

POLITICAL AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF JAMMING BY USSR OF VOA/BBC BROADCASTS

This brought out at meeting in CIA, at which is present from ORZ, ISD/H, USA, State, represented.

OSI double check

The jamming of VOA and BBC Russian language broadcasts by USSR transmitters should be considered as a long range tactic <sup>which the Kremlin will continue to use</sup> directly implementing <sup>the</sup> basic Soviet strategy of preventing Western oriented information from reaching Soviet ears. The timing of the <sup>? just</sup> ~~initial~~ full-scale operation (April 24) was probably motivated by an immediate desire to withhold from the Soviet population any knowledge of the phenomenal success of the airlift and the diplomatic surrender on the Berlin blockade, and to give the Kremlin a monopoly on the interpretation of events in the CFM meeting. However, the complexities of a jamming operation large enough to cover the 110 frequencies on which VOA and BBC are currently transmitting, undoubtedly necessitate a large capital investment of money, men and material not readily available or quickly assembled. The USSR began interfering with VOA broadcasts well over a year ago, particularly in the Far East where the techniques for the present large-scale operation were probably perfected. This initial interference was continued <sup>in varying degree</sup> ~~sporadically~~,

<sup>now</sup> ~~think we were not quite this visionary~~ indicating that the Soviet Government was preparing an intricate and widespread jamming system, employing <sup>both (+ Russian)</sup> German war time techniques and both foreign and <sup>? British, German</sup> domestic equipment.

The present effort requires the USSR to reallocate some technicians developed by Germans during WWII and

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not necessary  
and domestic

of the transmitters used for their own foreign broadcasts in order to cover

the necessary frequencies during those periods of VOA/BBC full-scale broadcast-

ing, a fact which probably indicates they are presently jamming at capacity. *that any future increase in the number of jammers will mean a decrease in the total number of transmitters available for regular broadcasts.*

Moreover, in order to jam those VOA/BBC frequencies operating near their own,

*especially in the Moscow area.* they have been willing to interfere with Soviet internal programs. *which programs? To what extent?*

The very use of jamming has given VOA and BBC wide advertisement and

probably has tended to increase the reportedly great curiosity of the Soviet

citizen in the content of these programs. Estimates are that *in the Moscow area, is sometimes* ~~the~~ jamming

is *98%* effective, *but this percentage which constantly varies is undoubtedly* best ~~is~~ *88%* effective, ~~and even this effectiveness probably pertains to~~

*flows away from the major cities, complete* ~~limited areas,~~ inasmuch as ~~total~~ obliteration of these programs appears impossible.

*human error (and elimination of human error)* without additional equipment, the Kremlin's willingness to risk an intensifica-

tion of curiosity on the part of Soviet citizens is an illustration of the

regime's desperate obsession to control all sources of information. Since VOA

and BBC represented the greatest breach in this control, the Kremlin was moved

to undertake the present *(degree of) hardly* "limited" interference, and will certainly be intent

on increasing this interference to as close to 100% efficiency as possible.

It seems logical, furthermore, that jamming will be further extended to

include the VOA/BBC satellite broadcasts when technically feasible. In this

*Language*

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no jamming

no jamming

see  
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substituted

human error

respect, trial runs have already been made on transmissions to Poland and

✓ Hungary.

*With satellite operation they can get effect; without it, it will be a different matter.*

At present, the maximum effect on US security is the serious reduction

in the presentation of the Western viewpoint on the internal and foreign policies

of the USSR. There are far-reaching military implications of even greater

importance to US security, which are brought out by the comparative success

communications, including telecommunications and radio-telephone

of the Kremlin in disrupting radio broadcasts. Jamming of radio frequencies in

time of war greatly complicates military operations, and present indications

*Coupled with the advantages stemming from their large geographic base*

of Soviet proficiency in this field are of prime importance to US military

planners.

*but not same facilities. Seaman could not jam by area because of space. Note: Soviet ally, radio telecommunications (tel. etc.)*

*was inhibited in more code at the speed of 12 w/min. This for there has been no Russian interference discerned with this. Not true*

*It has been interfered with and furthermore this is not pertinent to political + security implications.*



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