year career in the Directorate of Science and Technology, where he observed the Intelligence Community's role in the Cuban Missile Crisis. His study of the crisis in retirement convinced him that "a comprehensive account of intelligence activities during the crisis is not to be found."(1) Thus Heitchue avows that his version "is a unique story of what US intelligence knew, when it knew it, and how it knew what the Soviets were doing in Cuba prior to and during the crisis" because "it is an all-source story." (11–13)

The uniqueness assertion is likely to be challenged by readers of Dino Brugioni's *Eyeball To Eyeball*[a] and Michael Dobb's *One Minute to Midnight*,[b] since both accounts describe the all-source intelligence contributions to crisis. Dobbs was the first to report that the Soviets stored nuclear warheads in Cuba during the crisis, while other evidence—primarily photographic—led Brugioni to presume they had done so. (6)

Heitchue's narrative covers the crisis from beginning to end, citing reliable open sources supplemented by his own observations. For example, "The single most defining feature of the Soviet adventure in Cuba was the extreme

secrecy … enveloped by measures to conceal, to mislead, to deceive, to cover up and to lie." (14)

He is also candid regarding US intelligence acknowledging "that intelligence made a difference, perhaps the difference. At the same time, US intelligence missed and misjudged important aspects of the Soviet venture in Cuba. Those errors did not materially affect the peaceful resolution of the crisis that was accomplished through diplomatic means." (126)

Nevertheless, he mentions some failures and near-failures to make his point. The most serious is that during the crisis, "intelligence did not confirm the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on the island." This is followed by his assessment that "the size, composition and organization of Soviet forces on the island was seriously underestimated." (127)

Later he takes up the nuclear weapons theme again when he notes that "CIA had written in the President's [Intelligence] Checklist on 27 October that the FROG missile could carry a nuclear warhead." Then he asks, "Should the Agency have highlighted the possibility of a nuclear warhead … was there a failure of imagination by the CIA?" (136)

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a. Brugioni, *Eyeball To Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Random House, 1991).

b. Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War* (Vintage Books, 2009).

In the final chapter, Heitchue discusses why Khrushchev decided to undertake such a risky gamble. He compares the views of established scholars but in the end accepts that the answer will remain uncertain since Khrushchev never explained his reasoning.

Heitchue's judgments regarding both the Soviet and US roles in the crisis are worthy of consideration and constitute the majority of what is new in the book. He has provided a good summary, well-documented, of the crisis.

Espionage and Enslavement in the Revolution: The True Story of Robert Townsend and Elizabeth, by Claire Bellerjeau and Tiffany Yecke Brooks. (Lyons Press, 2021) 216 pages, endnote, photo, index.

Historians Claire Bellerjeau and Tiffany Brooks tell two overlapping stories in *Espionage and Enslavement in the Revolution*. One summarizes the espionage activities of the Culper Spy Ring that provided intelligence about the British in southern New York to Gen. George Washington during the War of Independence.[a] New York City shopkeeper Robert Townsend—alias Samuel Culper, Jr.—was one of the principal agents in the ring, and his role forms the links to the second story in *Enslavement in the Revolution*.

Since the Culper Ring story is well-known it is not surprising that the authors do not dwell on it, although they do sketch some operations and other agents serving Washington. The surprises come when the authors reveal the story of Robert Townsend and his family: slaveholders all. In the process they provide a seldom discussed tutorial on the extensive slavery in the North—the buying, selling, and giving— prior to and during the War of Independence.

The Townsend family lived in the Town of Oyster Bay, which stretched across Long Island from the North Shore to the South Shore. Slaves and former slaves had lived in the area since 1640. In her foreword to the book, actress

Vanessa Williams tells how she found her own family origins in the region.

When it came to enslavement, the Townsend family was not exceptional as the authors make clear. But their story is a good illustration of the contemporary practice, and they focus on Elizabeth—called Liss—thought to have been born in 1763. (12) When the British occupied the Townsend home, Liss became a favorite of the senior officer, and he took her with him when they left. She somehow escaped—there are hints she might have been a courier for Robert—and later turns up at his door in New York, pregnant. Bellerjeau and Brooks tell of Robert's efforts to help her, but he doesn't prevent her recapture in 1785. Enslaved once more, she never sees her son again.

Fortunately, she escapes again and returns to New York. Just how this was accomplished is not revealed. But in the end, Townsend finally helps her gain her freedom.

Espionage and Enslavement in the Revolution reveals a little known side of Robert Townsend and his family. Its timeline is at times difficult to follow but the story adds much needed historical background to a familiar but heretofore incomplete account of intelligence operations during the War of Independence. A valuable contribution.

The Liar: How A Double Agent in the CIA Became the Cold War's Last Honest Man, by Benjamin Cunningham. (Public Affairs, 2022) 268 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In his 1988 book, *Spy vs. Spy*, Ronald Kessler tells how Karl Koecher, a Czechoslovakian intelligence agent, penetrated the CIA in 1973 as a translator. He would go on to provide his service and the KGB with enough data

to compromise a Soviet official, Aleksandr Ogorodnik, as a CIA agent. More recently Koecher was the focus of a book by Howard Blum,[b] who makes unsupported claims that Koecher was a key KGB mole helping to protect

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a. See, for example, Lynn Groh, *The Culper Spy Ring* (Westminster Press, 1969).

b. Howard Blum, *The Spy Who Knew Too Much: An Ex-CIA Officer's Quest Through a Legacy of Betrayal* (Harper, 2022), reviewed by Hayden Peake in *Studies in Intelligence* 66, no. 3 (September 2022).

high-level KGB penetrations in the CIA. In *The Liar*, Benjamin Cunningham, former editor-in-chief of the *Prague Post,* supplements Kessler's version with much new material that counters the alternative account.

After reviewing Koecher's early life and his troubled encounters with the Czech security service (StB), Cunningham describes his paradoxical recruitment by the StB. Preferring counterintelligence to reporting on colleagues in Prague, the persistently irascible Koecher bargains with his considerable language skills—Russian, German, English, and French. He was initially assigned to spy on Germans and other foreigners, although as a new recruit he kept his other jobs as night watchman and at the local planetarium. It was then, in 1963, that he met and married Hana Pardamcová.

