

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

- I. The Sino-Soviet relationship has deteriorated to such an extent over the past ten years that we can describe the present situation as one of virtual divorce on grounds of incompatibility.
  - A. In fact, from its inception the alliance between the USSR and China bore many of the marks of a mere marriage of convenience.
    1. There were many signs that the marriage would be most unhappy.
    2. The partners had different backgrounds, they necessarily had different outlooks on major problems, and, as has become increasingly clear, their personal interests were ultimately incompatible.
  - B. To be sure, the Soviets and the Chinese were for a few years ~~on~~ relatively intimate terms.
    1. This was particularly so during the mid-1950's when cooperation in nuclear and missile technology was at its height.
  - C. The romance began to fade in the late 1950's.
    1. The Soviet leaders soon demonstrated a pronounced reluctance to assume the high

risks entailed in the aggressively belligerent policies tailored to China's aims and needs.

2. The Chinese, enraged by this unfaithfulness, this "sell-out", retaliated with all the bitterness of a woman scorned.

3. They openly accused the Soviets of the most treacherous and perverse kind of adultery, and named the US as corespondent.

D. There is not much chance that memories of old intimacies, or the prospect of new ones, will retie the marriage bonds.

E. The two partners are now at odds on virtually every matter of importance to Communist states.

F. Party, economic, military and even state relations between them have dwindled to the smallest possible minimum--and still be said to have relations at all.

II. The Two countries now can be regarded as engaged in a head-on struggle for leadership of the entire movement.

A. Because both regimes are headed by dedicated Communists, the dispute has been couched in doctrinal terms; each attempts to prove the heresy of the other by quoting from the scriptures of Marxism-Leninism.

B. This debate in dialectics has led some observers to believe that the argument was merely an "ideological" one, simply a matter of "counting the number of angels--or devils--that would fit on the head of a pin."

C. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The dispute, fundamentally, is one of deep national antagonisms, a power clash of opposing national interests. This is recognized by both sides and is expressed by their leaders in private. STATINTL

D. Some examples:

1. Chou En-Lai told [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that the dispute between the Soviet Union and China was actually a deep-rooted and permanent conflict of national interests. Chou told [REDACTED] that the Soviet Union wished to prevent China from becoming a great power. He had a list of grievances--Soviet failure to help the Chinese gain control of Manchuria at the end of World War II, the withdrawal of Soviet scientists and technicians from China in 1960, Moscow's failure to give economic aid--particularly food--in recent years during China's severe shortages. STATINTL

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2. Another example. This one, Soviet Sergei Mikoyan told [REDACTED] that the Soviet leaders, among them his father Anastas Mikoyan, felt that the dispute with China was irreconcilable, and that the struggle would be a protracted one.

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3. Another Soviet example. A high Soviet leader, [REDACTED] told his hearers that the present dispute is not a matter of theoretical argument. He said that it was a struggle for power and influence in Communist parties and governments worldwide. He said that the Chinese had been meddling in the affairs of other Communist countries.

III. I do not want to leave the impression that doctrinal or ideological issues are not an important part of the dispute. I do want to make the point that these doctrinal quibbles have tended to obscure the real argument--diametric differences over basic policies and interests. Couching the dispute in doctrinal terms has enabled the Chinese to pretend to be more Communist than the Soviets, and at the same time to

demand the right to lead the world movement. To give an example: Computers use binary symbols in their arguments--Communists use ideology.

A. You see, the Chinese made a real try--beginning in 1950 shortly after Stalin's death--to get for themselves an equal voice in the establishment of bloc policies. They wanted this so that Sino-Soviet bloc policies would support Chinese interests.

1. Actually, they never made it. But they created so much fuss and distracted the attention of the various Communist parties enough so that they caused a real split in the Communist world. As a result, two centers of doctrinal truth emerged and an opening was made for a multiplicity of interpretations by Communist parties and governments. No longer one monolithic way.

B. This has compounded the problem that has haunted Soviet leaders ever since Stalin's death.

1. Soviet policy makers, and the Chinese as well, now must take into account the interests of their satellites when they try to impose political and economic policies. The sheep no longer follow the commands of the shepherd blindly.

2. There are recent, and well publicized, examples: Rumania--refusal to subordinate its overall economic development CEMA planning. Also, its subsequent independent behavior; Cuba--refusal to soften its militant revolutionary plans for Latin America and its attempts to gain regional control of Communist parties there (remember Cuba's total economic dependence on the Soviet Union). North Vietnam--talking out of both sides of its mouth as it trys to get military and economic support from both China and the Soviet Union.

IV. We have now seen ten years of bitter history in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In the time that is available this morning it would be impossible for me--and probably boring for you--to cover this in detail. Instead, within the broad framework I have just sketched out, I will try to explore the depth of the dispute by looking carefully at three or four of the key areas in the conflict. After that, I will offer a brief appreciation of the current situation, and follow that with a short discussion of some of the implications of the break-up of the Sino-Soviet partnership.

V. One of the areas in which an early Soviet action vitally affected Chinese interests was the drastic Soviet cutback in 1960 of military aid and technical assistance. This left deep wounds which are still open.

A. In the summer of 1959, Khrushchev decided to make his now famous visit to the United States and to Camp David. This was his "peaceful coexistence" phase; you remember Chinese leaders correctly viewed this as an imminent danger to their interests. They responded by spilling out some of their simmering differences with the Soviet Union. They began a whispering campaign among Bloc parties with the aim of bringing pressure on the Soviet Union for a change of course.

1. The Soviets chose to strike back. At a meeting of all the ruling Communist parties at Bucharest in June 1960, the Soviet leaders organized a "surprise assault." They charged the Chinese with failure to follow the Soviet lead and urged the other delegates to tell the Chinese to fall in line. This whole operation was a flop. The Chinese refused to be cowed and they refused to knuckle under.

2. Khrushchev saw that stronger steps were needed. He knew that the Chinese needed Soviet aid badly. He thought that all he would have to do would be to suspend aid and the Chinese would fall right into line. (Like suspending your wife's allowance.) In August 1960, without warning, he pulled out the Soviet technicians then in China-- about 1300 of them. At the same time, he canceled about 150 contracts for heavy industrial and military projects.
  - a. The Soviets made no effort to soften the effects of the abrupt withdrawal and many technicians walked off with project blueprints.
  - b. At one major hydro-electric project, for example, only one Soviet generator was ever delivered, and it was so seriously damaged when the Chinese attempted to install it themselves that one Chinese official later commented that the whole dam might as well be blown up.
  - c. This treatment did not get the desired results, however. The Chinese acted like



Chinese on this occasion--not like chastised Communist cadres. They merely got more grim and determined about facing the Soviets down.

- B. What Khrushchev did accomplish, however, was to give the Chinese a nasty setback on their industrial and military development programs. China's economic plans had assumed continuing Soviet technical help and the pullout therefore collapsed Peking's entire timetable for industrialization.
1. The full extent of this planned-for aid program has never been revealed by the Chinese or the Soviets. We know, however, that it was a comprehensive and significant program.
  2. It aimed at giving China the capability of producing a broad range of modern weapons, including nuclear weapons; delivery vehicles such as jet bombers and guided missile submarines; and air defense weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles and supersonic fighters.
  3. China probably would have been producing all these items, in the early 1960's, if the Soviet Union had not renounced its commitments.