As his StB duties became full time, Koecher again complained that his abilities were underused and he was astounded when the StB assigned a new mission: "Go to the United States…. What should I do there?" he asked. "You are going to penetrate the CIA." "How?" "That's up to you." (61) Cunningham attributes this unorthodox assignment practice to an inexperienced StB, the first of several surprises offered by *The Liar*.

The next surprise comes after the Koechers are accepted in the United States as defectors from communism and

Karl spent two years acquiring a doctorate. Then after some time with Radio Free Europe, Koecher did some work at Columbia University's Russian Institute, then run by Zbigniew Brzezinski. While there he became a US citizen in 1971. While the StB attempted to maintain contact and assign other tasks, Koecher often resisted. Then in 1972 he applied to the CIA without informing the StB. It was only on one of his frequent trips to Czechoslovakia that he informed them he had penetrated the agency, and in their astonishment they informed the KGB.

At this point Cunningham introduces another surprise: KGB Gen. Oleg Kalugin, who visits Koecher in Prague to take advantage of his unexpected CIA access. Their relationship is choppy, and Cunningham hints that Kalugin was a CIA agent himself and may have been the source that informed the FBI of Koecher's StB/KGB operations. In any case, the Koechers were arrested, imprisoned, and eventually exchanged for Russian dissident Anatoly Scharansky.

Cunningham's thorough documentation includes lengthy interviews with Koecher and access to his StB file plus interviews with many of the other principals involved. This is the best account of the case to date, although it leaves two issues unanswered: Who was the liar—the word doesn't appear in the text—and why is the last honest man never identified?

*L**ast Call at the Hotel Imperial: The Reporters Who Took On a World at War,* by Deborah Cohen. (Random House, 2022) 557 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

Northwestern University professor and author Deborah Cohen has crafted an inviting premise for *Last Call at the Hotel Imperial*. She chronicles the careers of five prominent foreign correspondents from the United States who, she argues, pioneered the art of international muckraking during the middle of the 20th century. She admits her subjects—John Gunther and his wife Frances, H.R. Knickerbocker, James Sheean, and Dorothy Thompson— are "largely forgotten today." Cohen fixes her gaze, however, on an era when their names were common currency to millions of Americans and international statesmen. "They began the decade [of the 1930s] by reporting the story, but by 1939, they were the story," she writes and, if nothing else, the book credibly supports this claim. Regrettably, *Last Call* falls short of its considerable potential because of poor stylistic and narrative choices.

This same subject, detailing past generations of reporters, should supply a more thought-provoking work with applicable lessons for today.

Real stylistic and thematic problems emerge and grow acute from the outset. Strangely, she has decided to refer to her main protagonists and many of their associates by their first names. She calls Knickerbocker "The Knick" and, while that may have been the nickname used by his friends, this choice creates a clubby tone suggesting that Cohen also considers herself to be on friendly and decidedly partial terms with her subjects. Simultaneously, *Last Call* dwells at unnecessary length on the often sordid personal lives of its subjects. Peppered throughout are long-winded, often embarrassingly detailed accounts of failed marriages, drug taking, alcoholism, abortions, and every type of illicit affair. Cohen dedicates considerable time to

discussing Frances Gunther's psychiatric treatment and childhood trauma, neither of which apparently helped her overcome her writer's block or marital frustrations.

The focus on such prominent journalists provides a wealth of source material that seems at times to overwhelm the author. These individuals left behind not only a wealth of books, articles, and interviews but also private papers and voluminous correspondence. Cohen occasionally uses this material to spectacular effect when, for example, she details atmospherics on their meetings with Hitler, Mussolini, Churchill, Trotsky, and Jawaharlal Nehru. Mussolini, for example, had himself worked for the Socialist newspaper *Avanti!* and founded *Il Popolo d'Italia* in 1914; Cohen deftly demonstrates how he understood the art of manipulation during interviews, which he used effectively to generate positive coverage for his regime.

Frances Gunther's emotional affair with Nehru is also an interesting look at the way that personal feelings threaten to cloud political judgments and media coverage. Such anecdotes are too rare, however. They strike

suddenly like flashes of light before the narrative returns back to the seemingly unending, often scandalous soap opera that was each journalist's personal life.

Cohen acknowledges that her subjects ultimately became the story but fails to explore the implications of this trend. For example, Sheean openly sympathized with the Bolshevik regime and Thompson repeatedly pushed policy proposals to Franklin Roosevelt privately and publicly. Cohen never authoritatively addresses how these reporters reconciled the need to win the trust of their audiences with their poorly concealed politicking. She also seems reluctant to consider the possibility that her protagonists might have left a more lasting legacy had they more faithfully adhered to journalistic principles of balanced reporting. That these issues remain salient in the modern media makes Cohen's reluctance to address them all the more frustrating for a curious reader in the contemporary world.

The reviewer: Graham Alexander is the pen name of a member of CSI's Lesson's Learned program.

Scorpions' Dance: The President, the Spymaster, and Watergate,** by Jefferson Morley. (St. Martin's Press, 2022) 326 pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.

Former *Washington Post* journalist Jefferson Morely's 2008 book, *Our Man in Mexico,*[a] was well received despite some questionable comments about Kim Philby and hints of CIA involvement in the JFK assassination. Morely's 2017 book about James Angleton, *The Ghost*, departed from that precedent.[b] It scorned journalistic integrity and was a monument to inaccuracy.[c] *Scorpions' Dance* combines the negative features of both books, while raising undocumented speculation to a new level.

The central theme of the book, writes Morley, is that "Without Helms, Nixon would not have had his burglars. Without Nixon, Helms would not have occupied the director's suite in Langley for nearly seven years." (8) Morley attempts to validate that proposition by alternating discussions of the careers of both men from World War II to their retirement, while misinterpreting instances of routine

contact, for example, Helms's discussion of Watergate with Nixon. Then, Morley replays the familiar planning and execution of the Watergate operation, including the roles of all the participants, trying to contradict Helms's assertions that the CIA was not officially involved.

In a final example he digresses into Nixon's role in Vietnam and claims, without any evidence, that Helms and the CIA supported his policy: "With Helms's support, Nixon escalated war." (7) And amongst all the speculation, Morley manages to return to his favorite topic: the CIA had something to so with the JFK assassination. (54)

Scorpions' Dance has numerous factual errors. A few examples: Walter Pforzheimer was not "a career analyst" (78); William Hood did not write "several books about the CIA" (66); CIA Headquarters is a bit more than

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a. Jefferson Morley, *Our Man In Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA* (The University Press of Kansas, 2008).

b. Jefferson Morley, *The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton* (St. Martin's Press, 2017).

c. See, for example, the detailed review by CIA Historian David Robarge, *Studies in Intelligence* 61, no. 4 (December 2017), 77–81.

"five miles north of the White House"; the CIA did not "mark" Gen. René Schneider, commander-in-chief of the Chilean military, for death; and Helms "didn't wage war in Vietnam." (88)

Perhaps most significantly, Morley fails to document or demonstrate that Nixon and Helms had a relationship

that consciously or not led to Watergate and operations in Vietnam and enhanced both careers.[a] *Scorpions' Dance* does demonstrate that Jefferson Morley's grasp of intelligence is weak and will only confuse and mislead readers. *Caveat Lector*!

The Secret History of the Five Eyes: The Untold Story of the International Spy Network, by Richard Kerbaj. (Blink Publishing, 2022) 402 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

In his semi-autobiographical account, *Between Five Eyes*,[b] Anthony Wells tells about 50 years of the informal intelligence relationship between the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, commonly referred to as the Five Eyes relationship. In *The Secret History of the Five Eyes*, Australian investigative journalist Richard Kerbaj takes a longer view, with roots planted before World War II, when Britain and the United States began cooperating in intelligence matters. At the end of the war, the relationship was formalized in the BRUSA agreement. Renamed UKUSA in 1953, membership was gradually extended to include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Kerbaj writes that the term "Five Eyes" was first "publicly declared in 2010, though he does not cite a source and its precise genesis remains ambiguous. (ix) In any event, *The Secret History of the Five Eyes* attempts to track its origins, beginning with wartime SIGINT collaboration and its variations currently in effect. Other operations that justify its continuing existence include espionage cases, the VENONA project, defector contributions, post-9/11 cooperation, and the impact of the Snowden treachery.

Although Kerbaj correctly identifies the joint efforts, he has difficulties with the supporting details. For example, when discussing William Stephenson's pre-war intelligence contributions to British intelligence, Kerjab refers to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 30 years before it was created. (26) Another pre-war case involved GRU/KVD defector Walter Krivitsky. Kerbaj says Krivitsky defected to the United States at the beginning

of World War II; actually, Krivitsky had defected first in France in February 1937, and then to the United States, arriving in 1938.

In his treatment of the VENONA project, Kerjab states that the Soviet message traffic had been intercepted when, in fact, copies of all foreign traffic were supplied to the US government by Western Union.

The inclusion of the Cambridge spies as a topic of Five Eyes concern is curious. While it is true that all but Blunt had served in the United States, the treachery was a British problem. Even so, Kerbaj has trouble with the case details. Thus, Philby was not recruited by Guy Burgess around the same time as Donald Maclean at Cambridge or anywhere else. (100) That honor goes to Arnold Deutsch, in London, after which Philby mentioned Maclean to Deutsch. Similarly, Cambridge spy John Cairncross was not compromised as a Soviet agent in 1979, although Anthony Blunt was. And Blunt's MI5 superior, Guy Liddell, was never a "Scotland Yard detective."

In his discussion of the postwar case of atomic spy Klaus Fuchs, Kerjab names Ursula Beurton (SONJA) as Fuchs's NKVD handler in London. SONJA was GRU and never met Fuchs in London. Another GRU officer, Oleg Penkovsky, was never a defector and the secrets he provided did not "provoke the Cuban Missile Crisis." (142) More recent cases suffer similar deficiencies. For example Oleg Gordievsky (177) and Sergei Skripal were not double agents. (277)

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a. See also Peter Usowski, "The White House, Richard Helms, and Watergate: A Clash between Executive Power and Organizational Responsibility," *Studies in Intelligence* 66, no. 2 (June 2022).

b. Anthony R. Wells, *Between Five Eyes: 50 Years of Intelligence Sharing* (Casemate, 2020), reviewed by Hayden Peake in *Studies in Intelligence* 66, no. 1 (March 2022).

While many of the other cases reviewed were of interest to Five Eyes members, some were unilateral, not jointly run, a distinction the narrative doesn't make. The Ghost Stories operation (FBI arrest and exchange of 11 Russian agents) is an example: it was not "a joint operation by the Five Eyes agencies." (277)

The Secret History of the Five Eyes tells no secrets and is feeble history based on poor scholarship. Read with care.

W*ise Gals: The Spies Who Built the CIA and Changed the Future of Espionage,* by Natalia Holt. (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2022) 382 pages, endnotes, index. and details.

In 1953, a group of women in CIA came together as the Committee on Professional Women, dubbed the "Petticoat Panel," with the goal "to strip away the inherent sexism that plagued the institution they loved." (1) Despite this lofty goal, for four women their achievements over the next 20-plus years would always be overshadowed by their gender.

Natalia Holt's *Wise Gals* is the latest in the genre of books sharing the stories of female officers in OSS during World War II and their subsequent careers at CIA. The preceding issue of *Studies in Intelligence* alone reviewed three books and a PBS documentary on the stories of women in intelligence during World War II.[a] Holt tells the tales of five women: Eloise Page, Gen. William Donovan's secretary turned officer; Adelaide (Addy) Hawkins, a pioneer in covert communications; Jane Burrell, a photointerpreter who quickly rose to be a counterintelligence officer in Western Europe; Elizabeth (Liz) Sudmeier, a leading expert and officer for the Middle East; and Mary Hutchison, a highly educated "contract wife" who was an exemplary officer in the field. Their espionage stories are told in parallel with key events, from World War II to Nazi hunting to the Cold War.