- a. Now, however, China is not expected to achieve a significant nuclear weapons system capability until 1970 or later.
  - b. Limited production of Soviet-designed aircraft and naval ships is just now being resumed, and it is not based on the most modern Soviet designs.
4. During the heyday of Soviet aid, China apparently had access to the latest Soviet military designs in virtually every field except nuclear weapons. Even in the field of nuclear energy, a substantial foundation was provided by the Soviets.
- a. For example, the uranium used in China's nuclear tests is believed to have been produced in a small gaseous diffusion plant that had been designed and largely equipped by the Soviets before 1960.
  - b. Some other key nuclear and military facilities which were under construction before the withdrawal of Soviet aid include a plutonium reactor at Paotou; a nuclear weapons production site near Lake Kokonor; aircraft factories at Harbin, Mukden, Peiping, Chengtu, and Sian; a submarine

shipyard at Wuchang; a missile test range at Shuangchengtzu; and a rocket engine test center at Choukoutien, not far from Peking.

c. While there has been progress at all these facilities, it is clear that the progress has been slow and painful in comparison with what it would have been if the Soviets had kept their promises.

C. Actions taken by the Soviet Union toward other countries in the same period added insult to this injury. The Soviets began to supply to such countries as Egypt, Indonesia, and later India, military equipment of a type the Kremlin refused to give China.

1. These countries received the supersonic MIG-21, surface-to-air missiles, and other equipment in quantities that China cannot match to this day.

2. The Chinese cite instances such as these when they sneer at Soviet offers of economic aid to other countries, pointing up the "untrustworthiness" of the Russians, saying that they are a "broken reed" that should not be leaned on. Chou En-lai in early 1964 used this line effectively with leftist leaders in Africa.

(Pause)

VI. Another problem area in the Sino-Soviet relationship I want to spell out for you in some detail has to do with the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance worked out between Mao and Stalin after long and difficult negotiations in 1950.

A. Alliances of this sort have always been a cause of trouble between states. The chief reason is that each party interprets the mutual obligations imposed by the treaty from his own point of view--to meet his own interests.

1. Bismarck put the problem succinctly in a comment on the alliance between Prussia and the Austrian Empire before World War I. The Iran Chancellor remarked that in every such partnership one nation is the horse while the other is the rider. He said his main problem was to make sure that Prussia remained in the saddle.

B. The Chinese leaders all along have tried--through the Sino-Soviet treaty--to harness Soviet power so that it will further their own large ambitions. Specifically, they have tried to use Russian military strength as a shield behind which they could weaken and erode the US military presence

along the Chinese eastern shore on the Pacific.

1. The Sino-Soviet treaty was fairly solid during the early years of the alliance--during the Korean war and up to the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1958. However, strains had begun to appear before then.
2. After Sputnik I (1957) the Chinese became cocky over Communist military and technical success. The Russians already had the bomb and now they had beat the US into space.
  - a. In November 1957, the Chinese began to assert that the "East wind prevails over the West"--a slogan which sums up the arrogant certainty of Communist success which was increasingly evident in Peiping's propaganda and behavior.
  - b. It was in this cocky mood that the Chinese launched their Commune Movement and the "leap forward"--touted as sure-fire shortcuts to Communism--in the summer of 1958.
3. The thinking behind these radical domestic programs--criticized by the Russians as unrealistic and irresponsible--was reflected

in Peiping's decision to precipitate the Taiwan Straits crisis in August-September 1958.

- a. Chinese military pressure on the offshore islands was a clear challenge to the US, and involved risk of countermeasures which would bring the mutual assistance treaty into play.
- b. Moscow responded to Chinese calls for support without enthusiasm. Probably, the Soviets also admonished the Chinese against going too far. We know this much in retrospect. Five years later, the Chinese charged openly that Soviet help in 1958 had been too little and too late.
- c. Khrushchev's statement which he made in September 1958--that an attack on China would be regarded by the Russians as aggression against the Soviet Union--actually supports the Chinese charge. The statement was made only after the crisis was past its peak, when it was fairly clear that little risk was involved.