Holt has been publicly pushing to have Jane Burrell awarded a star on CIA's famed Memorial Wall inside the foyer of the Original Headquarters Building. Returning from a trip to Brussels on January 6, 1948, Burrell died when the plane she was traveling on crashed on approach to the Le Bourget Airport near Paris, and there has been debate around whether or not Burrell was on official CIA business or on holiday. When *Wise Gals* was released on September 22, 2022, Holt tweeted, "There's a woman you've never heard of, who sacrificed her life for her country, and she needs your support." Holt followed up with a series of tweets with pictures of Jane Burrell's story and has continued to advocate for her quest in her subsequent book talks.

The book is based on Holt's research from "diaries, letters, interviews, reports, memos, scrapbooks, and photographs" as well as Freedom of Information Act requests. (xii) She also notes that when she could not find support for material obtained from an interview, she would weigh other evidence from her research to determine if it should be included. Holt also states that "thoughts and feelings of individuals in the book were obtained through their personal materials and author interviews with those who knew them." (xiv)

At times, *Wise Gals* almost feels like fiction as Holt recounts stories from the women's histories. She attempts to bring her readers into the mind and emotions of the women while making the case that they struggled due to their gender and society's opinion of the role of women. When the book started to feel fictitious, this reviewer repeatedly returned to the sourcing notes and was sometime left wondering what was historical research and what was storytelling to fill in the book.

The way Holt interweaves the stories of the women over chunks of time is a bit complicated and confusing, causing this reader to lose track of who's who. The intent seemed to be to show the uniqueness of each woman's situation compared to the other women during a particular era. For example, Addy stuck in Washington, D.C., divorced with kids, versus Mary a CIA wife trying to prove herself as an officer, versus Eloise who is single for life and desperate to be a station chief, versus Liz and the danger of being an active case officer in the Middle East. The writing style can leave the reader wondering just how

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a. See *Studies in Intelligence* 66, no. 3 (September 2022), for reviews of *The Codebreaker* (PBS documentary), *The Girls Who Stepped Out of Line, A Spy Called Cynthia*, and *The Woman All Spies Fear*.

well the women actually knew each other and how often their paths crossed. All were on the Petticoat Panel in 1953 and there is a brief mention of their getting together for lunch, but it is unclear when that took place or if it was a reference to the panel. (310)

Aside from trailblazing the role of women at CIA, a theme that jumps out is that Addy, Mary, Eloise, Liz, and Jane loved and believed in the CIA's mission and were willing to take assignments and learn new skills to have a lifelong career. This is especially evident in the stories of Eloise and Addy. They may not have gotten every assignment or position they wanted and there may have been supervisors or coworkers who wanted to hold them back because of their gender, but these women displayed steadfast loyalty to intelligence and national security.

Setting aside some shortfalls, *Wise Gals* is an inspiring story of women who made major contributions to the creation of the CIA, executed operations with impact, pioneered intelligence work, and made lifelong careers at the agency. As for Jane Burrell, the CIA public website observes, "We know nothing about Jane's activity at the time of her death. She was returning from a trip to Brussels on January 6—traditionally the end of the Christmas season—and despite speculation that she was on an operational mission, the limited documentation sheds no light." At least for this reviewer, Jane Burrell deserves the star.

The reviewer: Janice A. Felt is a National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency officer serving in CSI's Lessons Learned Program.

Intelligence History Abroad

Britain's Plot To Kill Hitler: The True Story of Operation Foxley and SOE, by Eric Lee. (Greenhill Books, 2022) 200 pages, endnotes, appendix, no index.

In 1998, the British National Archives (then called the Public Record Office) published a facsimile reproduction of *Operation Foxley: The British Plan To Kill Hitler*, with a foreword by historian Ian Kershaw and an introduction by Mark Seaman, then a historian with the Imperial War Museum. *Britain's Plot To Kill Hitler* contains the same facsimile reproduction of the plan and the same foreword by Kershaw, plus 63 pages of prefatory comments written by historian Eric Lee in place of Seaman's 32-page introduction.

Lee's comments contain new material released since 1998. Of particular interest are the plans to assassinate Hitler formulated by Soviet (NKVD and GRU), British (SOE), and American (OSS) intelligence organizations. The Soviets first considered killing Hitler in the late 1930s, with a special military force and later with Alexander Foote, a British-born GRU agent handled by Ursula Kuczynski, aka SONJA.

Britain's Operation Foxley was formulated in mid-1944 after a French colonel reported that "Hitler was hiding in a chateau in Perpignan, in southwest France" (1) and was vulnerable to assassination. Neither was true, but as Lee describes, SOE set about considering the pros and cons of carrying out the task some other way. At times, Lee points out, their planning was less than thorough, as for example

when they proposed using a sniper and selected a British captain who was not sniper qualified, suffered from astigmatism, and was a poor shot.

In the event the sniper plan didn't work out, poisoning Hitler was seen as a kind of Plan B, and SOE selected thallium as the means. (20) Difficulties arose when selecting the means of application, and it was never tried. The most unusual plan considered involved hypnotizing Rudolf Hess, Hitler's former deputy who had defected to Britain, and sending him back to do the job.

The development of OSS schemes to assassinate Hitler was assigned by Director William Donovan to his "Professor Moriarty" and gadgets man, Stanley Lovell. (52) Lovell considered "adding female hormones to the Führer's carrots and beets" (62) as well as a variation on the British plan, in this case hypnotizing a marksman who would then shoot Hitler. Lee evaluates these and other potential solutions that were considered and rejected as operationally impractical.

In conclusion, Lee indulges in some counterfactual speculation on the likely result of a successful attempt on Hitler's life. He notes that senior SOE officers were sharply divided on the answer, with several suggesting that it would ensure his martyrdom while others argued

that Hitler's bungling of the war made him worth more alive than dead.

The facsimile Foxley operation document reveals the options formally considered by SOE. Lee's narrative explains why the operation was never attempted.

The Grey Men: Pursuing the Stasi Into the Present, by Ralph Hope. (Oneworld Publications, 2021) 319 pages, reference notes, bibliography, photos, index.

Former FBI Special Agent Ralph Hope served much of his career overseas as deputy head of the FBI office covering the Baltic states and as head of FBI operations in 11 West African countries. *The Grey Men* makes occasional reference to the African assignments, but its main focus is on the German Democratic Republic and its security police known internationally as the Stasi and "to many East Germans as the Grey Men." (7)

Hope begins his account by addressing the magnitude and nature of Stasi operations. He portrays a more familiar Stasi behavior than was presented by Alison Lewis in her study of the almost tolerant Stasi handling of East German writers and media professionals.[a] Hope documents the Stasi's monitoring of a country of 16 million citizens, with one Stasi officer for every 180 persons. If the informers or agents are included, it becomes one for every 63 persons. This works out, according to Hope, to maintaining files on 6 million citizens. In addition to their informers, information was acquired from surveillance, wiretapping, hidden microphones, mail opening, and interrogations conducted in the 17 secret prisons the Stasi maintained. (8)

In a compelling but chronologically and geographically disjointed narrative, *The Grey Men* tells how the Stasi applied these techniques before and after the Wall was erected. After the Wall came down, Hope reveals the turmoil that resulted when Stasi files became available to the public and other countries. Then he describes how former Stasi officers maneuvered to survive in a reunited Germany, ultimately adopted a "Lost Cause" rationale: "The GDR failed only because the political will was lost. We could have taken care of it." (255)

To help the reader understand the effect on German citizens, Hope introduces the story of Hubertus Knabe and follows his life from birth to his appointment as historian and scientific director of the Berlin-Hohenschönhausen Memorial—formerly the notorious Stasi torture prison in Berlin. Hope shows how Knabe's refusal to remain silent about Stasi abuses led to his eventual dismissal due to revisionist Stasi influence. It is that influence that Hope admonishes readers to be aware of and resist. A valuable account of secret police dominating society in a communist country.

Hitler's Spy Against Churchill: The Spy Who Died Out in the Cold, by Jan-Willem van den Braak. (Pen & Sword Military, 2022) 289 pages, endnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

J. C. Masterman's book, *The Double Cross System*, revealed that, with one exception, the British Security Service captured, turned, or executed the Nazis agents sent to Britain on espionage missions. Only a few sentences mention the exception, who was found dead on April 1, 1941, in a Cambridge air-raid shelter "where he

had committed suicide." (54) His identity card gave his name as Jan Willem Ter Braak.[b]

Dutch author Jan-Willem van den Braak was initially intrigued by the Ter Braak case after reading a brief comment about "Englebertus Fukken, alias William Ter Braak," in the 2012 Dutch edition of *Agent ZIGZAG* by

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a. Alison Lewis, *A State of Secrecy: Stasi Informers and the Culture of Surveillance* (Potomac Books, an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press, 2021).

b. J. C. Masterman's *The Double Cross System: In the War of 1939 to 1945* (Yale University Press, 1972), 54.

Ben Macintyre.[a] He decided to learn what else had been written about Ter Braak and discovered that in 1979 British author Richard Deacon had included a discussion of him in his book, *The British Connection*.[b] Drawing on multiple sources, Deacon included a more detailed summary of the case and gave his full name as Jan Willen (sic) Ter Braak. Deacon also noted that his sources left many questions unanswered. For example: was Ter Braak Dutch, as his name suggested, and was that his real name? Was the radio transmitter found among his belongings ever used to communicate with the Abwehr? How long had he lived in Cambridge, and did he work to survive? Why wasn't he caught like the other Double Cross agents? And then Deacon raised two surprising outliers: Was Ter Braak ever a Soviet agent and did he attempt to kill Churchill?

Drawing on recently released material in British and Dutch national archives and on interviews with members of Fukken's family, *Hitler's Spy Against Churchill* addresses these and related questions.

Van den Braak gives a detailed account of Fukken's unsettled and often problematic early life that included two short stints in prison for check forgery. Once free, he became engaged to a young Dutch girl and secretly joined the Dutch equivalent of the Nazi Party. That decision led to his recruitment as one of several Dutch Abwehr agents trained to conduct espionage in France and England as part of Operation LENA.

Here the story of Fukken's espionage in Britain devolves into speculation, which Van den Braak makes clear, in some instances by using italics. He does explain how Fukken was finally identified. A passport photo of Fukken's fiancée, found among his belongings, was sent to the Dutch intelligence service, and they learned his name from her.

The final chapters of the book present Van den Braak's often lengthy comments regarding the questions posed above, which amount to qualified conjecture. His strongest arguments debunk Deacon's account that Ter Braak (Fukken) was a Soviet spy. Similarly he does the same for the charge, made by E. H. Cookridge (alias), that he was sent to murder Churchill. Thus while *Hitler's Spy Against Churchill* clarifies some details of the Ter Braak case, many critical questions remain consigned to the domain of speculation.

Saboteur: The Untold Story of SOE's Youngest Agent at the Heart of the French Resistance, by Mark Seaman. (John Blake Publishing, 2020) 350 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Before Mark Seaman became the British Cabinet Office historian, he was a historian with the Imperial War Museum. It was there in 1983 that he met, worked, and became friends with Tony Brooks, whose wartime exploits with the Special Operations Executive (SOE) he grew to admire. Brooks was one of a select few the government had permitted M. R. D. Foot to interview for his official history, *SOE in France*.[c] Yet even that account contained some inaccuracies, Seaman says, although not as many as he found in other books. Thus, when Brooks asked Seaman to write his biography and put things right, he accepted the challenge and began the interviews and archival research that resulted in *Saboteur*.

Due to family circumstances, Tony Brooks spent much of his early years in France and Switzerland before attending college in Britain. He was back in France at the start of World War II and volunteered for the Royal Air Force but was rejected because he was just 17 years old. After the surrender of France, the bilingual Brooks unintentionally began his clandestine career when he helped a British soldier escape France to Spain. He continued to help others until his own situation demanded that he too escape to England. After being detained by Spanish authorities in less than desirable conditions that aggravated his chronic psoriasis, Brooks made it to England where, after lengthy processing, he joined the SOE when still 19.

a. Ben Macintyre, *Agent ZIGZAG: A True Story of Nazi Espionage, Love, and Betrayal* (Harmony Books, 2007), 69.

b. Richard Deacon, *The British Connection: Russia's Manipulation of British Individuals and Institutions* (Hamish Hamilton, 1979) 189–94.

c. M.R.D. Foot, *SOE in France* (London HMSO, 1966).