- C. The mutual assistance treaty received a second heavy blow in the fall of 1959, during Khrushchev's visit to Peiping for celebration of Communist China's tenth anniversary in October.
1. The Soviet leader had just concluded talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David. Khrushchev told the Chinese that "Communists of the Soviet Union consider it our sacred duty and primary task" to end the Cold War and guarantee the "triumph of the cause of peace."
  2. During his visit he advised the Chinese to seek a "peaceful solution" to the Taiwan problem--tantamount to accepting a two Chinas situation. The Chinese later declared bitterly that "the Chinese Communist Party has not forgotten this and never will."
  3. All in all, Khrushchev's meetings with Mao were so stormy no final communique was ever issued and the leaders argued bitterly over Chinese actions along the Sino-Indian border.
    - a. When Khrushchev was preparing to board his plane for home, Mao imperiously ignored

Khrushchev's extended hand. He shook it finally--only when it was extended a second time.

D. As Sino-Soviet relations worsened across the board and the exchanges of insults and invective between Peiping and Moscow mounted, it became increasingly clear that the mutual assistance treaty had lost most of its significance and value. By the end of 1962 the Chinese were implying that it was a worthless document. In 1963 they said so openly and flatly.

1. The Chinese representative at the anti-atomic bomb conference in Tokyo in August 1963 angrily rejected a claim by the Soviet delegate that Russian nuclear weapons provided a protective umbrella for Peiping. He said such remarks were an "insult to the Chinese people," who had relied mainly on their own strength to discourage the US from attacking them.

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2. A senior Chinese official told [REDACTED]

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that as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute the mutual assistance treaty could now be regarded as a "dead letter."



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3. During an interview [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Chinese Foreign Minister ~~SCA~~INTL

Yi declared that Soviet protection was "worthless."

4. These remarks echoed statements in Chinese propaganda which referred derisively to Soviet strength as a "tin-pointed spear" and called the Russians "untrustworthy cowards."

E. For their part, the Soviets have replied in kind, warning the Chinese publicly that Peiping did not hold a blank check on Russian military support in all contingencies.

VII. Another problem area in the Sino-Soviet relationship that I want to dwell on for a few moments involves the 4,000-mile long common Soviet-Chinese border. As mutual defense treaty declined in value their border problems increased.

A. The 4,000-mile Sino-Soviet frontier had been one of the world's quietest borders from 1949 to 1959, but serious tensions began developing in 1960. These tensions are continuing, and the border now looms to each protagonist as a new area that must be watched, protected, and bolstered with additional security measures.

- B. In the spring of 1962, the USSR encouraged the flight of some 50,000 Chinese nationals--ethnic Kazakhs and Uighurs--from Sinkiang Province into the Soviet Union and granted them asylum.
1. Refugee and defector reports leave little doubt that in early 1962 the Soviets spread the story among border tribes that living conditions were much better on the Soviet side and that they would be welcomed by Soviet authorities.
  2. Caught by surprise, the Chinese authorities did not immediately react. By late May 1962, however, the Chinese began to enforce new security controls, and no further border crossing incidents have been reported. The Chinese also closed down Soviet consulates that had been the centers for the subversion.
- C. The Chinese Communists have since tightened security on their far western frontier by sending in additional frontier guards.
1. They have also moved in "agricultural troops"--mostly demobilized soldiers--to settle key stretches of the border. Native inhabitants

have been systematically moved back about 20 miles from the border.

2. This has resulted in the kind of cordon sanitaire that one finds along frontiers between Communist and non-Communist states.
3. Secret Sino-Soviet talks to settle disputed portions of the existing boundary were held in Peiping in 1964.
4. We know from diplomatic sources that the talks broke down completely. While the Soviets appeared willing to reach some kind of a settlement if there were some give and take, the Chinese were adamant.
5. The Soviets wanted to keep the discussions to the few areas still undemarcated. From the outset, however, the Chinese insisted on a Soviet acknowledgement that the existing border is a result of unjust treaties imposed upon China by Czarist Russia.
6. The Chinese motive is to have a shining example of Soviet "imperialist" ambitions that they can use when talking to new nations in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere.

VIII. Competition for influence in the underdeveloped world is another problem area in the Sino-Soviet relationship. Throughout the underdeveloped world, Peiping is trying to undercut Soviet influence and to substitute its own extremist views.