Drawing on SOE archival records and memoirs, plus documents provided by and interviews with Brooks, Seaman describes Brooks's training, his bureaucratically bumpy assignment-preparation process, and his deployment by parachute to the unoccupied area of France. Once operational, Seaman writes, Brooks, even at his very young age, built the PIMENTO network or circuit that accomplished its D-Day sabotage and delay mission. In achieving that objective, Brooks overcame galling communication and control problems with London, issues with safe-house and landing-site selection, threats from the Gestapo and suspected double agents, all the while conducting local sabotage operations. Perhaps most surprising and impressive, was Brooks' handling of

relations with other circuits while successfully maintaining PIMENTO security and traveling under cover with false documents. At one point he was wounded in the leg by a grenade fragment and later arrested by the Germans, but he was released when his cover story checked out.

Brooks avoided the bureaucratic turmoil created by Charles de Gaulle in France after the war—described by Seaman—and returned to England where he eventually did some work for MI5 and became a staff officer with MI6. Seaman leaves that story for another time. With *Saboteur* he has done justice to a long-overlooked, genuinely successful SOE officer and made a fine contribution to SOE history.

***S**pies Who Changed History: The Greatest Spies and Agents of the 20th Century,* by Nigel West. (Frontline Books, 2022) 221 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

When published in 1981, Nigel West's *MI5*[a] drew critical attention for two reasons: its espionage revelations and its lack of source notes. Paradoxically it was also cited frequently by journalists and academics writing on the subject. Since the mid-1980s, as circumstances evolved, West has included source notes on most important issues in the more 30 non-fiction books he has written on intelligence. Both precedents are followed in the 14 case studies in *Spies Who Changed History*.

Before considering some examples, it is worth noting that many familiar espionage cases—e.g., Alger Hiss, the Rosenbergs, Penkovsky, Nosenko, Kuklinski, Gordievsky, Mitrokhin, Tolkachev, to name a few—are not included, since they have been written about in great detail.

Three of the 14—Walther Dewé, Christopher Draper, and Richard Wurmann, will be unfamiliar to most, though aspects of their intelligence activities may not be. For example, Dewé was in charge of the White Lady train-monitoring network during World War II that received much public attention. A more obscure case describes the contributions of Christopher Draper, the colorful Royal Air Force pilot and British agent who worked for MI5. Perhaps the least known was the troubled defector Richard Wurmann, who made an immense contribution before he was sent to a POW camp in the United States.

The names associated with several cases will be familiar to many readers of the intelligence literature, but they should not be overlooked because West has added new detail. Best known for his recruitment of Kim Philby, Arnold Deutsch is a case in point. West adds much new about his personal life and his NKVD career, especially his tour in the UK where he recruited 16 other British agents. Of extraordinary interest are the quotations from Philby's confession obtained from MI5 files made public for the first time. West demonstrates that Philby lied in an attempt to protect Soviet agents still alive and unknown to the authorities at the time.

And then there is the case of the double agent Ashraf Marwan who was compromised when his name appeared by accident on the internet. Marwan played a key role in the 1973 Yom Kipper War and, West writes, both the Israelis and the Egyptians claim he was their agent. The controversy continues after Marwan fell to his death from his fifth-floor flat in London. West tracks the complicated investigations that followed and have yet to assign accountability.

The sourcing quandary surfaces again in the final chapter, "Gennadi Vasilenko." Here West describes how CIA and the FBI learned that Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen were Soviet/Russian penetrations. West names Russians that he asserts provided the clues that led to their identification and arrest, but he does not give a source for

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a. Nigel West, *MI5: British Security Service Operations 1909–1945* (The Bodley Head, 1981).

this knowledge. Hopefully, as with his MI5 book, time will reveal the missing names.

Whether the cases presented in *Spies Who Changed History* live up to the subtitle—*The Greatest Spies and Agents of the 20th Century*—is debatable, considering those West felt obliged to omit. But they are worthy of attention, while being interesting and informative, even allowing for the sourcing challenges. Overall, a positive contribution to the literature.

Soviet Defectors: Revelations of Renegade Intelligence Officers, 1924–1954, by Kevin P. Riehle. (Edinburgh University Press, 2022) 326 pages, end-of-chapter notes, index.

After more than 30 years as a counterintelligence analyst assigned to various elements of the US government, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, Kevin Riehle (pronounced "real") taught at the National Intelligence University before joining the University of Mississippi's Center for Intelligence and Security Studies as an associate professor. In *Soviet Defectors*, Riehle presents the results of a study of nearly 100 Soviet intelligence officers who defected to various countries during the Stalin era.

The cases discussed are separated into five periods: 1924–30, 1937–40, 1941–46, 1947–51, and 1953–54. He explains the gaps in defections between the first and second periods as a consequence of the harsh measures employed in response to Stalin's anger and then publicly announced as a warning. It is true that there were some defections in the early 1930s, but these are defined by Riehle as "non-returnees" and included businessmen, academics, or military personnel and not intelligence officers.

With one exception, the defectors included in the first period will be unfamiliar to most readers. The exception is Georgi Agabekov who published a book about his service in the Joint State Political Directorate, known by its Russian acronym OGPU, which was established in 1923 to persecute the opponents of the Bolsheviks.[a] Succeeding periods included many less-well-known defectors, particularly those who went to non-English-speaking countries. Although Riehle doesn't treat each case in detail, he does discuss the forms of intelligence most often obtained from defectors—documents, technical expertise, and operational case details—and the limitations on the shelf life of the knowledge of the defectors. He also comments on the motivations, working conditions, and the prevailing political circumstance that contributed to the defections. And very valuably, Riehle provides a table at the beginning of each period listing the defectors, including their true and cover names, where known, and other background data.

As to the Soviet intelligence services, military and civilian, Riehle draws on defector debriefings to get a unique assessment of their growth, organization, priorities, operating procedures and the Soviet views of the Western powers.

Soviet Defectors is an important contribution to the literature that will leave the concerned reader in a state of anticipation awaiting a companion volume covering defectors in the post-Stalin era.

Tunnel 29: The True Story of an Extraordinary Escape Beneath the Berlin Wall, by Helena Merriman. (Public Affairs, 2021) 318 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Joachim Rudolph was 80 when BBC broadcast journalist Helena Merriman climbed the eight floors to his Berlin apartment to begin a series of interviews about a tunnel he and his compatriots had dug under the Berlin Wall some 60 years earlier. Joachim, as she refers to him, had detailed memories of the event and of the accompanying circumstances that led to the successful escape of 29 East German citizens into West Berlin. *Tunnel 29* tells that story.

Merriman begins Joachim's story when he was six and living on a farm in eastern Germany. After a failed attempt to avoid the Russian army, he and his mother made it to what became East Berlin where he grew up. As a teenager

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a. Georgi Agabekov, *OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror* (Brentano's, 1931).

he augmented the family income by smuggling coffee and other luxuries from West to East Berlin. When the Wall went up and entry to West Berlin was denied, Joachim and some friends spent hours searching for a way to escape to the West. Remarkably, they were successful and Joachim became a West German citizen, attended university, and enjoyed limited rights to visit East Berlin, where his girlfriend and mother still resided. Soon Joachim was thinking of ways to help both to escape.

To accomplish his goal, he created an escape organization to consider the options. When members demanded their loved ones be included, a tunnel became the only practical solution. Merriman explains how a group of amateurs implemented their decision.

The first operational issue they had to deal with was security. Contacting potential escapees in the East ran the risk of alerting Stasi informers. Their solution was careful selection of personnel who knew how to construct a tunnel and others who were willing to dig one: Joachim met

both conditions. Then they set about securing financing and, with CIA help, eventually concluded an arrangement with NBC TV producer Reuven Frank—later president of NBC—on the condition that NBC cameramen be allowed to film the digging to document the operation for TV.

Tunnel 29 is a engrossing account of failure and success. The principal failure occurred when Joachim's crew was persuaded to stop digging their tunnel and start digging another that was compromised by a Stasi informer. The success story describes how they returned to the original dig, overcame construction problems and got their loved ones to the West. After debriefing by CIA and MI6 officers at the Marienfelde Refugee Camp in the US sector, the escapees begin their life in freedom.

Merriman concludes her story with a summary of how the principals reacted to life in the West. A moving and rare firsthand contribution.

The Unquiet Englishman: A Life of Graham Greene, by Richard Greene. (W.W. Norton & Company, 2020) 591 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

Richard Greene (RG) is a poet, biographer, and professor of English at the University of Toronto. His recent biography of Graham Greene (no relation) is an objective, yet friendly, chronological account of Greene's public and private life. After acknowledging the other biographies of Greene, RG justifies his efforts, which are based on "thousands of pages" of newly discovered documents and letters to Greene's "family, friends, publishers, agents, and close associates" to which RG gained access. (xiv) The result is a view of Greene amid several intersecting themes that begins with his family life, education, and search for a vocation at Oxford. After settling on a writing career, he supplemented marriage with several mistresses and an intense pursuit of Catholicism. These attributes become an integral part of the dogged travels that augmented his World War II service with MI6 and his career as a successful screen writer, journalist, and novelist.

Prior to joining MI6 with the help of his sister ,who worked there before him, Greene served in the Ministry of Information and as an air-raid warden during the Blitz. MI6 needed an officer with experience in West Africa and Greene had traveled there in the mid-1930s. Before his departure, he returned to Oxford for operational

training to support his cover as a military officer. After a tour in Freetown, Sierra Leone, Greene was reassigned to London in late 1943. There he worked for Kim Philby as a counterintelligence analyst. RG explores the lasting, though controversial, relationship that developed following Greene's writing the introduction to Philby's memoir and his visits to Philby in Moscow.

As was typical of Greene, he continued writing during the war and published *The Ministry of Fear*—a Nazi spy novel—in 1943. As is typical of RG, he uses Greene's books as chronological benchmarks while exploring his life and those who were a part of it, such as Ian Fleming and his brother Peter. Many of the best novels as viewed by both Greene and RG involve spies. This includes *The Quiet American* (1955), whose central character, Alden Pyle, is a CIA officer. Written long before the massive US military involvement of the 1960s, many viewed it as perceptive and it stirred controversy by making clear that Greene disliked the United States and its foreign policy, which he saw as a threat to the whole world. (xvi)

Greene drew on his own experience in MI6 and his travels to revolutionary Cuba for *Our Man In Havana* (1958),

which he thought was funny and which some later viewed as anticipating the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. One MI5 officer thought it revealed too much and recommended Greene "go to prison," but he was overruled. (297)

Adopting a more serious tone, *The Human Factor* (1978) is considered by many professionals to be Greene's best spy novel, and it is said to have been used in counterintelligence classes in Western agencies. Although some saw it as a version of the Philby saga, RG says it was not, despite obvious parallels. Each of these novels and many others were made into films as Greene became world famous.

One of Greene's most well-known writings was *The Third Man*. RG notes it was not a spy story and was first written as a screen play. Published later as a book, it lacked the film's most famous lines—"In Italy, for thirty years under the Borgias, they had warfare, terror, murder, and bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In Switzerland, they had brotherly love, they had five hundred years of democracy and peace—and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock." Orson Welles wrote those lines. RG points out that the cuckoo clock was invented in Germany. (185)

The Unquiet Englishman merges Greene's adventurous, interesting, and sometimes atrocious behavior to produce a valuable review of his literary legacy. It is a good read by any measure.

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Studies in Intelligence

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Afghan Napolean: The Life of Ahmad Shah Massoud, by Sandy Gall; *Swords of Lightning*, Mark Nutsch, Bob Pennington, and Jim DeFelice (66 3 [September 2022]), review essay by J.R. Seeger.

The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War, by Craig Whitlock (66 3 [September 2022]), reviewed by Graham Alexander.

The Black Banners Declassified: How Torture Derailed the War on Terror after 9/11, by Ali H. Soufan with Daniel Freedman (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.*

Disruption: Inside the Largest Counterrorism Investigation in History, by Aki Peritz (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by J.R. Seeger.

The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern Warfare, by Nicholas Mulder (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Thomas G. Coffey.

The Fourth Man: The Hunt for a KGB Spy at the Top of the CIA and the Rise of Putin's Russia, by Robert Baer (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

Getting To Know the President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates and Presidents-Elect 1952–2016, by John L. Helgerson (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World, by Benjamin R. Young (66 4 [December 2022]), reviewed by Yong Suk Lee.

The Perfect Police State: An Undercover Odyssey Into China's Terrifying Surveillance Dystopia of the Future, by Geoffrey Cain (66 3 [September 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

Putin, by Philip Short (66 4 [December 2022]), reviewed by J.E. Leonardson.

Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence, by Amy Zegart (66 1 [March 2022], reviewed by Hayden Peake.

Spymaster's Prism: The Fight Against Russian Aggression, by Jack Devine (IO Bookshelf, 66 4 [December 2022], reviewed by Hayden Peake.

Surveillance State: Inside China's Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control, by Josh Chin and Liza Lin (IO Bookshelf, 66 4 [December 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

*Reviews by Hayden Peake will be found in the Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf (IOB) section of each edition.

The World According to China, by Elizabeth C. Economy (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Jeffrey W.

Why Democracies Develop and Decline, by Michael Coppedge, et al. (eds.) (66 4 [December 2022]), reviewed by Anthony T. Sutton.

GENERAL

Between Five Eyes: 50 Years of Intelligence Sharing, by Anthony R. Wells (66 1 [March 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

Collective Discussion: Toward Critical Approaches to Intelligence as a Social Phenomenon, by Hager Ben Jaffel, et al. (66 3 [September 2022]), reviewed by Joseph Gartin.

Honey Trapped: Sex, Betrayal and Weaponized Love, by Henry R. Schlesinger (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

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Lying for Money: How Legendary Frauds Reveal the Workings of the World, by Dan Davies (IO Bookshelf, 66 4 [December 2022]), reviewed by J. E. Leonardson.

Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy, by Martin Indyk (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Alan Fisher.

The Recruiter: Spying and the Lost Art of American Intelligence, by Douglas London (66 1 [March 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

Spies on the Sidelines: The High-Stakes World of NFL Espionage, by Kevin Bryant (IO Bookshelf, 66 4 [December 2022]), reviewed by David A. Welker.

A Spy in Plain Sight: The Inside Story of the FBI and Robert Hanssen—America's Most Damaging Russian Spy, by Lis Wiehl (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

Stars and Spies: Intelligence Operations and the Entertainment Business, by Christopher Andrew and Julius Green (66 1 [March 2022]), reviewed by Kenneth Lasoen.

Three Dangerous Men: Russia China, Iran, and the Rise of Irregular Warfare, by Seth Jones; *Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias*, Stephen D. Biddle 66 2 [June 2022]), review essay by J.R. Seeger.

HISTORY

Agent Josephine: American Beauty, French Hero, British Spy, by Damien Lewis (IO Bookshelf, 66 4 [December 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

All Blood Runs Red: The Legendary Life of Eugene Bullard—Boxer, Pilot, Soldier, Spy, by Phil Keith with Tom Calvin (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

All the Frequent Trouble of Our Days: The True Story of the American Women at the Heart of the German Resistance to Hitler, by Rebecca Donner (66 1 [March 2022]), reviewed by Melissa Jane Taylor.

Break in The Chain—Intelligence Ignored: Military Intelligence in Vietnam and Why the Easter Offensive Should Have Turned Out Differently, by W.R. (Bob) Baker (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

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Britain's Plot To Kill Hitler: The True Story of Operation Foxley and SOE, by Eric Lee (IO Bookshelf, 66 4 [December 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

Capital of Spies: Intelligence Agencies in Berlin During the Cold War, by Sven Felix Kellerhoff & Bernd Von Kostka, trans. Linden Lyons (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

Captain Shakespear: Desert Exploration, Arabian Intrigue and the Rise of Ibn Sa'ud, by Alan Dillon (66 1 [March 2022]), reviewed by Daniel P. King.

Chile, the CIA and the Cold War: A Transatlantic Perspective, by James Lockhart (66 3 [September 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

Checkmate in Berlin: The Cold War Showdown that Shaped the Modern World, by Giles Milton (66 1 [March 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

The Cold War Wilderness of Mirrors: Counterintelligence and the U.S. and Soviet Military Liaison Missions, 1947–1990, by Aden C. Magee (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

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The Grey Men: Pursuing the Stasi Into the Present, by Ralph Hope (IO Bookshelf, 66 4 [December 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

Hitler's Spy Against Churchill: The Spy Who Died Out In The Cold, by Jan-William van den Braak (IO Bookshelf, 66 4 [December 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

How To Stage A Coup: And Ten Other Lessons From The World of Secret Statecraft, by Rory Cormac, (66 3 [September 2022]), reviewed by Hayden Peake.

International Brigade Against Apartheid: Secrets of the Peoples War that Liberated South Africa, by Ronnie Kasrils, ed. (66 3 [September 2022]), reviewed by Paul Kepp.

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Damascus Station: A Novel, by David McClosky (IO Bookshelf, 66 3 [September 2022]), reviewed by Graham Alexander.

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Spies in Canaan, by David Park (IO Bookshelf, 66 3 [September 2022]), reviewed by J.E. Leonardson.

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All the Old Knives, Prime Video (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by Joseph Gartin.

The Codebreaker, PBS: The American Experience (66 3 [September 2022]), reviewed by Randy Burkett.

The Courier, (66 1 [March 2022]), review essay by Randy Burkett

The Gray Man, Netflix (66 3 [September 2022]), reviewed by Mike R.

REDISCOVERED

HHhH, by Laurent Binet (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed by J.E. Leonardson.

Naples '44, by Norman Lewis (66 2 [June 2022]), reviewed, by Joseph Gartin.

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